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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the 'economics of food safety'.  The discussion outlines a 
theoretical 'equilibrium' model of food safety.  This is used as a basis for 
understanding the concept of 'market failure' in the food safety context.  Three 
specific market failures are identified.  These are risk perception, information 
asymmetry and social costs and benefits.  It is suggested that the government 
needs to intervene to correct these market failures.  This leads into the main 
research undertaken as part of the thesis.  The core issue is the extent to which 
government intervention is demanded by the public. 
 
The government intervenes through the provision of public goods which in this 
context is the work undertaken through the Food Standards Agency.  To estimate 
the demand for food safety activities, undertaken by the Agency, it is necessary to 
elicit the public's willingness to pay for food safety.  The thesis uses a stated 
preference technique, contingent valuation, to try and estimate the demand, and 
so the willingness to pay for the 'food safety public good'.  It is suggested that the 
technique is most appropriate for the valuation of common cases of food poisoning.  
Methodological problems still arose with a restricted safety concept.  In particular, 
part-whole bias where the relatively narrow scope of the question was overlooked.  
Respondents tended to generalise to include, in their valuation of the food safety 
issue, more serious forms of food safety hazard.   
 
The research suggests that public understanding of the food system is vital for the 
success of such a contingent valuation exercise.  However, such knowledge 
appears to be limited, given respondent's disconnection from farming, food 
manufacturing and to a lesser extent food retailing.  Thus the public's limited 
knowledge of the food system is a major constraint on the usefulness of contingent 
valuation in this area. 
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Introduction to the research study 
 
In the past 15 years, in the United Kingdom, the significance of food safety policy 
has grown.  Food safety 'emergencies' ranging from salmonella in eggs in 1989 
and in particular BSE in 1996, to dioxin in 1999 have led to a greater emphasis, in 
government policy, on food safety.  In 2000 The Food Standards Agency was 
established to improve the co-ordination and communication of food safety policy.  
It aimed to provide independent recommendations into food policy to balance the 
needs of different stakeholders.   
 
Perhaps the political imperative to restore credibility in decision making meant that 
less emphasis was placed on economic issues, such as the costs to the economy 
of food poisoning.  The Food Standards Agency has estimated the annual cost of 
all food poisoning at £350 million (Food Standards Agency 2000b). 
 
The general purpose of the research is to find out how much public demand there 
is for activities, undertaken by the Food Standards Agency.  The specific aim is to 
assess the usefulness of economic valuation techniques in the food safety context.  
Such techniques measure the benefits of particular policies in monetary terms.  
There are two major questions: 
 
1)  Can a monetary valuation be placed on particular food safety measures? 
 
If such an amount can be obtained, then there is a secondary question: 
 
2)  To what extent can such valuations contribute to policy making? 
 
These two questions will be returned to at the end of the thesis, to find out how well 
they can be answered. 
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Preface 
 
This section outlines the structure of the thesis.   
 
The theoretical foundations of the thesis are outlined in part 1.  Chapter 1 
begins with a discussion of a conventional demand and supply model applied to 
food safety.  This is to illustrate how, in principle, there could be an equilibrium 
level of food safety.  Chapter 1 then relaxes this assumption and suggests that 
food safety can be under and over supplied which is characterised as 'market 
failure'.  The social costs and benefits which fall outside the operation of the market 
are also examined. 
 
Chapter 2 explores the theme of public goods which are needed to correct the 
market failures previously outlined.  Economic theory suggests that governments 
do not know how much intervention to provide.  These public goods are not bought 
and sold like commodities in conventional private markets.  Therefore government 
policy makers do not have the 'market signals' from which to make decisions about 
the quantity of public goods that are demanded. 
 
The methodology for the research study is outlined in part 2.  A method is 
needed to find out how much of a public good is desired.  The method adopted in 
this research entails the public being asked how much of the food safety public 
good they want, or how much they are willing to pay for public goods.  In other 
words, the public are asked to state their preferences for public goods.   
 
Chapter 3 examines the differences between revealed and stated preference.  
Revealed preference is when there is indirect guidance from the market, as to the 
valuation of public goods.  Stated preference is where the public is asked to 
directly value a public good when it is compared to other goods and services.  
Chapter 4 studies variations between alternative stated preference methods.  It is 
argued that the contingent valuation method is an appropriate technique for the 
valuation of public goods.   
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Chapter 5 provides detail on the chosen approach including an examination of 
elicitation formats [e.g. open and closed-ended questions] and payment methods 
[e.g. taxes or market prices].  There is also a comprehensive discussion on 
property rights and 'part-whole bias'.  Chapter 6 examines how issues related to 
food safety could affect the valuation exercise.  In particular, the concepts of risk 
perception and information asymmetry are relevant.  Chapter 6 also uses a 
discussion of environmental valuation to inform the research.  An examination of 
broader food safety concerns [including the food supply chain] is also provided to 
focus the investigation. 
 
Part 3 details the practical research that was undertaken for this thesis.  The 
preliminary research is outlined in Chapter 7.  This stage of the enquiry was about 
which food safety issue would be most appropriate for valuation.  This first stage 
was developed, with the discussion in chapter 6, so that the safety concept for 
valuation was restricted to common cases of food poisoning.  These instances of 
food poisoning are confined only to inadequate food hygiene practices in the food 
outlets where the food is sold.  Chapter 8 describes the piloting of the contingent 
valuation questionnaire. This stage of the research was about how to devise a 
question for the purposes of the food hygiene valuation concept.  Chapter 9 
outlines the outcome of the final questionnaire.  This stage is the main empirical 
study which attempts to estimate the value of a food safety policy to deal with 
common cases of food poisoning. 
 
Part 4 provides a discussion based on the research.  Chapter 10 details 
qualitative responses from the empirical study.  In particular, some of the reasons 
that respondents gave for being willing (or unwilling) to pay are discussed.  Food 
safety issues, such as property rights, trust in the food system and understanding 
of the food supply chain are examined.  Chapter 11 provides a cost benefit 
analysis based on the results of the main study.  A relevant concern is that there is 
no ‘real’ market data with which to compare the contingent valuation results.  
Finally, in chapter 12, there are some conclusions on the main food safety issues 
that have been raised in the thesis. 
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Part 1:  Background to the study 
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Chapter 1:  The market for food safety 
 
1.1. Introduction to the ‘market’ for food safety 
 
There are two main concepts to be addressed in this chapter.  First, the notion of 
the ideal market under perfect competition, where a theoretical equilibrium amount 
of food safety can be achieved; second, the concept of food safety not being an 
absolute goal is introduced. 
 
Economic trade-offs are about the allocation of scarce resources between 
alternative uses.  More formally, “economics is the science which studies human 
behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses” (Robbins 1935).  The “end” to be sought is a reduction in death 
and human suffering caused by food borne disease.  The scarce means which 
have alternative uses are the “vast and varied” resources available to society; 
these include the scarce skills of food scientists and food technologists” (Swinbank 
1993:84).  Food safety is the purpose to which some of these resources could be 
devoted. 
 
In this context, food safety can be defined as “the inverse of food risk, the 
probability of not suffering some hazard from consuming the food in question” 
(Henson and Traill 1993:153).  Hazard is defined as the severity of an adverse 
impact.  Risk is defined as the probability of the hazard occurring (Ritson and Li 
Wei 1998:253).  It is argued that consumers are willing, theoretically at least, to 
trade off cost against safety.  “There is a willingness of individuals to accept a 
degree of food risk in exchange for other attributes” (Ritson and Li Wei 1998:254).  
Thus safety may not be demanded fully when taste, the appearance of the food or 
price are favourable.  For example, unpasteurised milk and soft boiled eggs have 
been purchased despite reservations over safety.   
 
The trading off of safety against other food attributes can be explained by 
considering the demand and supply of food safety.  “Food safety can be regarded 
as a good like any other, with supply and demand interacting to determine a 
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market clearing price.  The demand for food safety is determined by consumers 
willingness to pay for additional safety, reflecting the value placed upon the 
benefits that they derive e.g. reduced pain and suffering, longer life expectancy 
etc”  (Henson and Traill 1993:153). 
 
Swinbank (1993:86) explains how demand for food safety may increase with 
greater affluence.  “If real income increases, and the demand curve shifts to the 
right then a new market equilibrium will be determined which will involve a higher 
level of food safety and a higher price”.   To elaborate “as wages increase, 
consumers have higher opportunity costs of time.  This means that the costs of 
illness ... are greater and the productivity losses to society are higher for those with 
higher wages.  More affluent individuals and societies will demand a higher level of 
food safety and will be willing to pay for a reduction in health risks” (Kinsey 
1993:170-1). 
 
Moreover, in an affluent society like Britain, food safety can be seen as price 
inelastic.  “Beyond a minimum income level when an adequate diet can be 
afforded, food safety, certainly for life threatening conditions, is likely to show the 
characteristics of a price inelastic good with consumers willing to pay a sizeable 
price premium for a product they perceive to be “safer” (Swinbank 1993:86).  
Organic food could be seen as a price inelastic good with sellers able to pass on 
higher prices if consumers believe that it is “safer”, than conventional food. 
 
1.2. Food Safety cannot be an ‘absolute goal’ 
 
Swinbank (1993:86) outlines why increasing the supply of food safety increases 
the cost.  “The provision of safer food will require the use of more resources: 
greater selectivity in choosing raw materials, more hygienic handling procedures, 
better chill-chain facilities etc”.  Alternatively, it could be the number of inspections 
per unit of food produced that increases marginal cost (Kinsey 1993:170).  The 
marginal cost of additional food safety is likely to rise; as society moves towards 
the elusive, but unobtainable, goal of absolute safety. The result is that the 
marginal costs of each additional unit of “safety” could reach very high levels 
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(Swinbank 1993:86).  As marginal costs increase consumers will be increasingly 
unwilling to pay for extra 'units' of food safety (Swinbank 1993:86).  "It will only be 
profitable for industry to supply safety up to the level at which consumers are 
willing to value it".  This achieves “an optimal amount of safety” (Ritson and Li Wei 
1998:255).  In other words, the demand and supply of food safety are in equilibrium.  
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Nevertheless, if food safety becomes increasingly costly to provide, i.e. marginal 
cost is greater than marginal benefit, then it would become sensible to spend 
money elsewhere.  The corollary is that food safety is not an absolute goal but is 
competing with other public and private interests for resources (Ritson and Li Wei 
1998:255). 
 
To return to the equilibrium model of food safety, theoretical assumptions have to 
be made.  It must be assumed that food risk can be measured and observed 
clearly; and that consumers know how much food safety they want.  This 'amount' 
of safety will then be supplied by industry.  The theoretical assumption would be of 
perfect competition with market participants being perfectly informed (Swinbank 
1993b:16).  If this was the case “there would be no need to know what the 
aggregate costs and benefits of food safety amount to.  The market, through the 
interplay of demand and supply, would automatically deliver the optimum level of 
food safety” (Swinbank 1993:91).  However, assumptions of perfect competition 
are unrealistic as a ‘real’ market is likely "to be characterised by a small number of 
dominant [oligopolistic] sellers and less than perfectly informed buyers" (Swinbank 
1993:87).  If this is the case then the industry may under-supply food safety 
because consumers are unable to tell whether too little safety has been provided.  
Nevertheless, “there is some reason to believe that food safety in particular and 
quality in general will be supplied by the market e.g. through branding” (Swinbank 
1993:87) 
 
1.3. The over and under supply of food safety 
 
However, branding could lead to an over-supply of food safety.  A market solution 
to the issue of how much food safety is needed could provide “too much” food 
safety.  Swinbank (1993:88) provides an example: “for certain products, such as 
canned goods, susceptible however remotely, to a 'dread effect' like death from 
botulism, the market disciplines can be severe; and under such circumstances 
companies will go to extreme lengths to protect the good name of their brands”.  
Food companies may wish to protect themselves from “food terrorists” who may 
threaten to poison their food (Swinbank 1993:88).  In some instances the market 
  
 
 
 
21 
over-emphasizes food borne disease risks and this leads to over investment in 
food safety by companies.  Moreover, media coverage of food contamination may 
cause consumers to overestimate the damage from the consumption of a product 
(Segerson 1999:63). 
 
In other instances “the market under reacts and produces too low a level of food 
safety”.  For example “in other parts of the food system where branded products 
are not so prevalent and the dread effect of contracting food borne disease not so 
marked, the market mechanism might not bite so deeply e.g. salmonella in eggs 
before Edwina Currie’s statement”  (Swinbank 1993:88-9). 
 
These examples show that the theoretical equilibrium model of food safety 
although providing valuable guidance is unrealistic.  The value of the classical 
demand and supply model is that it can “assess impacts of actual or proposed 
regulatory changes that affect market supply, such as a ban on a pesticide or some 
other supply restricting action.  A typical regulatory action that restricts supply will 
shift the supply curve to the left causing a rise in price.  The size of the price impact 
depends on the responsiveness (elasticity) of the quantity demanded.  The less 
responsive (inelastic) the demand relationship, the greater will be the impact on 
market price; and the greater will be the impact on consumers relative to 
producers” (Caswell ed. 1991: 5,6,11).  If it is assumed that frequently there is a 
lack of available substitutes to food conventionally grown with pesticides, then 
consumers will face an inelastic demand curve.  The impact of a pesticide tax 
would then be borne mostly by consumers. 
 
The two practical examples given show why the market for food safety is not in 
equilibrium and why government intervention may be needed.  It is stated that 
(Swinbank 1993b:19) “those seeking to justify state intervention on the grounds of 
“market failure” need a high standard of proof”.  Perhaps, the two examples above 
are instances of such proof given that “the market cannot be relied upon 
automatically to provide the desired amount of food safety” (Ritson and Li Wei 
1998:255).   
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Market failure can also be understood as the ‘goods’ that markets fail to produce, 
such as a reduced food borne disease burden on the Health Service, because no 
one [in the food industry] finds it in their interest to produce them.  This is because 
the cost of producing the 'goods' can never be completely recovered in profits.  
Consequently, "there is a divergence between private and socially optimal levels of 
food safety” (Henson and Traill 1993:153).  There is a difference between the 
demand for food safety from a consumer and the need for food safety from society 
in general.  This argument is discussed in the next section. 
 
1.4. Social Costs and Benefits 
 
1.4.1. Definition of social costs and benefits (externalities) 
 
This section discusses externalities which is an example of market failure.  It 
“arises whenever an individual’s production or consumption decision directly 
affects the production or consumption of others; other than through market prices” 
(Begg et al.  1984:334). 
 
Social costs, in the context of food safety, can be understood as the expense 
“which falls outside the individual food consumer” (Ritson and Li Wei 1998: 257).  
Ill health which results from food consumption imposes costs upon society.  These 
costs are external to the private decisions that are made about what is an 
acceptable level of food safety (Henson and Traill 1993:159). 
 
In a positive context, information available on food safety for the consumer, “yields 
benefits to society as a whole (because there is less of a burden on the NHS and 
so the taxpayer)” (Griffith et. al. 1999:8).  This is in addition to the private benefits 
accruing to the individual who pays for the safety information.  These social 
benefits which result from the public good characteristics (see chapter 2) of 
information are not adequately taken into account in the marketplace and therefore 
the market for food safety information is likely to be under supplied. 
 
1.4.2. Externalities associated with an individual purchasing unsafe food 
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Social costs can be divided into tangible and intangible costs.  Tangible social 
costs include broader losses to government such as “state funded medical and 
hospital expenses above those directly borne by the sufferer” (Swinbank 1993:90).  
In the context of outbreaks of disease such as salmonella “the expense of 
investigation and the follow up (studies) of affected individuals” is also relevant 
(Sockett 1993:117).  Moreover, if social costs are seen as implications beyond the 
consumer then there could be “costs to be incurred by sectors of the food industry 
when illness is associated with a particular type of food or product.  These may 
include loss of product confidence by consumers, recall and destruction of a 
contaminated product” (Sockett 1993:117).  Also there are other measurable costs 
to industry in general; for example losses in production if workers are ill through 
food poisoning (Swinbank 1993:89). 
 
Intangible social costs include the loss of leisure and distress to others, close to the 
individual, such as friends and family (Swinbank 1993:90).  However, it is more 
difficult and contentious to evaluate intangible costs e.g. loss of leisure (Ritson and 
Li Wei 1998:257).  Moreover, the loss of life is particularly fraught because, 
potentially, there is a paradoxical situation where death is ‘less costly’ than major 
illness.  This is because death may result in lower health treatment costs. 
 
1.4.3. The social benefit (or cost) of a policy to correct the externality 
 
The previous analysis suggests that it would be worthwhile to consider intervention 
so that more food safety is provided.  For example, environmental health officers 
could be employed to make sure food outlets provide clean premises.  This is not 
just to try and make sure that food customers do not become ill, but also to reduce 
the health costs to society.  If the tangible and intangible costs could be reduced 
then it would be beneficial to society.  However, such a benefit would need to 
outweigh the cost of say an environmental health employment initiative.  The 
tangible costs could attract a “direct monetary measure” (Ritson and Li Wei 
1998:257) and so theoretically could be included in such a cost benefit analysis. 
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However, intangible costs present a challenge to economists.  “The quantification 
of intangible costs is problematic involving complex methodologies based upon 
contingencies (or estimates) which are abstract from the real world” (Henson and 
Traill 1993:159).  For example, it may be difficult to ask consumers to ‘value’ the 
cost of lost leisure time, if they theoretically happened to suffer from a rare case of 
food poisoning.  Thus, a cost benefit analysis would be difficult to calculate 
because of the problem with the measurement of intangible costs. 
 
Finally, decision making is not just about reducing externalities or correcting the 
market failure.  This is because a policy to reduce externalities is not costless.  
There is a cost to government of intervention and there is also a cost to business.  
The cost to business of complying with regulation, introduced by government, is an 
expense which would not exist in the free market (Swinbank 1993:91).  Food 
regulation will lead to additional costs to the food industry, (and so consumers) 
above what would have been incurred in a free market.  There are industry costs of 
“determining, enforcing and complying with regulations” (Swinbank 1993:91).  
Moreover, there are distributional issues namely who pays for the regulations.  
Taxpayers, the food industry e.g. employees and shareholders in growing, 
processing or distributing companies, or consumers in higher prices, could all bear 
the costs of regulation (Swinbank 1993:91). 
 
1.5.  Summary of chapter one 
 
This chapter has shown that the concept of a market equilibrium for food safety is 
not realistic.  Indeed, equilibrium has rarely been observed in real life (Soros 
1998:36).  Nevertheless, the idealised model of equilibrium is useful because it 
illustrates what is not a desired outcome; attempts to achieve absolute safety at 
extremely high marginal costs. 
 
However, without intervention food safety may be undersupplied.  This is because, 
the self interest of the market may not cause societal benefits to emerge; to an 
optimum level.  State intervention could help correct the under-supply of food 
safety.  One of the aims of the thesis is to find out how much intervention is needed.  
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To understand this concept it is necessary to look at the role of 'public goods' in 
market economies which is the topic of chapter two. 
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Chapter 2: Public goods and state intervention 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
“A public good is a good that, even if consumed by one person, can still be 
consumed by other people” (Begg et. al. 1984:351).  The main aspects are that “it 
is possible for one person to consume without reducing the amount available for 
someone else and it is impossible to exclude anyone from consumption except at a 
prohibitive cost” (Begg et.  al. 1984:351).  Food safety is a public good when it is 
difficult to exclude people from its consumption.  In many cases it is not possible to 
regulate so that various levels of safety are attached to different products (Ritson 
and Wei Mai 1998:256).  Consequently, people are unable to buy different 
‘amounts’ of safety.  Thus, if the government is going to intervene then the public 
will expect consistent standards.  “In these circumstances the cost (of say 
regulation) has to be shared among all consumers (when added to price as an 
industry cost) or shared by all taxpayers, when public expenditure is involved” 
(Ritson and Wei Mai 1998:256). 
 
However, food safety is not a pure public good, like national defence.  This is 
because with defence it is not possible to opt out of the public provision.  Military 
spending entails that every member of the public “necessarily consumes the same 
quantity, namely whatever quantity is supplied in aggregate” (Begg et. al. 
1984:352).  However, this is not the case with food safety.  People, who eat out 
less, may use less of the public good than others; that is, they do not benefit so 
much from say the monitoring of food premises.  Also, food safety is not a pure 
public good because surveillance of the food industry is only 'modifying' the market.  
It is providing ‘enforcement’ of food safety regulations additional to work already 
undertaken by the private sector.  Thus, one of the debates is how far state 
intervention is needed in addition to industry safety measures. 
 
One of the issues in economics is the extent to which public goods, such as food 
safety regulation, should be funded.  This presents a challenge because when 
‘food safety’ is supplied to all the population, then everyone can benefit regardless 
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of whether they are willing to pay or not.  Due to the public nature of the good it will 
be provided irrespective of whether an individual demands it or not.  Given that 
people can benefit without paying directly then they could be getting a ‘free ride’.  
In common, with many public programmes, some people may be receiving more 
value from the public good than they are willing to pay for. 
 
Free riding can occur because of the inability to exclude people from the 
consumption of public goods.  Since people benefit simultaneously from the given 
capacity of a public good (whatever is supplied, is supplied in aggregate) then it 
follows that the marginal cost of the collective benefit will be zero.  “The marginal 
cost, to the public, remains zero even though the marginal factor cost, with respect 
to variations in capacity of the good, is positive” (Mishan 1981:434).  In other words, 
the marginal factor cost of food regulation increases, e.g. with the employment of 
more environmental health officers.  With marginal cost remaining zero but 
marginal factor cost increasing with the size of the public good; free riding 
becomes more of a problem with greater investment in public goods.  This makes 
the additional funding of state intervention more of a challenge. 
 
There is a case for intervention as there are reasons for food regulation being 
supplied by the public sector.  The difficulty of discovering the value people place 
on public goods could be one reason for food safety being located in the state 
sector (Mishan 1981:440).  A feature that would act against food safety being in the 
private sector is the need for private enterprise to introduce physical means of 
exclusion in order to exact payments from the beneficiary.  Thus if food regulation 
was supplied in the private sector then production would be inefficient.  The price 
would be set above (zero) marginal cost.  This is because additional resources 
would have to be used in providing effective means of exclusion (Mishan 
1981:440-1).  The “optimal use (of public goods) requires that the service be freely 
available to all which also realises the exchange efficiency condition as everybody 
pays the same zero price for the marginal service” (Mishan 1981:438). 
 
If food safety is to be located in the public sector then the appropriate amount of 
taxation to pay for it needs to be determined.  This is the challenge; because it is 
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unclear what value individuals place on food standards.  Since policy makers do 
not have these values then they will find it hard “to construct a valid demand curve” 
for food safety (Mitchell and Simmons 1994:68).   Policymakers do not have 
market signals so it is difficult for efficient choices, over the quantity of public goods, 
to be made.  In a market for private goods you can discover how much people want 
something from their willingness to pay for it.  However, elections, which determine 
the provision of public goods, do not give such clear signals to policymakers.  
Decision-makers only learn how many people want a policy but not the strength of 
their feeling (Mitchell and Simmons 1994:68).   Consequently, some assessment is 
needed of strength of feeling; that is, for example, how much people would be 
willing to pay for food standards. 
 
Apart from the ‘free riders’ mentioned earlier there is also what might be called 
‘forced riders’.  An individual paying a standard rate of tax might feel overcharged.  
This is because public goods are provided in single quantities.  Therefore some 
people receive higher standards than they would want (Mitchell and Simmons 
1994:89).  The challenge of ‘forced riding’, and ‘free riding’, suggests that a 
methodology is needed so that there is a better understanding of how much 
regulation is wanted by the public.  However, it is difficult to apply principles of 
market pricing to public goods; “governments cannot readily and accurately 
measure how much of a public good is demanded” (Mitchell and Simmons 
1994:87).  This is because, the benefits of a public good being jointly consumed, 
cannot be sold separately to each individual at a price (Mishan 1981:430).  
Although this is one of the main aims of the thesis; to try and measure the demand 
for food standards. 
 
Until now intervention has been examined in general.  However, there is an issue 
of where government should intervene (see chapter 6 on information asymmetry).  
Kinsey (1993:175) suggests that food products, which have characteristics which 
are transparent to consumers, require little government intervention in the form of 
inspection.  However, “some agency must still be accountable for the truth of the 
information on the labels and in the advertising”.  In contrast Kinsey (1993:175) 
states that “those goods (attributes) that carry large negative benefits (externalities) 
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will be over provided unless taxed or restricted in some way”.  The argument here 
seems to be that experience goods, whose characteristics are transparent to 
consumers in the long run, require less intervention than credence goods.  
Credence goods seem to require intervention because the attributes of those 
products carry large negative externalities.  The claim that food products are free 
from bacterial pathogens and carcinogens is a credence good (Kinsey 1993:173). 
 
The ways in which government could intervene are now examined.  There is a 
demand instrument e.g. information remedies (Henson and Traill 1993:160-1).  In 
other words, “government may inform and educate consumers about a risk or 
require producers to do so” (Ives et.al. 1995:1-2).  There are also supply 
instruments such as process standards and product performance standards.  
“Government may establish standards (say temperature standards) which must be 
met by producers during processing of foodstuffs.  Government may (also) require 
foods at the point of sale to meet minimum safety requirements such as maximum 
allowances for pesticide residues or micro-organisms.  Some items may even be 
banned” (Ives et.al. 1995:1-2). 
 
Intervention though is not without cost.  It is possible that supply - based solutions, 
with the imposition of overly strict standards, may restrict choice and inflict 
unnecessary costs on a large portion of society (Henson and Traill 1993:162).  If 
the “range of qualities or standards over which the market operates is curtailed” too 
much then there is a loss of consumer welfare (Swinbank 1993:91).  This would be 
the case if the range of products now on sale excluded some products that 
(consumers) would otherwise have purchased, of if (consumers) were forced to 
pay a higher price for unwanted levels of safety (Swinbank 1993:91). 
 
In chapter one, the market automatically balanced demand and supply.  However, 
as stated previously this ‘best’ way of reaching the 'equilibrium' amount of food 
safety does not work out in practice.  There are imperfections and so reasons for 
intervention.  The government therefore tries to devise a ‘second best’ solution to 
find out the appropriate level of food safety.  When government intervenes it needs 
some guidance, some decision rules, to enable it to determine the appropriate 
  
 
 
 
30 
level of food safety (Swinbank 1993:92).  Therefore government now faces the 
challenge of “determining the point where the marginal (additional) spending on 
food safety just balances the marginal benefits gained from the resultant increase 
in food safety” (Swinbank 1993:92). 
 
Cost benefit analysis may be helpful in trying to guide government towards the 
optimum level of food safety regulation.  In terms of government expenditure this is 
a major challenge.  This is because with public good trade offs then the optimum 
(amount of expenditure on food safety) also implies that no redirection of spending 
from say road safety to food safety could increase human welfare (Swinbank 
1993:92).  Nevertheless, the level of intervention, which could be applied to food 
safety, still needs to be addressed. 
The analysis developed here does not offer much guidance as to the appropriate 
size of the 'food safety public good'.  Nevertheless it emphasises that the 
introduction of public goods, poses problems “because the market cannot provide 
the information necessary to determine whether state intervention is economically 
viable or not” (Mishan 1981:441).  It has also been shown that state intervention is 
not without cost.  If government intervention is to take place; then the state should 
act as an analogue to the market to provide public goods and eliminate 
externalities.  To do this it should achieve the same preference (demand) 
revelation for these public goods as the market achieves for private goods (Mueller 
1989:3).  This is the purpose of willingness to pay analysis (contingent valuation) 
introduced in chapter four.  As stated earlier the state needs ‘demand revelation’, if 
it is to successfully allocate resources.  This is crucial as public support for public 
services, may depend upon research methods being able to highlight the demand, 
or need, for such state intervention. 
 
2.2. The contrast between food safety and 'pure' public goods 
 
An examination of some of the issues affecting the Food Standards Agency is now 
relevant.  It will show that government intervention is complex in the food safety 
arena, and perhaps more difficult than intervention which supplies 'pure' public 
goods.  Longfield (1997) argues that “food safety is undoubtedly a matter for 
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government”.  Since the late 19th century, in particular, the state has intervened in 
the 'market' for food safety.  "The sale of food and drugs act of 1875 remains 
essentially in force today" (Collins 1993:102-3).  Thus, food safety has become a 
'right' based on statute and common law.   
 
Arguably, the contemporary food safety 'emergencies' have led to a potential 
breakdown in trust in the government.  As Longfield (1997) states: "If we can’t trust 
the government to ensure our food is safe, then what can we trust them with?”.  
This view highlights the state's role in upholding food safety standards.  
Nevertheless, it overlooks the difficulty that the government faces with intervention 
in this area.  The state cannot simply supply food safety.     It can only deliver 
appropriate regulations, and there is much debate over what food laws are 
considered to be appropriate. 
 
The government cannot sub-contract the manufacture of ‘food safety' as would be 
the case with say defence equipment.  Thus, the provision of a pure public good is 
perhaps easier for the state to deliver.  Moreover, regardless of the public’s views 
on national defence there is agreement that it is the government’s responsibility.  In 
contrast, the private sector has a significant responsibility for food safety which 
lessens the role of the state. 
 
A flood defence policy could also be easier for the government to implement.  
Coastal flood protection is almost certainly the responsibility of the state because it 
is difficult to practise exclusion, so the private sector will refuse to pay.  
Government could contract out the building of a flood wall.  Perhaps, the amount of 
flood protection required, by the public, could be estimated without too much 
difficulty.  Different types of flood wall could be specified, in terms of their size and 
cost; and their ability to withstand the greatest flood over a particular duration.  This 
information could be communicated to the public, so effectively they could 
determine whether they want flood protection which should cover say a 5,10 or 20 
year period. 
 
2.3. Food safety as an impure public good 
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Earlier in the chapter, it was argued that the public could not opt out of ‘pure’ 
public goods such as national defence.  The following discussion suggests that 
the situation with food safety can be different.  Food safety can be interpreted as 
an ‘impure’ public good.  The basic standards of food safety are enforced 
collectively (i.e. as a public good 'across the board') by Environmental Health 
Officers.  However, above these basic standards the private sector plays a 
significant role in the delivery of food safety.  This is because, crucially, parts of 
the private sector, can exclude people from its food safety standards. 
 
The major supermarkets, in particular, have developed “their own quality 
definitions of foodstuffs which go well beyond the more limited (government) food 
safety and hygiene legislation” (Marsden et. al. 1999:444).  Thus the state’s role 
is that of an external guarantor, to the supermarket’s regulation policies. The 
customers of the supermarkets benefit from the major retailers safety initiatives.  
However, those who cannot afford to shop at the major supermarkets, or do not 
have access to them, are excluded.  Those who are excluded from the 
supermarkets food safety initiatives have to rely on the state’s “baseline 
standards and supervision” (Marsden et. al. 1999:437).  Government supervision 
remains important for maintaining food standards in the independent sector such 
as in takeaways (Marsden et. al. 1999:443).  Thus state intervention can be 
described as a public good for the domestic regulation of the independent food 
sector.  Nevertheless given that the supermarkets are influential in setting their 
own standards, then the state's role is limited.  The Food Standards Agency may, 
to a large degree, be better understood as a merit good. 
 
2.4. Food safety as a merit good 
 
“Merit goods are goods that society thinks everyone ought to have regardless of 
whether they are wanted by each individual” (Begg et. al. 1984:355).  The 
justification for the public provision of merit goods is that society places a 
different value on these [merit] goods from the value placed on them by the 
individual.  Like public goods, it follows that individual choice within a free market 
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economy will lead to a different [inefficient] allocation; from the allocation that 
society wants to see (Begg et. al. 1984:355). 
 
Education could be used as an example of a merit good, and the following 
argument discusses the [merit good] case for government intervention in 
education.  Arguably, university education should be considered as a private 
good.  On this basis university students should see education as a personal 
investment and they should have to borrow money if they want to ‘purchase’ 
such an education.  If education is left to the market in this way then demand 
could fall as many people will not want to borrow such money.  Thus education 
as a positive externality, in say a production context, would be lost.  The merit 
good case is that: “more education will raise the productivity of not only the 
individual worker but of the other workers with whom this worker co-operates” 
(Begg et.  al. 1984:355).  This example could be applied to food safety education 
where knowledge of food hygiene practices would not only benefit the individual 
but other people who consume the food prepared by the individual.  This would 
be relevant in the home, but particularly in catering establishments.  Thus say if 
individuals demand too little [food safety] knowledge, then the Food Standards 
Agency could encourage the provision of food hygiene education.  
Communication of food safety practices through television advertisements has 
been one way that the Agency has attempted to provide this education.  
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Part 2:  Methodology for the research study 
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Chapter 3:  Revealed and Stated Preference 
 
3.1. Definitions of revealed and stated preference 
 
Chapter 2 argued that it is difficult to find out how much of a public good is needed.  
The lack of a “marketed output” from a public good, such as the enforcement of 
food safety regulations, means that there is no precision when it comes to 
measuring the quantity of a public good that is needed (Kamarack 1983:105).  It is 
though possible to derive information indirectly from the market.  An approach 
which is described as 'revealed preference' (see top of table 3.1).  Alternatively, the 
public could be asked to state their preferences directly.  This is described as 
'stated preference' (see the bottom of table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1.  Behaviour based methods for the valuation of public goods. 
 
   Results from directly  Results from indirectly 
   observing valuations  observing valuations 
 
Observed  OBSERVED / DIRECT OBSERVED / INDIRECT 
Market  Referenda (4.3)  Travel cost (3.4) 
Behaviour                        Housing example (3.4)  
 
Responses to HYPOTHETICAL /   HYPOTHETICAL / INDIRECT 
Hypothetical  DIRECT  
Markets  Contingent Valuation Conjoint analysis (4.5) 
   (4.2)    Contingent ranking (4.7) 
 
Sources:  Based on Mitchell and Carson (1989:75) and O’Doherty (1996:44). 
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3.2.  The cost of illness approach 
 
This section will briefly examine how much food safety could be worth, from the 
(revealed) costs of food-borne illness.  There is an approach which estimates the 
cost of illness.  It is the total of the medical costs of an illness, in addition to the 
forgone market income from lost work time (Antle 1999:608).  The value of a food 
safety policy could be quantified by adding (1) the amount that health costs are 
reduced, and (2) the money that the public would earn, if they did not suffer from a 
food-borne illness. 
 
The problem with this approach is that there is a difficulty in measuring the illness 
costs for non wage earners or undervalued workers e.g. voluntary carers (Ives et. 
al 1995:53).  The method focuses on lost monetary income or lost output.  This 
emphasis on economic productivity could result in an under valuation of illness in 
those who do not work, for example the elderly.  Such an approach may be seen 
as "unacceptable" to society as a whole (Ives et. al. 1995:41).  Moreover, 
intangible costs, such as the loss of leisure time through food borne illness are 
beyond the scope of the cost of illness approach.  Consequently, there is a case for 
using a different method for the valuation of food safety policies.   
 
3.3. Willingness to pay and consumer's surplus 
 
This section provides the direction for the rest of the chapter.  It is necessary to 
introduce the concepts of willingness to pay and consumer's surplus.  The 
economist's fundamental criterion of value is willingness to pay, and how much 
money people are prepared to ‘give up’, or trade-off, for, in this case a public good.  
The demand curve, as an ordered summary of people's willingness to pay, is of 
importance in measuring the societal benefit of additional food safety.  The aim of 
the research is to approximate the demand curve for food safety (Laslett 
1995:11-12).   
 
If there is not an appropriate (revealed preference) method of examining the 
'market' for food safety then there still exists, theoretically at least, a latent demand 
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curve that could be uncovered using a (stated preference) questionnaire 
(Hanemann 1995:81).  If such a survey were undertaken then a sample would be 
taken, from a representative population group.  A willingness to pay question 
would be asked to respondents, and the results when aggregated should 
correspond to a market demand schedule (Hanemann 1995:81). 
 
The concept of consumer’s surplus is now relevant.  It is a demand related concept 
that measures “the difference between the amount of money that the consumer is 
willing to pay, for a given quantity of a good, and the amount that the consumer 
actually pays” (Call and Holahan 1983:91).  For a quantity increase, in public 
goods, the consumer surplus measure can be interpreted as the respondent's 
maximum willingness to pay, in order to gain the quantity increase and still 
maintain the initial level of utility (Mitchell and Carson 1998:25).  The measurement 
of consumer’s surplus, when aggregated, can help estimate the public benefits of a 
quantity increase in a public good.   
 
The consumer's surplus (the total sum elicited from a study of people’s collective 
willingness to pay) is a reflection of what a safety improvement was worth to the 
public; relative to the alternative ways in which they could have spent their limited 
incomes (Jones-Lee et. al. 1999:77).  The emphasis is on public preferences, 
because decision making should take into account people's preferences.  It is 
members of the public who will be affected by choices made over safety spending.  
It is the public which stands to benefit from improvements to public safety and it is 
ultimately they who will have to pay for it (Jones-Lee et. al. 1999:77). 
 
3.4. Examples of revealed preference  
 
The discussion will now look at whether knowledge gained through environmental 
valuation could be used to value food safety.  The demand for environmental 
public goods has been ‘revealed’ by examining the purchases of related goods in 
the private market place (Garrod and Willis 1999:7).  One revealed preference 
method used in environmental valuation is the Travel Cost Method.  It can be used 
to estimate the demand, or marginal valuation, curve for recreation sites (Garrod 
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and Willis 1999:7).  It has been used to estimate the value of a National Park.  It 
does this by assessing the demand for the related market good.  It examines how 
much people are prepared to spend on travel to gain access to the park (Garrod 
and Willis 1999:125).   This should help the researcher understand how much they 
demand the National Park.  The advantage, of this approach, is that it is based on 
observed behaviour involving a real rather than a hypothetical choice (Ives et. al. 
1995:42). 
 
It is also suggested that the demand for goods, such as housing, can be used to 
derive the demand for environmental goods.  For example, a house in a National 
Park has an environmental ‘good’, or benefit, of a scenic view.  If the non 
environmental characteristics of housing are controlled then it is possible to work 
out “the implicit price that individuals are willing to pay to consume the 
environmental characteristics (such as the view) associated with the house” 
(Garrod and Willis 1999:8).  In theory, it could be possible to work out the demand 
for National Parks by comparing house prices inside and outside the Parks.  
Houses inside the National Park could have a better view than a similar property 
outside the Park.  The price differential between the two properties could give 
some indication of the value, of the view, that the landscape of the National Park 
property provides. 
 
3.5.  Preventative expenditure and averting behaviour 
 
Revealed preference can also be understood by using the concept of preventative 
expenditure or averting behaviour from the environmental economics literature.  
Preventative expenditure is about what people are prepared to spend to reduce an 
environmental problem.  For example, double glazing could be installed to reduce 
road traffic noise (Garrod and Willis 1999:7).  An 'averting behaviour' approach 
infers a monetary value by observing the costs that people are prepared to incur in 
order to avoid negative effects.  For example, an individual could move to an area 
with less air pollution, at a greater distance from their place of work, thus incurring 
additional transport costs in terms of time and money (Garrod and Willis 1999:7).    
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An example of preventative expenditure, in terms of food, could be the need for 
consumers to spend money to acquire information.  For instance, information 
about how to store food properly to decrease the probability of food-borne illness.  
Food 'averting behaviour' could be understood as a switch from, what consumers 
perceive as, less safe to safer foods.  For example from meat to non-meat 
alternatives or vice versa.  This is elaborated upon in the following discussion on 
BSE. 
 
A study was conducted in France to analyse consumer’s meat purchasing 
behaviour after the 1996 BSE crisis.  An exercise was developed to determine the 
public’s willingness to pay for beef which should not transmit CJD (Latouche et. al 
1998:347).  The authors suggest that averting behaviour does not fully value the 
benefit of safer food.  It is suggested that the “complete avoidance of the exposure 
is possible since the consumer can choose alternative products that are supposed 
to be safe”.  People could avoid the need to evaluate the potential risk from beef 
consumption by choosing an alternative product e.g. non meat alternatives such 
as soya.   
 
The cost to the consumer from reducing their exposure to health risks "is a lower 
limit of the true value people give to health risk reduction” (Latouche et. al. 
1998:349).   Therefore, this expenditure, to avoid health risks, cannot be used as a 
proxy for the full willingness to pay for safer food.  It is similar to expenditure on 
double glazing which reduces traffic noise to the householder inside the property 
but not outside (Garrod and Willis 1999:43).  Thus expenditure on double glazing is 
only a partial solution, and a low estimate of the value people place on the 
environment. 
 
It is stated that "following Henson (1996) the theoretically correct measure of the 
value that individuals attach to better food safety is their willingness to pay for safer 
foods; i.e. the largest monetary amount they are willing to pay for a specific 
improvement in food safety"  (Latouche et. al. 1998:349).  The French authors built 
a hypothetical scenario, into their willingness to pay study, that only beef 
consumption is available.  The problem is that respondents were asked to pay only 
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for 'safer' beef and so some people stated very large bids (willingness to pay 
amounts); given that they were not allowed to 'buy' substitute products.  In practice, 
in actual food markets, alternative purchases can be made e.g. other meat or non 
meat choices so the French study is not realistic.  This example is useful though in 
highlighting the challenge with trying to value safer food. 
 
3.6.  Revealed preference - the market for organic food 
 
Another possibility is that the demand for food safety could be revealed by 
examining the purchase of related food products.  In this context, the market for 
organic food may appear to be useful for estimating the demand for food safety.  
For example Corsi and Novelli (2003:1) asked Italian consumers whether they 
would be willing to pay for organic beef meat.  However, the authors suggest that 
organic meat "is considered safer and more environmentally friendly".  On this 
basis an increase in the demand for organic food cannot necessarily be explained 
by a greater desire for food safety.  The demand for organics may be due to 
environmental as well as safety concerns.  Moreover, the safety element, of a 
purchasing decision for organic food, is difficult to separate from other 
characteristics such as taste, freshness or the locality of the produce.   
 
This highlights the problem with revealed preference.  "Like all induction, it 
requires an act of faith to extrapolate from particular choices to general assertions 
about behaviour and preference” (Sen in Hanemann 1995:107).  “The Achilles’ 
heel of revealed preference is that you have to know what the choice”, to purchase 
organic food, “is about” (Hanemann 1995:108-9). 
 
3.7.  Stated preference as an alternative to revealed preference 
 
Market based revealed preference techniques attempt to identify and observe 
purchasing choices, in situations in which people may actually trade off income 
against food safety.  But if demand for organic food is, in practice, such a poor 
proxy for demand for food safety, then revealed preference appears to be 
inappropriate in this context.  Although revealed preference has the advantage of 
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basing estimates on real choices it is limited by the rarity of pure wealth versus risk 
tradeoffs (Jones-Lee et. al 1985:50).  As chapter 2 outlined, people expect 
consistent food standards; so trading off money against food safety rarely occurs.  
Moreover, the discussion on organics highlighted the difficulty of disentangling the 
effect of other non safety factors from safety purchasing behaviour. 
 
In contrast to revealed preference, a [stated preference] questionnaire approach 
may be considered.  This potentially allows the researcher to obtain the 
information that he requires (Jones Lee et al. 1985:51).  The virtue of this approach 
is its directness.  Mishan (1971:705) provides the justification and foundation for 
such a direct method.  He suggests that if there is not appropriate real market data 
then economists should consider the alternative.  If researchers are concerned 
with understanding increases in the demand, for non-market goods, then they may 
have to consider the possibility that data yielded by surveys, based on the 
questionnaire method, is better than no data at all. 
This leads into a discussion of the stated preference method.  This method 
"question(s) individuals directly about the value they place on non-market (public) 
goods" (Henson 1996:404).  Pearmain and Kroes (1990:2) suggest that stated 
preference is about using “people’s statements of how they would respond to 
different situations”.  Stated preference is also a relevant tool in environmental 
valuation because revealed preference, or behaviour in the market place, cannot 
value all environmental goods.  Methods such as travel-cost “cannot estimate 
non-use values since there is, by definition, no related market good for the mere 
existence, as distinct from use, of a (National) park” (Garrod and Willis 
1999:125-6).  It is not possible to have a market, or revealed preference, for a good 
that exists but is not used.  This is also true in the food safety context as the 
following example will outline. 
 
The services delivered by environmental health officers do not benefit the public 
directly.  They do not provide 'safe food' themselves rather they provide 
reassurance to the public by enforcing existing standards.  There is a 'direct use' 
value to consumers if they purchase safer food because outlets are inspected.  
Also there is an 'option value' of enforcement.  If a consumer wanted to buy food 
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from a takeaway they would have the option of doing so because the food 
premises are being monitored.   
 
There is no 'market' for the services of Environmental Health Officers. It is for this 
reason that stated preference is needed to value a food safety public good, such 
as the enforcement work undertaken by Environmental Health Officers.  The 
enforcement of food safety regulations provides choice to the public.  By ensuring, 
in theory at least, that all food hygiene outlets meet the legal standards then the 
public is reassured and so is able to buy food from a wide range of food premises.  
This choice may not be exercised but there is, at least, an option value that cannot 
be easily derived from purchases made by food consumers. 
 
3.8.  The potential for stated preference to guide state intervention 
 
Stated Preference techniques could, in theory, provide valuations of public goods 
even in the absence of markets (from which revealed preference could be used).  
The benefit of food safety regulations could be valued using stated preference.  
Such a benefit valuation could be explicitly outlined and so the basis for 
decision-making would be transparent (Garrod and Willis 1999:4).  A food safety 
valuation explicitly done for scrutiny by policy makers, and the public, is helpful 
(Turner et. al. 1994:109).  Decision makers can explicitly see what value is being 
attached to food safety.  They can then consider how the valuation was derived, by 
the researcher, and provide feedback on the quality of the valuation.  The next 
chapter will discuss different methods of stated preference.  
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Chapter 4:  Methods of Stated Preference 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter will first examine the contingent valuation technique as it has 
frequently been used in environmental valuation.  It will then discuss other 
methods of stated preference such as choice experiments.   
 
4.2.  Definition of contingent valuation 
 
Contingent valuation is where individuals are supposed to be able to give 
meaningful monetary values for public goods which are generally not priced 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989:96).  It aims to measure the benefits of non marketed 
goods so that they can be entered directly into cost benefit calculations (Bateman 
and Willis eds 1999:1).  Such a study could be conceptualised as a hypothetical 
referendum, but with a price [often in the form of a tax] on the public good to be 
provided.  The study is intended to be self contained as it is meant to just affect the 
respondents answering the question.  Thus respondents are voting on “whether to 
tax themselves for a particular purpose" (Hanemann 1995:90).  The method 
“avoids the absence of markets for public goods” because the public is presented 
“with a hypothetical political market in which they have the opportunity to buy the 
good in question” (Mitchell and Carson 1989:2-3). 
 
The questionnaire situation where the good is presented needs to be made 
realistic to respondents.  Thus participants should then be able to accurately 
predict their decision whether to pay and if so how much to pay (Hanemann 
1995:109).  The questionnaire, apart from being realistic, should also provide 
impartial information, about the good in question, and should use a representative 
sample of the population.   
 
Contingent valuation could have a useful input into public policy resource 
allocation.  It has the potential to improve upon the decisions made at general 
elections.  The problem with elections (as stated in chapter 2) is that they do not 
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provide accurate market signals.  A contingent valuation study could give the 
necessary ‘market signals’ as to the demand for public goods.  This is because the 
method can be analogous to referenda.   
4.3.  The analogy between a referendum and contingent valuation 
 
A referendum is an act of referring a political question to the electorate by a direct 
vote.  It can be seen as direct democracy as the decision making is in the hands of 
the public rather than political parties.  The theme for discussion here is whether 
people behave and vote differently in political markets compared to consumer 
markets.  It is argued that the private or consumer market may not be relevant to 
state intervention.  This is because when it comes to voting in elections, and to 
decisions about public goods, people may be less self interested and more public 
spirited than when they participate in the market for private goods.  For example, 
for votes over public spending such as for pensions or schools, people may vote in 
favour of them even though they may not directly benefit.  Private desires (i.e. 
consumer demand) can still be considered in a public voting context.  However, the 
discussion on public spiritedness suggests that a political market is a more 
appropriate analogue for contingent valuation surveys than are private markets 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989:93-4). 
 
If a referendum is used as the basis for the question then a contingent valuation 
study has the possibility of offering an almost real life situation.  The behaviour to 
be predicted by such a study is how informed citizens would actually vote if a 
proposition to provide an additional, or improved public good, was on a ballot.  
After all referenda are used, in America at least, to make binding decisions about 
the provision of state services, such as a new school building to be financed 
through public expenditure.  Moreover, a referendum has clear economic 
implications for a voter’s household as it “will have to bear its share of any cost 
implied by the proposal it passes” (Mitchell and Carson 1989:94).  The application 
of referenda to contingent valuation is helpful because “they provide an 
institutional model for asking people to express their preferences for public goods” 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989:77). 
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Defence spending, as a pure public good, could be an appropriate application for 
contingent valuation.  The technique could be used to value specific military 
programmes.  In Switzerland referenda have been used to find out if people want 
to pay, for a certain amount of extra defence equipment (Hanemann 1995:83).  In 
comparison if a defence valuation exercise had been undertaken in the United 
Kingdom, on willingness to pay for the 2003 Gulf War, then there would have been 
the potential for a rational input into decision making.  Contingent valuation results 
could have better reflected the welfare of society, than the outcome of an opinion 
poll on public attitudes towards the war.  This is because with contingent valuation 
people would not only have had to state whether they were in favour of the war; but 
whether they were willing to pay higher taxes for the war.  These taxes could 
alternatively have been spent on other public goods, such as health and education.  
If such an exercise was used as the basis for a decision, then respondents would 
have had a powerful incentive to take the valuation exercise seriously.  In practice, 
politicians are unwilling to sanction such a willingness to pay exercise because it 
could restrict their scope for decision making.  Nevertheless, this does not discredit 
the appropriateness of the research method for the valuation of pure public goods. 
 
Moreover, contingent valuation could be “more representative than its real world 
referendum counterpart” (Mitchell and Carson 1989:95).  The poor, for example, 
could be better represented in a contingent valuation study than they would be by 
ordinary political participation.  Contingent valuation interviewers, instead of 
relying on voters to register and come to the polls, go to the respondent’s homes 
and work hard to ensure people’s participation.  Also if people with lower incomes 
are underrepresented among respondents because it is more difficult to get them 
to participate, then statistical techniques could be used “to weight the data to 
compensate at least in part for this shortfall” (Mitchell and Carson 1989:95). 
 
The contingent valuation method, if it were to be adopted widely, would have to 
improve upon existing methods of consultation over public goods.  Existing 
methods tend to be quite simple.  For example, they could ask the public whether 
they would be willing to spend more money on public goods or whether people 
want the same amount of money spent or even less spent (Mitchell and Carson 
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1989:75).  Simple methods such as this may be favoured by local authorities.  A 
local authority could ask people if they wanted more, less, or the same amount of 
money spent on food safety.  Thus borough councils can obtain a rough idea of 
public preferences about food safety.  However, a local authority survey may offer 
a sparse description of a public good.  Respondents are rarely given information 
about what is currently being spent on public goods and how it is being spent 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989:87).  Moreover, a council survey may offer an 
insufficient incentive to the respondent to consider monetary trade offs.  For 
example, a council survey is unlikely to include an attempt at creating a market, in 
other words a trade off situation.  Moreover, such a survey would be unlikely to 
specify a payment obligation.    But this type of public consultation is relevant as it 
provides examples which contingent valuation studies should improve upon if they 
are realistically going to contribute to policy. 
 
4.4.  Other methods of stated preference  
 
Other methods of stated preference are relevant.  These other approaches are 
conjoint analysis and contingent ranking.   
 
Contingent valuation exercises concentrate on the valuation of a particular 
scenario, such as greater regulation of food safety.  This requires researchers to 
concentrate on providing adequate information about the scenario so that the 
respondent can judge the overall improvement.  The results of these exercises 
provide information on preferences considering the whole situation rather than 
specific aspects of it. 
 
4.5.  Conjoint analysis 
 
Conjoint analysis can be used to examine the response of the individual to 
changes in the attributes contained within the whole situation; as well as the 
scenario as a whole.  Thus, rather than examining the entire situation as a 
contingent valuation study would do, the conjoint analysis approach allows 
researchers to break down the whole concept into different parts.  Therefore, it is 
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possible to determine preferences over individual attributes (Garrod and Willis 
1999:203).  Conjoint analysis has been applied in marketing for over 25 years, for 
example see the egg study below (Bateman and Willis eds. 1999:462).  However, 
more recently it has been applied in economics (see Louviere 1991, Louviere et. al. 
2000). 
 
In a conjoint analysis respondents are given hypothetical options.  These options 
represent “packages”, or combinations, of different attributes which usually 
describe a particular product (Pearmain and Kroes 1990:17).  In Ness and 
Gerhardy’s analysis of eggs; eggs have attributes such as production method, 
origin and price (per half dozen).  Consequently, there could be a battery egg, 
which is imported and has a price of say 52p (Ness and Gerhardy 1994:29).  The 
aim is to analyse consumer multi-attribute trade offs, for example, a local free 
range egg, with a price of 84p against an imported battery egg priced at 52p.  The 
objective is to find out which attribute combinations confer the highest utility (Ness 
and Gerhardy 1994:27).  For example, is an expensive free-range egg preferred to 
a cheaper battery egg?   
 
One problem is that there are many product combinations which can be traded off 
against each other.  There may be three levels, battery, barn and free range 
associated with the attribute of production method.  These three levels will then 
have to be combined with different origins and price tiers.  “As the number of 
attributes and levels is increased, the number of resulting options also increases, 
so that the task of assessing all of them soon becomes too much for most 
respondents.  A range of strategies can be pursued to reduce the number of 
options” (Pearmain and Kroes 1990:7).  But “even in fairly modest experiments, 
the number of concepts can become too great to expect respondents to make 
meaningful evaluations” (Ness and Gerhardy 1994:28).  Although, too few levels 
may impede the analysis, for example if price were omitted, and only the 
production method and the origin were included.  Therefore a balance is needed 
(Garrod and Willis 1999:207).   
 
In Burton et. al's full study outlined later (2001:487) there were 27 choice sets 
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which were split into 3 subsets of 9.  This shows the complexity of these types of 
studies as a respondent is being asked to make 9 different trade-offs.  This is 
convoluted as there were five attributes to be considered.  These were food bill, 
production technology, level of farm chemical use, food miles and health risk.   
 
However, the advantage of this method it that it should avoid part-whole bias, 
which is discussed in detail in chapter 5.  The whole GM 'scenario' was broken 
down into parts.  It could be hypothetically assumed that GM technology reduces 
the use of chemicals and reduces food health risk.  The 'overall benefit' of these 
two elements can be broken down and evaluated separately to see which one was 
worth more to the consumer.  The advantage of this approach is that the trade-off, 
between say the reduction in chemical use and money, is more specific than 
contingent valuation where only the whole 'GM scenario' can be evaluated.  The 
following section examines the method again to argue that valuation studies 
related to genetically modified food may not be appropriate. 
4.6.  Choice modelling and willingness to pay for GM food  
 
The conjoint analysis or choice experiment study by Ness and Gerhardy on eggs 
was based on market prices and actual types of conditions for hens' e.g.  battery or 
free range.  These attributes are readily available in food outlets whether they are 
supermarkets or farm shops.  The inherent problem, with Burton et. al's study 
(2001) on GM food, is that GM food has not been, and may not be, fully introduced 
in Britain.  Evaluation of the GM issue, in the United Kingdom, could have been 
hindered by the public's awareness that a number of policy decisions had to be 
made (Rigby et. al. 2004:148).  For example, ingredients derived from GMO's 
need to be labelled as GM despite the absence of detectable GM ingredients 
(Rigby et. al. 2004:130). 
 
The study proposes a simple choice set, trading off traditional technology at 100% 
of the current weekly food bill against GM technology at 80% of the current bill 
(Burton et. al. 2001:481).  It is not clear, in practice, that GM foods would be “80% 
of the current bill”.  Studies such as this should not present situations which leave 
themselves open to being contested by respondents. 
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This choice study appears to be limited by different types of protest responses.  
First, some of the respondents removed the choice sets.  ‘Cleaning’ took place 
where people tried to scribble out and change the choices which indicates that 
people were trying to protest vote (Rigby 2001).  Second, some respondents 
selected the status quo for all the choice sets presented to them.  The authors 
admit that the respondents may again be registering “a form of protest vote: 
because of strong objections to some aspect of the choice sets, they consistently 
select the current position, without any consideration of the attribute levels 
presented” (Burton et. al. 2001:487).  The researchers chose to exclude these 
responses because it was felt that some people were not making choices based on 
the attribute levels.  Holland (1995:36) suggests that rather than excluding 
anomalous cases it would be better to re-consider them.  It is worth finding out the 
number of protest responses and why such concerns are present.  
 
The following discussion outlines a possible concern with genetically modified food.  
It has been proposed that there should be a GM free label so that consumers can 
identify what food would be and would not be genetically modified (Grocer 2001).  
However, this could mean that conventional food will become a premium product 
and such food will sell at a higher price, with the new label.  This would be the case 
if genetic modification began to dominate the market and the GM free food became 
a niche product.  Perhaps, a food with ‘no added’ GM ingredients could become a 
special product like foods with ‘no added’ sugar (Fine et. al. 1996:140).  Therefore 
consumers who want to continue purchasing conventional food would have to pay 
more to keep their consumption patterns unchanged.  This would be an erosion of 
the consumer’s property rights (see 5.3).  Also this might explain why respondents 
were “consistently selecting the current position” as stated above.  Alternatively, 
this may explain why some people refused to engage with the choices at all 
(Holland 1995:36), or even tried to change them. 
 
Perhaps qualitative studies are more appropriate when examining genetically 
modified food.  This is because consumers can simply state their views for or 
against.  A quantitative study on genetically modified food would be more 
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complicated.  Burton et. al’s study, made hypothetical assumptions about 
attributes such as the price levels.  In addition it treated the current price level, of 
conventional food, as fixed.  It appeared to overlook the benefit, in price terms, 
which GM food would receive, from conventional food, potentially, becoming 
marginalised as a niche product. 
 
4.7.  Contingent Ranking 
 
Another stated preference technique is the contingent ranking method.  “The 
contingent ranking method [asks] respondents to rank their choices rather than just 
choose the one that they most prefer [like conjoint analysis].  In contingent ranking 
a sample of individuals is required to rank a discrete set of alternatives from their 
most to their least preferred” (Garrod and Willis 1999:211).  Garrod and Willis 
(1999:275) have used contingent ranking to investigate the public’s demand for 
different levels of biodiversity offered by various forest management standards. 
 
It is suggested that respondents may use varying criteria, in making ranking 
decisions, at different levels.  In other words, the criteria for ranking the first and 
last choices may not be consistent.  Whether this is due to respondent fatigue or 
difficulty in discriminating between lower ranked alternatives is unclear (Garrod 
and Willis 1999:215-6).   
The indirectness of the method presents a problem.  With contingent ranking, the 
researcher tends to elicit preferences in the form of attitudes rather than 
behavioural intentions.  Instead of requiring respondents to declare clearly that 
they are willing to give up a specified amount of money in order to receive the good 
in question [as in contingent valuation], the contingent ranking technique [only] 
requires respondents to make rank order preferences for a set of alternative 
choices” (Mitchell and Carson 1989:85).  
 
4.8.  The choice of stated preference method 
 
Contingent valuation could be viewed as the most appropriate method.  It is less of 
a cognitive burden than contingent ranking or conjoint analysis; given that there 
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were 9 choice sets in Burton et. al's study (2001:487).  The complexity of conjoint 
analysis could lead to respondents consistently selecting the current situation (see 
4.6).  This may be because people are using the 'status quo' option as a way of 
simplifying their answers (Rigby et. al. 2004:66).   
 
In contrast contingent valuation is more straightforward as there can be only one 
question.  Thus, the advantage of contingent valuation is that respondents could 
provide more considered answers to this 'one whole scenario'.  The construction of 
a plausible, generic, food safety situation is useful given that the valuation exercise 
is being directed at members of the public.   
 
Another advantage of contingent valuation is that it focuses on the trade off 
between the 'whole scenario' and 'the cost' (Rigby et. al. 2004:148).  In comparison 
to the Unites States, the British public is unfamiliar with this kind of trade-off and 
votes on tax propositions (Willis 1995:127).  However, this kind of exercise could 
improve the quality of the British debate over taxation.  Emphasis could be placed 
on the real economic issue, i.e. the public's willingness to pay, rather than political 
campaigning (see 5.2.2.).  The different approaches for undertaking a contingent 
valuation exercise are addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5:  Methodological challenges when undertaking a contingent 
valuation study 
 
5.1. Discussion on Elicitation Methods 
 
5.1.1.  Introduction to elicitation methods 
 
This chapter will explore the methodological challenges which confront a 
contingent valuation study.  These challenges are elicitation methods, payment 
methods, property rights and part-whole bias. 
 
The main methods (or 'elicitation formats') will be examined.  Bids or values are 
obtained through some form of questionnaire survey and elicitation format, in 
which individuals are asked to state their maximum willingness to pay for the good 
(Garrod and Willis 1999:134).  The aim is then to work out from this the consumer’s 
surplus for the public good.   
 
5.1.2 .  Open and closed-ended formats 
 
First there is an open-ended question in which no values are specified and 
individuals are asked a simple question on their maximum willingness to pay for 
the good e.g. what is the most you would be willing to pay for the ‘food safety public 
good’?  Where respondents have no prior experience of purchasing it, which they 
would not as there is not a market say for food hygiene regulation, “then 
respondents may experience considerable difficulty with this format” (Garrod and 
Willis 1999:134).   
 
It is also suggested that open-ended formats should not be used to elicit non-use 
or passive values.  For example, the existence of regulations; in other words “those 
situations for which there is no market in the good or similar good” (Garrod and 
Willis 1999:134).  The open-ended method would be appropriate when valuing 
National Parks where respondents have experience in purchasing similar goods 
e.g. access to other private recreation sites.  However, this elicitation format has 
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less relevance to food safety, as there is not a similar good which could inform 
demand for food safety, as a public good.  Also, there could be a problem of 
inconsistency if the open-ended approach were used to value food safety.  If 
people are uncertain, and not knowledgeable, about food safety, then their 
response will reflect this and there could be a variance, or inconsistency, of 
willingness to pay responses across the cross section of the sample (Bateman and 
Willis eds. 1999:529)   
 
A second type of approach is a closed-ended question where a range of values are 
specified and the respondent chooses one of the values.  This type of question 
could be asked as follows: suppose a food safety public good, such as the 
enforcement of food hygiene regulations, could be improved; would you be willing 
to pay £x (where x is the WTP amount) to make sure that this improvement took 
place.  This type of question is useful because it offers guidance to the respondent, 
as to their potential willingness to pay, where there is not a market.  There is 
guidance because the “format anchors the respondent’s answer to the range of 
values presented, although respondents can be offered an ‘other’ category in 
which they can specify a value (Garrod and Willis 1999:134). 
 
A combination of the two approaches leads to “a dichotomous choice question in 
which a single payment amount is presented to the respondent who either agrees 
or disagrees with the amount” (Garrod and Willis 1999:135).  This approach is like 
a referendum with a payment attached.  For example: suppose a food safety public 
good, such as the enforcement of food hygiene regulations, could be improved - 
would you be willing to pay £75 extra to make sure this improvement was 
implemented  (Yes / No) ?  
 
“The payment amount is randomly varied in the sample questionnaire survey 
across a pre determined range” (Garrod and Willis 1999:135).  This 
pre-determined price range has to be established.  The problem is that the range of 
values, to be used in an empirical study, will require a piloting exercise.  
Open-ended questions will be needed to elicit the pre determined range.  A large 
scale open-ended pilot study is useful for a dichotomous choice or referendum 
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type format, to establish that responses are well calibrated (Garrod and Willis 
1999:135).   
 
The aim is to make sure that the amount specified, e.g. the £75 stated above, is in 
the ‘right’ place.  An ideal open-ended pilot would be able to put the £75 amount in 
the middle of a later closed-ended sample of WTP responses.  This would help the 
pre-determined range to focus on the public’s median willingness to pay.  For 
example, a dichotomous choice question could be asked to elicit whether the 
respondent was willing to pay, say, £100, it might then be found that the majority of 
respondents were not willing to pay.  Therefore, the bid level could be switched to 
£50.  If the majority of people were willing to pay at that level then the bid amount 
could be raised to £75 as would be predicted by an ideal pilot survey. 
 
The advantage of this dichotomous choice procedure is that it reduces 
non-response because the respondent just has to give a yes or no answer.  Also, 
because people are responding to monetary amounts along a pre-determined 
range then there is not the problem of outliers.  People have to respond to a 
pre-determined payment figure and are not allowed to give an unrealistic, outlying, 
bid amount as could be the case in an open-ended question (Pearce and 
Ozdemiroglu 2002:50,52). 
 
Researchers have been concerned about respondents in dichotomous choice 
situations who are prone to 'yes-saying' (Aakkula 1999:115).  This will have the 
effect of increasing the average willingness to pay which appears to be a limitation 
of this approach.  If respondents are not given the opportunity to say 'don't know' 
[in a dichotomous choice question] then there could be too many agreement 
responses.  Mitchell and Carson (1989:173) suggest that affirmative responses 
may be caused by questionnaire design.  They quote a methodological experiment 
where respondents were asked whether they were in favour of a hypothetical 
public goods programme or not.  The proportion of people who volunteered a don’t 
know response was 69%.  In another version, which explicitly offered respondents 
the option of saying they did not have an opinion; 90% of people refused to give 
one.  The use of a “don’t know” statement (Hanemann 1995:95) could reduce ‘yes 
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saying’ where people are too inclined to agree with a willingness to pay statement.   
 
5.1.3.  Iterative bidding  
 
There is also the "iterative bidding format or series of dichotomous questions”.  
The iterative bidding approach begins as a dichotomous choice question: is the 
respondent willing to pay £x (£100) for the food-safety public good (Yes/No)?  To 
avoid too much repetition the iteration may double (£200), or halve (£50), the 
previous bid (£100) presented to the respondent, depending upon whether the 
person was WTP or was not WTP.  The bidding process aims to move, or iterate, 
between the sum the respondent is willing to pay and that which he is not, to 
determine a more precise WTP amount (Garrod and Willis 1999:135).   
 
This method has been criticized because the bidding method may be tedious for 
respondents.  Also the efficiency gains from follow up WTP questions (iterative 
bids) may be small (Garrod and Willis 1999:136).  The gain in efficiency is small 
because going from a single to a double bounded format could introduce a bias 
into the study.  The second bid may be inconsistent with the first (Bateman and 
Willis eds. 1999:382).  People may not react in a neutral way to the second bid 
amount.  If the respondent had said 'yes' to the first bid then they might view the 
presentation of the second [higher or doubled] bid as an attempt at bargaining 
which may be resented.  Thus, in this case, there could be a bias towards a follow 
up no response.   
 
If the individual had said 'no' to the first bid then they may feel that a second [lower 
or halved] bid is unwanted.  They may feel that they are being offered an inferior or 
cheaper version of the commodity.  If so, this would cause a greater incidence of 
follow-up no responses "than would be anticipated on the basis of the 'no' 
response to the first question alone" (Bateman and Willis eds. 1999:385).   
 
The effect whereby the respondent does not react in a neutral manner has been 
described as a "reiteration bias".  The problem is that respondents could "alter their 
behaviour over repeated invitations to bid" (Garrod, Scarpa and Willis 1999:11).  
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The basic single-bound, closed-ended, format does not have this re-iteration bias. 
 
The starting point for the 'bidding game' may also be contentious as it could affect 
the respondent's answer.  Respondents may use the first bid amount presented to 
them as a clue regarding the appropriate willingness to pay amount (Bateman and 
Willis eds. 1999:530).   
 
5.1.4.  Payment cards 
 
A payment card approach is where respondents are presented with a card with 
potential contributions to the public good being valued from £0 to some upper limit.  
The advantage, of a payment card, is that it can present visual information to 
respondents.  It lists all the possible bid amounts and so it is not anchored to a 
particular bid amount (Bateman and Willis eds. 1999:195).  Another advantage of 
this approach is that it provides more context than open-ended questions (Aakkula 
1999:114).   
 
The respondent only has to choose one WTP amount from the card and so it is 
quicker to answer than the iterative bidding format.  Respondents are just asked 
“what amount on this card is the most you would be willing to pay for the public 
good being proposed" (Garrod and Willis 1999:136).  The amount chosen can be 
understood only as an indication of willingness to pay; that it lies between the 
highest number below the amount circled, and the smallest number above it 
(Bateman and Willis eds. 1999:305).  For example, take 1, 2 and 3 on a card; 2 is 
circled but the WTP could lie between 1 and 3. 
 
Starting point bias could seriously affect the payment card approach.  The starting 
point, commencing the range of WTP amounts, could influence the final WTP 
value for the good.  People could think that the starting point suggested is what 
other people pay and therefore what is expected of them (Garrod and Willis 
1999:155).  Given the example above people might think a non payment (£0) may 
be appropriate because of the starting point bias.   
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5.1.5.  The choice of elicitation approach:  open and closed-ended formats 
 
The development of the methodology should inform how the research study is 
undertaken.  Before 1985, most contingent valuation studies used an open-ended 
willingness to pay question such as “what is the most you would be willing to pay?”  
Since then most major CV surveys have used closed-ended questions such as: if it 
cost £x would you be willing to pay this amount.  The argument in favour of a 
closed-ended approach is that people do not know their WTP for most items 
whether they are private or public goods.  Moreover, people cannot discover it by 
examining their utility function or demand curve.  Instead willingness to pay is 
revealed to them, from the consequences of their acts of judgement, when they 
make purchasing decisions.  For example, "here is an item it costs $5 will you take 
it?” (Hanemann 1995:90-1).  These purchasing decisions "whether in the market 
or in voting (for public goods) are usually discrete" (Hanemann 1995:90-1).  
Therefore the decision making is clear and so the closed-ended format is more 
realistic.  
 
Moreover, there is an abundance of evidence that respondents find open-ended 
questions more difficult to answer than closed-ended ones.  “Even if people have 
experience buying an item and can state an amount which they would be willing to 
pay, they may find it hard to state the maximum” (Hanemann 1995:90-1).  The 
maximum WTP is needed to estimate the consumer’s surplus properly.  
Open-ended responses can understate maximum willingness to pay because “the 
maximum is an extreme [and so] errors of cognition tend to fall on the low side” 
(Hanemann 1995:90-1).  This bias may be reinforced by strategic behaviour, free 
riding, associated with open-ended questions which leads respondents to state 
less than their maximum willingness to pay.  Moreover, experimental evidence 
shows that open-ended surveys reveal less than the consumer’s maximum 
willingness to pay.   
 
Arguably, the closed-ended referendum format is superior to open-ended surveys.  
There is apparently no strategic reason for the respondent to answer a referendum 
question falsely.  This led to the method being endorsed by the United States 
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Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
panel (Hanemann 1995:90).  The method has been used in many environmental 
valuation studies, for example see Garrod and Willis (1999:250-1).  Also, a recent 
study on genetically modified food used a closed-ended dichotomous choice 
question (Rigby et. al. 2004:84).  Although Willis (1995:127) argues that "there is 
no definitive evidence that referendum models out perform open-ended, payment 
card or iterative bidding formats for public goods.  There is no standard against 
which results from different methods can be compared". 
 
A closed-ended question could be constructed so that if the respondent wants 
the good, at the specified tax price, then they have to say yes.  Also they would 
have to say no if the tax price was too high for them.  The question should lead to 
respondents thinking that if extra tax is (not) paid then there is (not) the 
investment in the public good.  Respondents should not believe that the good is 
certain to be provided as this could lead them to understating their willingness to 
pay.  Instead the aim of the researcher is to elicit the respondent's willingness to 
pay correctly (Mitchell and Carson 1989:85).  This leads into a discussion about 
the question being incentive compatible.   
5.1.6.  Incentive compatibility 
 
A valuation question is incentive compatible if a respondent has the incentive to 
correctly reveal their willingness to pay (Bateman and Willis eds. 1999:161).  
Incentive compatibility requires the contingent valuation scenario to be coercive, 
i.e. the respondent would have to pay the amount bid, and consequential, i.e.  
the level of the bid should impact on the chances of the good being supplied.   
 
One of the dangers with a contingent valuation survey is that it offers 
respondents "a costless way to make a point" about the provision of public goods 
(Bateman and Willis eds. 1999:136).  To avoid this, the scenario needs to be 
made realistic.  If the payment situation could be implemented, then there is an 
incentive for the respondent to give an honest willingness to pay.  It will be in the 
respondent's interest to accept the bid if his WTP is greater or equal to the price 
asked and to reject otherwise (Pearce and Ozdemiroglu 2002:52).  If a valuation 
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question is incentive compatible then it should avoid the 'warm glow' problem 
outlined in the next section. 
 
5.1.7.  The Warm Glow Effect 
 
Respondents could treat the request for a willingness to pay amount, in a 
contingent valuation questionnaire, as they would a donation to charity.  The 
respondent would not be making a proper trade off between money and safety.  
The respondent is not stating their demand for a public good but may instead be 
purchasing ‘moral satisfaction’ (Kahneman and Knetch (1992:57).  People may 
say they are willing to pay because it gives them a feeling of well being [a 'warm 
glow'].   
 
Contingent valuation is about asking individuals to make private contributions to 
a publicly provided good.  But this gives respondents the opportunity to enjoy 
private ‘warm glow’ benefits from hypothetical contributions towards the good 
(Chilton and Hutchinson 1999:344).  The problem is that respondents may be 
more interested in the private warm glow benefits of giving and less concerned 
with the scope of the public good.  Therefore it could be problematic to transfer 
the result of a contingent valuation study to the real world.  If though a valuation 
exercise could be made to appear realistic then perhaps the ‘warm glow effect’ 
could be removed.  The question would need to encourage an honest response, 
i.e. be incentive compatible, with respondents believing that they could be taxed 
on the basis of their responses.  This is because taxation is assumed not to 
contain warm glow preferences from giving money to government (Chilton and 
Hutchinson 1999:348). 
 
5.2. Discussion on Payment Methods 
 
5.2.1.  Payment methods 
 
The chapter has so far looked at elicitation methods.  The discussion will now 
examine different payment methods.  Taxation was previously highlighted as part 
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of a referendum style question and so could be easily chosen as a payment 
method.  However, the issue is more complicated as the next section on taxation 
outlines. 
 
5.2.2.  Taxation as a payment method 
 
The chosen payment method should be connected to the good in question.  It 
should be fair and equitable as those paying for the good should be those 
receiving the benefits (Garrod and Willis 1999:132).  In theory, income tax is 
connected to say national defence and is a fair method of payment.  This is 
because taxpayers pay while it is they who receive the benefits. 
 
The advantage of taxation as a payment method is that public goods are usually 
funded out of taxation.  In particular, hypothecated taxation clarifies the link 
between the payment of taxes and the delivery of public goods.  Thus taxation 
could have legitimacy with the public (Mulgan and Murray 1997:303).  If the 
public could perceive higher taxes going into say an improved health service then 
they may be willing to pay higher taxes (Independent 2000). 
 
However, the poor quality of the debate over taxation, presents problems for its 
use as a payment method.  For example, in the run up to the 1992 election 
confrontational political imagery was used.  For example a “poster portrayed 
Labour as a huge locust gobbling up all before it” (King et. al 1993:141).  This 
negative campaigning could damage the case for public goods, giving the 
impression of a government taking too much of the public’s money.  Also in 1992 
tax was portrayed as a “bombshell” as if the public were being attacked by the 
state.  The 1997 general election was no better; tax was used as a ‘weapon’ to 
attack the incumbent [Conservative] government.  Labour emotively warned of 
plans to put VAT on food (Butler and Kavanagh 1997:60). 
 
The implications of negative campaigning are that the public may have a 
perception of government exploitation.  The danger is that harmful political 
advertising may undermine society’s support for public goods.  The concern is 
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that the use of the term ‘tax’, could cause a [public good] valuation question to be 
dismissed out of hand.  Also a valuation question which used income tax as a 
payment method would perhaps discourage responses from low or non-
taxpayers.  This is because tax may not be seen as relevant by such 
respondents.   
 
5.2.3.  Market Prices as a payment method  
 
Food safety valuation studies have asked people whether they would be willing to 
pay a higher price for safer food.  Examples include willingness to pay a price 
premium for pesticide free produce such as Fu et. al. (1999:220).  This is a 
consumer study which asked people how much more they would be willing to pay 
for food where pesticide residue was 25% less.  Such studies show that 
consumers are willing to pay higher prices (Fu et. al. 1999:221) for what they 
perceive to be lower food borne risk.  This could justify the use of market prices as 
the payment method; on the basis that it may not create the protest responses 
which taxation may engender.  Market prices could be an appropriate method 
although some concerns with market prices, as a payment method, need to be 
addressed.  This is the purpose of the next section. 
 
5.2.4.  Problems with market prices as a payment method 
 
Griffith et al’s study on chemical contaminants (1999) used food prices as the 
payment method.  One quarter of Griffith et.al.’s (1999:113) respondents agreed 
with the statement:”If I had to increase the amount I spend on food each week to 
fund the programme, I would change the type or amount of food I buy”.  Higher 
food prices could lead to less food being bought or the same quantity with a lower 
quality and price.  The funding of public goods is not supposed to affect food 
consumption; if it did then it would create another distortion which could require 
intervention.  Another concern is that, some consumers may be saying that they 
would change the type or amount of food that they are buying to avoid having to 
fund the programme.  Food prices, potentially give people the opportunity to ‘free 
ride’ by changing their food consumption patterns so they do not have to pay. 
  
 
 
 
62 
 
The study removed 30% of the respondents, from the benefit estimation, who were 
not willing to pay for the surveillance programme.  The justification for doing this is 
free riding; that people may want the public good of surveillance but are not willing 
to pay for it.  It is stated that “it is apparent that the vast majority of zero bids were 
protests rather than a valid assessment of the actual value placed by respondents 
on the programme” (Griffith et. al. 1999:108).  However, some respondents may 
not have been willing to pay because they did not understand the question.  People 
may have thought that they were being asked to pay more, through higher food 
prices, for a public programme for which they were already paying taxes.  The 
question is about keeping the programme and paying a higher price for food 
versus removing the programme (Griffith et al. 1999:103).  It appears implicit, that 
taxes would fall slightly if the programme were removed.  Respondents may have 
difficulty understanding this concept because the reduced tax burden is not made 
clear.   
 
5.2.5.  Summary of discussion on payment methods 
 
The previous discussion suggested that the use of market prices can be 
problematic.  An increase in food prices is an unusual way to fund public goods.  
Indeed, the proposal to fund the Food Standards Agency from a levy on food 
retailers was dropped.  This was due to industry opposition, but also the costs to 
retailers would have been passed onto consumers which would have been 
unpopular.  Nevertheless the concerns with income tax could cause the payment 
question to be rejected, regardless of whether people want more food safety or not.  
Market prices may avoid this problem and could therefore be more appropriate.   
 
 
5.3. Discussion on Property Rights 
 
5.3.1.  Willingness to pay and willingness to accept 
 
The discussion will now explain why the study needs to be about 'willingness to 
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pay' rather than 'willingness to accept'.  A willingness to accept question involves 
the respondent having to trade off less safety for more money.  This is a 
contentious exercise as the Griffith et. al. study (1999:103) emphasised.  Nearly all 
the respondents [92%] said they definitely or probably would not be prepared to 
pay lower food prices in exchange for lower levels of food safety.  To understand 
fully why the willingness to accept measure is controversial, it is necessary to 
discuss the concept of property rights. 
 
5.3.2.  Introduction to Property Rights 
 
Consumer property rights are where the consumer can decide whether or not to 
consume the good (Garrod and Willis 1999:17).  Under pure public goods, such as 
defence expenditure, exclusion cannot be practised, or the benefit avoided, so 
consumers do not have a property right.  However, under impure or semi-public 
goods, such as some aspects of food safety regulation, consumers do have a 
choice.  For example, they can purchase food from supermarkets where public 
intervention is limited.  The problem is that the public could feel that they have to 
pay twice.  First, in terms of private averting behaviour, to minimise individual or 
household risks, by shopping at the major supermarkets.  Second, in terms of 
paying for the government to address food hazards particularly in small premises, 
whether they use these or not.   
 
If the individual does not own the right to a good, then the relevant measure of the 
usefulness of the good to the individual is the maximum he would be willing to pay 
to acquire it.  However, if the individual owns the good, then the minimum the 
individual would be willing to accept as compensation for its loss is the appropriate 
utility measure.  This is because willingness to accept is the amount that would 
restore the individual to his utility level before being deprived of the good (Garrod 
and Willis 1999:126). 
 
It is suggested that research on consumer demand could provide insight into 
alternative levels of food safety, either above or below the established standards 
(Caswell ed.  1991:20).  Willingness to pay is about measuring an increase in food 
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safety above the established standard.  Under willingness to accept, a respondent 
is asked to state how much money they want for a lower level of food safety.  
However, it is difficult to measure “below the established standard”.  Willingness to 
accept tends to be higher than willingness to pay.  The reasons for this are useful 
for highlighting the problems associated with property rights.   
 
5.3.3.  The challenge from property rights 
 
Willingness to accept may be higher because people may reject the property right 
implied by WTA questions; that they have to “sell” their right to some food safety 
attribute.  Moreover, psychologists suggest that ownership itself makes a 
commodity more valuable resulting in a higher selling price (Garrod and Willis 
1999:127).  Compared to willingness to pay for a commodity, respondents are 
more reluctant to forgo the same good if they feel that they own it. 
 
Moreover, respondents may behave in a calculated way.  They may have a greater 
incentive to act strategically when being asked about how much money they want 
for the loss of a good.  In contingent valuation terms, this could be a home owner 
wanting to overstate their demand for compensation in the context of a compulsory 
purchase (Garrod and Willis 1999:127-8).  People may demand much more to give 
up an object, such as the ownership of a house, than they would be willing to pay to 
acquire it.  This creates an asymmetry of value and is described as “loss aversion”.  
The value function (the trade off between money and safety) is steeper for losses 
than for gains (Mitchell and Carson 1989:35).  Individuals would, in theory, want 
increasing [steeper] amounts of money for incremental [steady] increases in food 
risk. 
 
To summarise, people’s values and willingness to make trade offs are conditioned 
by their initial endowment of the goods in question.  It is argued that individuals 
“disproportionately prefer the status quo” (Garrod and Willis 1999:128).  This may 
have interesting implications for food safety and may explain some of the food 
concerns of recent years e.g. over the introduction of novel foods which is clearly a 
departure from the status quo. 
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5.3.4.  Irradiated food and property rights  
 
The introduction of irradiated food could be contentious from a property rights 
perspective.  Donaldson et. al. (1996) studied people's willingness to pay for the 
irradiation of poultry meat.  The aim of the study was to estimate the benefits of 
using irradiation to eliminate the risk of poultry-borne illness.  In particular, the 
purpose was to estimate the intangible benefits of reducing the risk of illness.  A 
preliminary question was asked to elicit whether respondents would buy irradiated 
poultry meat.  If they would, they were then asked about their willingness to pay.  
This was done by asking respondents about their willingness to pay, over and 
above current expenditure, for poultry meat which had been treated by this method 
(Donaldson et. al. 1996:285).  “Participants were asked how much extra they 
would be willing to pay; as a percentage of what they currently spend on poultry 
each week” (Donaldson et. al. 1996:287). 
 
Irradiation is about exposing products to specified doses of ionizing radiation so 
that the safety of the poultry can be maintained.  For example, salmonella and 
campylobacter are killed off by irradiation (Donaldson et. al. 1996:286).  The 
problem is that the use of food irradiation was not permitted in the UK until 1991 
(Donaldson et. al. 1996:286).  More significantly, is that the food retailers do not, 
officially, sell irradiated food making the study unrealistic from a public perspective 
(Marsden et. al. 1997:26).  Also, like genetically modified food, there is not a 
consensus on whether irradiation is acceptable (Henson 1995) which could lead to 
a rejection of the property rights underlying the question. 
 
The property rights assumption is that since consumers do not have irradiated food 
then they would be willing to pay more to acquire it.  This is acceptable for those 
who approve of the technology.  However, the methodology encountered problems, 
for those who did not approve of irradiated meat.  Respondents were instead 
asked if they were willing to pay more to have poultry meat which had not been 
irradiated.  Those respondents were being asked to pay more to maintain the 
status quo (i.e. non irradiated poultry meat).  Not surprisingly many of those, 
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whose preferences were for non - irradiated poultry meat, were not willing to pay. 
 
5.3.5.  Property rights and protest responses 
 
Mitchell and Carson (1989:32) describe a study with both willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept questions.  Respondents frequently gave protest responses, 
or infinite values, when asked how much they would accept in return for not having 
an amenity, for which they own the property right.  In contrast, the willingness to 
pay question, to receive the amenity, appeared to be less contentious.  The 
implication is that willingness to accept generally is not used because it appears 
that people are unwilling to trade off rights, which they think they should have, 
against money.  The protest bids and infinite values may reflect the unwillingness 
to trade off or lose a particular ‘property right’. 
 
A study of the greenbelt, on Tyneside, “demonstrated that the preservation of the 
greenbelt, in terms of the amenity value of the land, was highly dependent upon 
the property rights perspective and whether accept or payment measures were 
used in the evaluation.  Willingness to pay to avert the loss of the green belt was 
only one third of the willingness to accept compensation for its loss” (Garrod and 
Willis 1999:174).   
 
“The example illustrates the importance of the property rights perspective to the 
valuation of an asset.  It might be argued that, in Britain, amenity rights to greenbelt 
land are vested with the local community.  Unfortunately, local authorities are all 
too willing to grant planning permission for urban development on green belt land 
without compensating local residents in any way for the amenity loss” (Garrod and 
Willis 1999:174).  Environmental valuation has undergone greater investigation, 
than food safety valuation, so again there is an example from the environmental 
literature that could help inform this research.  The property rights issue will need 
careful attention in a food safety contingent valuation given that policy appears to 
be loaded against local residents in the context of no compensation. 
 
5.3.6.  Food safety property rights 
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In the context of food safety, property rights could be less contentious if 
improvements to safety are outlined.  A reduction in risk is appropriate for valuation 
because people do not 'own' the safety right and so should be willing to pay.  
Moreover, in chapter 1, it was explained that people were willing to consume food 
which might not be entirely safe.  This might be because people feel that they have 
a right to gain or acquire food which might not be safe e.g. soft boiled eggs. 
 
The property rights issue becomes more contentious if the subject is a reduction in 
‘rights’.  The public will strongly defend their right not to eat potentially unsafe food.  
This is based on the above discussion on the willingness to accept compensation.  
The Food Standards Agency’s recommendation that the Over Thirty Month Rule 
should be replaced with BSE testing is particularly controversial.  The Over Thirty 
Month Rule “does not allow cattle over 30 months to enter the food chain” (Food 
Standards Agency 2003b).  The Agency’s own figures suggest that it is safer than 
BSE testing.  The change, based on the Agency’s most realistic estimates, “could 
mean less than one additional case of new variant CJD (human BSE) over the next 
sixty years”.  The recommendation could be justified on the basis of excessive 
(marginal) costs given the slight difference in risk between the two policies.  The 
money saved is £300 million per year, given that the OTM rule costs £360 million 
compared to BSE testing of £60 million.  This money could perhaps save more 
lives elsewhere say if it were invested in the health service.  Nevertheless, the 
Agency is recommending a policy which will increase risk; in which case a 
willingness to pay measure, of the Agency’s activities in this area, would be 
inappropriate.  A willingness to accept measure would be more accurate but 
attempting such a measure could be impossible if the compensation figure were 
stated to be infinite.  Moreover, the perceived risks are of the worst kinds such as 
dread risk, CJD is invariably fatal, and involuntary risk, the food consumer will not 
know if they are that possible additional CJD case.  Also, the external costs could 
be huge if the ‘additional case’ were a blood or organ donor. 
 
5.3.7.  A new approach to Property Rights 
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Mitchell and Carson (1989:38) propose a “new property rights approach” to the 
problems posed by willingness to pay and in particular willingness to accept.  They 
suggest a “rethinking of the property right implied in those public goods which 
require annual payments ... to maintain a given level of the good”.  The respondent 
will be asked what they are willing to pay, so that the present level of consumption, 
of the public good, can be maintained.  Mitchell and Carson (1989:38) suggest that 
many public goods have the characteristics outlined.  For example, they argue that 
“air quality would rapidly decline if no money were spent by business and 
government on control measures”.   
 
In a contingent valuation study the respondent would be first informed that they are 
already paying taxes to provide the current quality level of a good such as air 
visibility.  They would then be asked to state the maximum payment (which could 
be the present payment) that they are willing to make to preserve the current 
quality level.  “To use a referendum analogy, the consumer is asked to set the 
highest amount they would be willing to pay annually in taxes for a given program, 
which guarantees to maintain the present level of supply of a good for the next and 
succeeding years” (Mitchell and Carson 1989:41).   
 
The Griffith et. al. study (1999) highlights the difficulty of the new property rights 
approach.  Respondents were asked: “if for some reason, the current source of 
funding for the survey and research programme were to stop and the only 
alternative source of funding would increase the price of food in the shops would 
you be willing to pay more for the food you buy each week to ensure the 
programme could continue?” (Griffith et al. 1999:105).  However, the study may 
have suffered through the use of the new property rights approach.  It may have 
been better if the question had stated, you pay a level of taxation for the monitoring 
of chemicals in food now; would you be willing to pay a certain amount more for a 
specified improvement in the monitoring programme.  This would have been 
clearer to respondents as there is an explicit exchange between more money and 
a greater investment in monitoring.  There is an issue about the present value of 
the current policy but that may not be well addressed by contingent valuation.  
Perhaps, contingent valuation is better employed where respondents can see a 
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direct relationship, in theory at least, between an increased payment and an 
improvement in the public good. 
 
5.3.8.  Summary of property rights issue 
 
The challenge from the property rights issue pervades a contingent valuation 
questionnaire in this context.  Food safety is seen as uncompromising; in other 
words consumers expect it to be provided.   Although some consumers may be 
willing to pay more for some relatively strong guarantee of safety, the majority feel 
that it is a right; rather than a privilege for which extra should be paid.  
 
Ironically, the increase in publicity about poor food safety could raise its value as a 
positive benefit (Loader and Hobbs 1999:692-3).  This raises difficult questions 
about what consumers can expect from the food industry and from the existing 
level of public food regulation.  Poorer food safety could imply an erosion of the 
consumer’s property rights which would explain why additional safety would be 
seen as having a positive benefit.  The public would need to purchase ‘food safety’ 
and be willing to pay for it to make up for the poorer prevailing standards.  They 
might though be reluctant to buy the ‘ownership’ of food safety, as they may feel 
that they should already possess this property right.  These expectations will have 
implications for the public's willingness to pay. 
 
This section has shown that a contingent valuation survey, examining food safety, 
below the initial level would be difficult to justify given the controversial nature of 
willingness to accept measures.  Therefore contingent valuation is suitably applied 
when monetary values are associated with anticipated improvements in safety 
(Jones-Lee et al. 1985:49).  The research undertaken for this thesis focuses on 
[the measurement of] the benefit of risk reduction.  If the hazard is serious enough 
to involve the saving of lives, then the economist can attempt to elicit the value for 
"the prevention of a statistical fatality" (Jones Lee et. al 1999:51).  
 
Garrod and Willis (1999:131) suggest that once the property rights issue has been 
resolved then a contingent valuation study can be undertaken.  However, this 
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issue is not easily resolved.  The public may be reluctant to accept explanations for 
why increases in risk have occurred.  This is because food safety is a public right 
[see 2.2].  Therefore, the advantages to the public arising from ‘successful’ food 
safety could be perceived to be small.  However, the costs of food safety problems 
can be huge; in particular where the hazard is serious. 
 
5.4.  Discussion on Part-whole bias (described as 'embedding') 
 
5.4.1.  The challenge from Part-whole bias 
 
The valuation of the whole scenario in a contingent valuation study [see 4.4], could 
lead to 'part-whole bias'.  This is where values of individual (food safety) 
characteristics when aggregated separately, can be worth more than the value of 
the whole concept (Garrod and Willis 1999:9).  The problem is that different 
quantities of the same public good tend to be treated, or valued, in the same way 
(Garrod and Willis 1999:163).  For example, people may be willing to pay almost 
as much to preserve a single elephant as they would be willing to pay to preserve 
the whole of African wildlife (Holland 1995:26). 
 
In the food safety context, if the benefit of reducing different types of food 
poisoning were valued separately then they would probably be worth ‘more’, than if 
they were appraised collectively.  Part-whole bias is a persistent challenge in 
contingent valuation.  Garrod and Willis (1999:144) describe a private goods study 
where the value of the parts consistently exceeded that of the whole which 
suggests that further refinement of the contingent valuation method will not lead to 
the eradication of the part-whole bias in public goods.  This discussion can be 
understood using the following case study on salmonella. 
 
5.4.2.  Food poisoning case study 
 
5.4.2.1. Covey et. al. 1998: A study on food poisoning informed by Henson’s 
1996 research. 
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This is a study on egg consumption in which people were asked how much more 
they would be willing to pay for an alternative brand of eggs.  The research 
compared this alternative safer brand of eggs, where the risk of food poisoning 
was lower, with the type of eggs that they would usually buy.   
 
The researchers were interested in whether respondents were likely to assign 
much the same values to a good; as to a subset of that good.  The 'good' was the 
benefit, from the reduction in risk of food poisoning, to the respondent.  The 'good' 
included the range of food poisoning possibilities, from death, to severe cases, to 
mild episodes of illness.  A subset of the 'good' was only part of the benefit; say a 
reduction in the risk of death only. 
 
The questionnaire asked people what they would be willing to pay for the safer 
[alternative] brand of eggs, on top of the average price per box.  They were asked 
what they would be willing to pay for the reduction in [egg consumption food 
poisoning] risk.  They were asked their willingness to pay in two different ways to 
test the embedding concept (see table 5.1).  A major shortcoming was that, a in the 
bottom up format, was different to, c in the top down layout. 
 
Table 5.1:  Covey et. al. questionnaire on food poisoning risk 
 
Bottom up      Top down 
 
Reduction in risk of     Reduction in risk of 
 
(a)  Food poisoning leading to death  (a)  Death + severe + mild 
(b)  Severe food poisoning    (b)  Death + severe 
(c)  Mild food poisoning     (c)  Death 
(d)  Death + Severe + Mild    (d)  Mild 
 
5.4.2.2. Discussion on embedding  
 
Proponents of contingent valuation, such as Mitchell and Carson, suggest that 
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embedding is a problem caused by defects in the survey design rather than 
shortcomings with the method itself (Covey et. al. 1998:246). However, Covey et. 
al. (1998:246) suggest that the onus is on the practitioner to establish the 
sensitivity of their measurement device properly; through the use of internal 
consistency checks.  The implicit argument is that if after thorough and proper 
investigation embedding still occurs, then this would raise doubts over the 
methodology.  Covey et. al. (1998:249) suggest that “if x is a subset of a bundle of 
goods X, and if respondents are WTP the same amount for x as for X, they would 
be exhibiting the kind of insensitivity to scope .., known as the embedding effect”.   
 
The authors compared willingness to pay to reduce the risk of death (the subset of 
a bundle of goods) with reductions in the risks of death, severe and mild food 
poisoning (the bundle of goods).  It is suggested that the results (1998:254) show 
limitations with contingent valuation.  Different orders were used to measure 
willingness to pay to avoid the various food risks.  The first order was (1) death, 
then (2) death and severe food poisoning and lastly (3) death, severe food 
poisoning and mild food poisoning.  The second order was the reverse.  In other 
words, (1) death, severe food poisoning and mild food poisoning, then (2) death 
and severe food poisoning and lastly (3) just death.  In the first order by adding 
food poisoning the valuation increased slightly.  In the second order, by taking 
away the food poisoning the valuation decreased by more.  Death contributed 
more to the total amount (death, major food poisoning and minor food poisoning) in 
the first order.   
 
The subset of the bundle of goods (death) contributed more to the whole bundle of 
goods (death and major and minor food poisoning) when it was asked about first.  
This shows that the order in which the questions are asked affects the valuation.  
The question order has an impact on the value of the parts in relation to the whole.  
This should not be the case and so this "sequencing effect" (Aakkula1999:96) 
raises doubts over the methodology.   
 
One of the reasons for Covey et. al’s unsatisfactory results may be that reductions 
in the risk of death were used to test embedding.  “The very small size of the 
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reduction in the risk of death - just 1 in 6,000,000 - magnifies such [embedding] 
effects when it comes to calculating the value of statistical life”  (Covey et.al. 
1998:254).  The subset, death, dominates the whole group of goods, death and 
severe and mild food poisoning. 
 
Another concern is with the food safety benefit presented in Covey et. al's study 
(1998:254).  The benefit could have been seen as a “good thing”.  Thus people just 
stated what they could afford to obtain ownership of it.  The public may have 
responded by stating a willingness to pay amount, to purchase the good, which 
represented what they could afford to pay without greatly disturbing their current 
expenditure pattern.   Respondents may have offered a valuation based on what 
they could afford rather than a valuation based on the scope of the good 
presented. 
 
5.4.2.3 Understanding food poisoning 
 
This section outlines that the public may not be able to understand different extents 
of food poisoning.  Therefore different scopes of illness could be treated the same.  
Covey et. al. (1998:249) note that respondents are unable to differentiate between 
severe temporary episodes of food poisoning, and the same initial experience 
followed by a lifelong chronic condition.  This indicates the difficulty with trying to 
explain serious cases of food poisoning to respondents.  Henson’s (1996:404) 
food poisoning study argued; the main weakness of contingent valuation surveys 
is their reliance upon hypothetical scenarios.  Salmonella from eggs being an 
example of a food hazard which is rarely relevant to the public’s understanding.  
Indeed, health issues, underlying the use of contingent valuation in this food policy 
area, may be difficult for economists to use fully.   
 
Covey et. al (1998:249) used Henson’s severe (temporary) food poisoning 
description from his 1996 study but thought that another definition for chronic food 
poisoning was necessary.  They suggest that “from a survey of the clinical 
literature, it appeared that a proportion of severe cases of food poisoning from 
eggs are liable to result in a chronic condition known as Irritable Bowel Syndrome”. 
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5.4.2.4. Conclusion to Covey et. al’s study 
 
The valuation of reductions in risk, to avoid death, should be avoided.  First, it may 
dominate other factors that could be valued such as severe and more common 
cases of food poisoning.  Moreover, death is emotive and the minute risks of 1 in 6 
000 000 are abstract from the public’s understanding.  Chronic types of food 
poisoning could also be avoided as it may be unclear how long these episodes of 
illness are likely to last.  The practitioner undertaking a valuation study has the 
problem of not knowing when severe food poisoning is likely to become a chronic 
condition.  
 
The danger is that severe temporary and severe chronic cases of food poisoning 
could become embedded or difficult to separate from each other.  To reduce this 
‘embedding' problem only common, that is less severe and non permanent, cases 
of food poisoning could be outlined in a study.  Moreover, common cases of food 
poisoning could be more understandable to respondents. 
 
5.4.3    Problems over the scope and scale of a contingent valuation 
question 
 
A general concern is that respondents do not understand the scope or scale of the 
question.  A contingent valuation questionnaire, on food safety, could lead into 
areas which go beyond food safety; defined as the probability of not suffering some 
food hazard (Henson and Traill 1993:153).  If respondents were asked whether 
they were willing to pay for safer meat then they may have trouble separating food 
safety, from other issues such as animal welfare. 
 
Respondents may not be able to distinguish between differences in the scale of the 
good (Garrod and Willis 1999:158).  Individuals may find it hard to distinguish 
between minor or more serious outbreaks of food poisoning.  There could be 
confusion over the scope of food regulation.  It could cover just food poisoning or 
have much greater breadth including BSE.  The following case study shows the 
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problems that can occur if respondents overestimate the scope of the public good 
being presented to them. 
 
5.4.4.  Case study on chemical contamination 
 
5.4.4.1. Griffith et al’s study on chemical contaminants (1999) 
 
This study is an attempt to value a government programme monitoring chemical 
contaminants in food.  The research looks at chemicals, such as dioxin, which may 
enter the food chain inadvertently from industrial processes.  Naturally occurring 
toxicants, such as mycotoxins, are also examined by this former MAFF 
surveillance project. 
 
“The aim of this evaluation is to assess whether current controls on chemical 
contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants are cost effective” (Griffith et. al. 
1999: i).  Contingent valuation was used as members of the public were asked 
whether they would be willing to pay “a certain pre-specified amount each week 
through higher food prices to (make sure that) the current programme of controls 
would continue” (Griffith et.  al. 1999: vi).  As part of the contingent valuation 
exercise “a variety of attitudinal questions were included to test the reliability of 
responses to the willingness to pay question” (Griffith et. al. 1999: vii), to find out 
whether people were giving valid reasons for being willing to pay or not. 
 
5.4.4.2. Problems with understanding the scope of the programme 
 
Embedding was present in the study when nearly 30% of respondents agreed with 
the statement: “I would expect the survey and research programme to help reduce 
all hazards associated with food not just those with which it is specifically aimed at”.  
So, nearly 30% of people expected the study to do more than monitor chemical 
contamination in food.  This could lead to those people overvaluing the benefits of 
the programme.   
The authors concluded that the policy intervention produced a significant net social 
benefit (Griffith et. al 1999:118).  The average willingness to pay was used to 
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estimate the value placed on the current controls by the population as a whole 
(Griffith et. al. 1999:113).  To calculate the benefit across the population it is 
necessary to multiply household willingness to pay, per year, by the number of 
households.  The household annual “willingness to pay” was £38 which if 
multiplied by the number of households [23.5 million] gives a total annual value 
across the population of £887 million.  This leads to a cost benefit analysis over the 
duration of the five year programme.  The benefits of the programme are valued at 
£4.4 billion [£887 million for 5 years] compared to a cost of 19.3 million. 
 
The embedding problem suggests that the estimated benefit should be treated 
with caution.  The programme is one of surveillance only, so the net social benefit 
could be due to respondents also valuing a reduction in the source of the 
contamination.  Perhaps, respondents were also valuing a reduction in the sources 
of pollution which could affect food safety.  Heavy metals, such as cadmium, could 
contaminate the food supply highlighting the need to reduce atmospheric pollution.  
A report on the chemical aspects of food surveillance states that:”major 
atmospheric sources of cadmium include refuse incineration, non-ferrous metal 
production, iron and steel production and fossil fuel combustion.  The main routes 
by which cadmium contamination of agricultural soils in the UK can occur are from 
atmospheric deposition” (MAFF 1998:8).                                                                 
 
A programme which monitors the levels of chemicals in food should lead to later 
action being taken, when contamination is above a specified threshold.   However, 
surveillance does not have any direct value on its own.  It is a preliminary cost, an 
essential prerequisite, which guides decision making over where intervention may 
be needed.  It is the follow up action such as a ban on contaminated food where 
the direct benefit lies.  The public's valuation of the 'monitoring benefit' may be 
vastly over estimated.  The public may believe that the industrial processes which 
can cause contamination are being dealt with as part of the chemical monitoring 
programme. 
 
It is difficult to see how a monitoring programme can have such huge benefits.  A 
broader programme, than just monitoring, would try and reduce contamination at 
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source such as through tighter controls on incinerators and other industrial 
processes.  Controls such as these largely explain, the 82%, reduction in dioxin 
intakes from food in the United Kingdom (ENDS 2001:48).  The problem is that a 
broad set of measures, such as those described, should be worth significantly 
more than a monitoring programme, which itself was supposed to be worth £4.4 
billion.  However, if the public are unable to distinguish between the scopes of 
different programmes then a ‘chemical reduction at source’ programme would also 
be valued at about £4.4 billion.   
 
Another environmental example is instructive.  A contingent valuation study could 
estimate the benefit of a public programme to monitor air pollution from road 
vehicles in a particular area.  However, the valuation would not be able to include 
any actual health benefits because these are dependent upon later interventions.  
Health benefits would require additional policies, such as those to reduce traffic 
levels or improve exhausts.  Likewise, the success of the contaminants 
programme will depend on the quality and quantity of subsequent interventions 
which may be needed.  It is suggested that MAFF has looked at “the impact on the 
food chain of emissions of dioxins from incinerators and other chemical plants”.  
The tests on dioxin in milk in the Bolsover area is an example of this survey (Griffith 
et al. 1999:21).  The fundamental issue though is about what action is taken 
regarding food once it has been tested.  This is particularly the case if it is shown to 
be contaminated. 
 
5.4.5. Insensitivity to scope 
 
The previous discussion argued that respondents may not be able to judge the 
scope of a public goods programme accurately.  The particular concern is that 
respondents may not be able to understand properly the difference between the 
'part' and the 'whole' of a good (see 5.4.1.).  A method can be used to try and 
reduce this challenge in contingent valuation studies (Aakkula 1999:97).  A study 
could describe a good and a smaller part of the good too, with a clear statement 
that the good and the smaller entity are separate.  Respondents could then be 
asked to value the (whole) good and to allocate a proportion of its value to the 
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smaller entity.  This has been undertaken for the valuation of landscapes (Willis 
and Garrod 1993:1-22). 
 
Another study (Powe and Bateman 2004:258-271) asked respondents to value 
riverline saline flood alleviation schemes in an area of Broadland, an area that 
stretches across parts of Norfolk and Suffolk in Eastern England.  "A larger, 
embracing scheme to protect the "whole" area from saline flooding was compared 
to four smaller, separate "part" schemes that would only protect sub-areas of 
Broadland" (Powe and Bateman 2004:259).  It is suggested that variations in the 
perceived realism of different programmes could lead to an insensitivity of scope.  
The 'part' schemes were considered to be significantly more realistic than the 
'whole' scheme (Powe and Bateman 2004:259).  "It was found that respondents 
perceiving a scheme to be realistic were ... significantly likely to be willing to pay 
more than those who questioned the realism of a given scheme" (Powe and 
Bateman 2004:268).  Thus 'part schemes' could be valued more highly, in relation 
to the whole, because of the perceived realism of the 'part-schemes'.  
Consequently, realism could be a relevant factor in explaining insensitivity to 
scope. 
 
In terms of food safety, there is perhaps the danger of attempting a valuation of an 
unrealistic whole scenario.  The above analysis "that respondents may consider 
larger schemes less realistic than smaller alternatives" (Powe and Bateman 
2004:268) should be borne in mind.  It may be unwise to value the elimination of 
food poisoning as this could be seen as unrealistic.  Respondents could simply 
reject such a (whole) scenario and refuse to pay.  How food safety issues could 
impact on a valuation study is discussed in the next chapter.  Such issues need to 
be perceived as realistic and understandable for the exercise to be a success. 
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Chapter 6:  The impact of food safety issues on contingent valuation  
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
The last chapter examined some of the methodological issues affecting a 
contingent valuation survey.  This chapter will discuss how food safety issues 
impact on such a valuation study.  In particular, risk perception and information 
asymmetry are relevant.  It will also examine how people approach questions 
involving safety, and how this can affect their valuations.  Again environmental 
examples are helpful as they provide guidance for how a safety valuation could be 
undertaken and what issues may emerge. 
 
Risk perception, will be discussed in detail first.  It will put food safety in context.  It 
will suggest that other broader concerns, such as nutrition, may be of greater 
economic significance than food safety concepts. 
 
6.2.   Risk Perception 
 
6.2.1. Introduction  
 
This discussion focuses on the divergence between the risk perceived by the 
public and the 'actual' level of risk assuming it is known.  The cause of this 
divergence is that there is a limited amount of information that the public can 
assimilate.  Moreover, the information which is considered may be interpreted in a 
subjective manner.  For example, consumers may become overly concerned 
about certain risks and may overestimate particular risks such as botulism.  
Consumer pressures for safety could lead to excessive costs as the example in 
chapter 1 suggested.  Perhaps, an underestimation of food risks, on the part of 
consumers led to “too little” safety being provided, given the example of salmonella 
in eggs. 
 
6.2.2. Classifications of food risk 
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Consumer risk perceptions make decision making regarding food safety fraught.  It 
is stated that public “value judgements are not resolvable scientifically” (Doderlein 
1988:9).  This can be explained by the potential gap between consequences and 
probabilities.  The consequences, of an invariably fatal food hazard, approaches 
infinity although the probability (the risk) for the relevant event may approach zero” 
(Doderlein 1988:5).  Market failure may arise through consumer's 
misunderstanding of probabilities.  People “have been shown to have problems 
dealing with very small changes in probabilities and in understanding risk change 
concepts" (Ives et. al (1995:73).  Thus, market failure could occur because 
consumer purchasing behaviour could become volatile leading to, say, too much 
demand for food safety.   
 
The severity of the hazard is relevant as the “zero-infinity” problem suggested.  A 
small chance of a severe outcome, such as botulism, may cause more concern 
than a higher chance of a less severe outcome, for example salmonella (Ritson 
and Li Wei 1998:257).  Another concept is availability bias.  In general terms, rare 
causes of death are overestimated and common causes underestimated.  For 
example, the public estimate of number of deaths from botulism per year is higher 
than the actual number of deaths.  “This seems to agree with the general prediction 
from availability that vivid events will be easier to recall and that they will be given 
an inflated subjective probability”.  It is suggested that there is causality between 
news media reports and subjective risk estimates.  This is because; a bias in 
newspaper reports tends to favour those dramatic deaths that can be 
overestimated (Brehmer 1988:29-30).  The probabilities associated with hazards 
which are highly visible, sudden and receive high levels of publicity, such as 
botulism are over-estimated, whereas the probabilities associated with silent, 
gradual events, such as diet related coronary heart disease or cancer are 
underestimated (Henson and Traill 1993: 156). 
 
The difficult problems, in terms of risk perception, are to a greater extent those 
food issues for which society has no frequency information or little such 
information such as BSE (Brehmer 1988:32).  Ritson and Li Wei (1998:257) 
suggest that food concerns which are subject to contradictory evidence also 
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present a challenge.  This is because, given BSE, scientific evidence is 
inconclusive and expert opinion is in disagreement (Lang et. al. 1996:5).  Also 
scientifically defined risk, in other words, the “quantification of risk as probability for 
fatalities per year” (Bjordal 1988:45) may have less value, to the consumer, in the 
context of conflicting estimates and explanations.  Moreover, in the face of 
evolving evidence over risks the public may take a conservative attitude.  
“Research indicates that, as evidence accumulates, public perceptions are slow to 
change, and can be extremely persistent in the face of contrary evidence.  Initial 
impressions about a hazard tend to structure the way that subsequent evidence is 
interpreted” (Cox and Tait 1991:184). 
 
Expert and public perceptions of risk may differ over particular food hazards.  
There is a difference between what many scientists perceive to be relevant, such 
as microbiological concerns, versus what consumers perceive to be relevant, e.g. 
chemical contamination (Brennan et. al. 2001: 10-12).  Expert judgements often 
focus upon fatality rates but this is only one of the aspects that affect the public’s 
perceived risk.   
 
Therefore consumers do not always agree with the risk calculated by experts.  
Such differences do not mean that lay people are irrational in their risk assessment 
or that experts are wrong (Brehmer 1988:29-30).  It is just that they have different 
perspectives.  For example, a public perspective may give more emphasis to risks 
affecting vulnerable groups such as the old and young.  Perhaps, the way CJD 
may be affecting a particular, although not necessarily vulnerable group, younger 
people, could account for some of the concern over the disease. 
 
There are other concepts associated with risk perception.  A voluntary risk is 
preferred to an involuntary one.  A decision to choose a specific product, where the 
risk is understood, is preferred to a possible exposure to an unknown risk.  A 
takeaway meal is an example of an unknown risk if the takeaway does not label its 
foods in detail.  Also, naturally occurring risks are perceived more favourably, 
compared to man made risks.  For example, unpasteurised milk may be more 
harmful than food conventionally grown with pesticides.  However, if 'raw' milk is 
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seen as natural then it may be perceived more favourably than conventionally 
grown food.  Lack of awareness of food issues may also be problematic.  For 
example, there may be particular concern over patulin, a chemical which was 
found in apple juice.   
 
If consumer biases are leading to disparities with expert opinion then there are 
implications for government intervention.  The chemical versus microbiological 
dichotomy would be a classic example.  Perhaps a disproportionate level of 
attention is given to chemical hazards, compared to microbiological hazards.  This 
is because chemical hazards suggest a range of unfavourable risk perception 
factors such as an involuntary hazard and lack of public knowledge.  Caswell and 
Henson (1999:593) suggest that the food hazards which command the most 
attention from governments are not necessarily those for which the risk to human 
health (as scientifically or probabilistically defined) is greatest.  Rather, 
governments may also be guided by political considerations such as the need to 
protect “consumer confidence” or to be seen to be “taking action”. 
 
The debate over genetically modified food can be seen as a debate over control 
over the food system and, in particular, the public’s control over their food 
consumption.  This suggests that the public would prefer to choose whether or not 
to consume GM food on a voluntary basis. 
 
6.2.3. The relevance of nutrition to the economics of food safety 
 
The James report (1997) claims that in economic terms, nutritional aspects of food 
quality and safety have a much greater economic and health impact than 
microbiological, chemical or GM or novel food concerns.  James suggested that 
“the economic cost of diet based diseases is three to four times that of all food 
scares, including BSE” (Financial Times 1997).  This suggests that a broad 
definition of food safety is needed including the nutritional quality of the diet.  Diet is 
relevant as it puts the cost of major food concerns, such as BSE, into perspective.  
However, health problems caused by poor nutrition or diet could be perceived as a 
voluntary risk.  This is because information is now widely available on what is an 
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appropriate diet.  Therefore the public can make their own choices to a greater 
extent over nutritional issues compared to food ‘emergencies’ such as BSE.  
 
6.2.4. Risk Communication 
 
This leads onto how the government should deal with consumer risk perceptions.  
The government has frequently chosen to communicate risk to the public with 
emphasis being placed on a dose - response approach.  This is the amount of food 
which would need to be consumed to cause ill health.   An example of a dose 
response approach was when radioactive waste was found in supermarket salmon 
(Daily Telegraph 2003).  The Government’s Food Standards Agency 
communicated risk stating that a consumer would need to eat 700 portions of 
salmon a day for the salmon to be ‘unsafe’ (Food Standards Agency 2003a).  
However, the issue could also be considered from the premise of an involuntary 
risk; that the public unknowingly purchased contaminated salmon.  Greenpeace 
took what could be interpreted as an ‘involuntary risk perspective’ stating that the 
radioactive waste should not be there (Daily Telegraph 2003).  Given that the 
radioactive waste was not previously known to be present, to newspaper readers, 
then the public did not have a voluntary choice over purchase.  The difference in 
risk perception between The Food Standards Agency and Greenpeace makes the 
evaluation of government intervention, in terms of risk communication difficult. 
 
6.2.5. Risk homeostasis 
 
This section continues the theme of perceived risk.  A hypothesis was developed 
(Wilde 1982) that the public attempts to keep the level of risk at a constant level.  
This theory has been termed risk homeostasis and has also been described as risk 
compensation.  It is suggested that “safety interventions that do not alter people’s 
propensity to take risks will be frustrated” because people will try and “re-establish 
the level of risk” with which they were originally content (Adams 1995:215).  
Examples of this theory have often been given in the context of road accidents.  It 
is argued that if roads are made safer, then motorists will drive faster.  This offsets 
the reduction in risk, say from improved road design (Cox and Tait 1991:191). 
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Risk homeostasis theory could be applied to food safety.  If a food technology is 
believed to be safe then society will use it more dangerously, to get more benefit 
out of it.   Genetically modified (GM) food could be seen as safe because arguably 
it is 'substantially equivalent' to conventional food.  However, G.M. food could also 
be understood as food technology being used in a more dangerous manner.  
Society could turn to a riskier food technology which offers a cheaper alternative 
(Fischhoff 1984:1830).  
 
An increase in takeaway food purchased presents a challenge in terms of risk 
compensation.  This is because takeaways which once may have been perceived 
as luxuries could now have become social necessities.  If such meals are now 
more widely available, and part of everyday life, then their consumption can be 
thought of as socially necessary (Berry 1994:20).   
 
The emergence of takeaway food is an example of the divergence between food 
consumption and food preparation and provides a justification for government 
intervention.  When people purchase takeaways the food consumer, the principal, 
is separated from the preparer, the agent.  This means that the 'the agent' should 
adopt the (presumably) high standards of 'the principal'.  However, there is an 
incentive for the agent to adopt lower standards of cleanliness than 'the principal' 
so there is the problem of ‘moral hazard’ which results in an increased risk of food 
poisoning (Craven and Johnson 1999:146-7).  The preparer has the scope to 
‘undersupply’ food safety as the consumer cannot see the food being prepared.  
Moreover, there is an incentive to ‘undersupply’ food safety as safety measures 
are likely to cost more money and reduce profits.  This theme highlights that 
producers, or preparers of food, have more knowledge about the safety of food 
than consumers.   
 
The state could intervene, through the employment of additional hygiene 
enforcement officers, to make sure that the food preparer is not allowed to reduce 
standards.  However, this intervention may be offset by the increased risk from 
greater takeaway food consumption. 
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To elaborate, more environmental health officers could be employed to monitor 
takeaway food shops.  Health officers could prosecute unclean food premises and 
force them to raise their standards or ultimately close them down.  This could 
reduce the risk of food poisoning from the consumption of takeaway food.  If such 
risk is reduced then the public may have more confidence in the hygiene practices 
of takeaways.  Consumers could then eat out more exposing themselves to a 
greater extent to the hygiene practices of the takeaways.  This could lead to 
increases in food poisoning as people eat out more.  Thus the reduction in risk 
from the government intervention could theoretically be offset. 
 
The argument presented is a hypothesis.  It would be difficult to prove such a 
theory in practice.  The purpose instead is to show that government intervention to 
reduce risk may not necessarily have the desired effect.  This needs to be borne in 
mind when governments allocate resources.  Thus there is an issue over whether 
greater food hygiene regulation encourages people to take greater food risks.  The 
employment of environmental health officers may give the public confidence in 
eating out, but perhaps only in the short term.  If the theory is accurate then it may 
be more cost effective to encourage people to eat out less and take more 
responsibility for their own food preparation.  There are other approaches which 
the government could take, which would require less government intervention in 
terms of monitoring food premises.  The state could encourage “food citizenship” 
whereby the public is an active participant in their consumption (Lang 1997:13).  
Cooking initiatives could be promoted to reduce the public’s reliance say on 
takeaway food.   
 
6.2.6.  Summary 
 
Risk perception can cause a failure in the market for food safety as it breaks one of 
the conditions of perfect competition.  Imperfect information, in terms of an 
inaccurate perception of the food risk, will lead to a market valuation which under 
or over-supplies food safety.  Although one of the remedies, to employ health 
officers to oversee food hygiene in food outlets may not solve the problem of 
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insufficient food hygiene. 
 
6.3.  Information Asymmetry 
 
6.3.1. Background to Information Asymmetry 
 
In regard to food risks, producers or sellers may be better informed than 
consumers so the market may not be in equilibrium.  Moreover, the classical model 
[in chapter 1] assumed that the costs and benefits of any action were fully known 
and would occur instantaneously.  This is not the case with many food safety 
issues not being resolved for several years after consumption (Caswell ed. 
1991:11).  The 'under-supply' of food safety, with say BSE, may not be apparent to 
the consumer until well after the food has been consumed.  This suggests that 
government intervention may be needed although solutions may not be 
satisfactory. 
 
Information asymmetry is where producers or sellers may be better informed than 
consumers about the safety, and composition, of food.  This presents a problem 
because producers could under supply food safety.  An analogy with used cars 
(Akerlof 1970 in Swinbank 1993:87) can be used for explanation.  “The sellers 
have more knowledge about the quality of the car than the buyers.  But good cars 
and bad cars must still sell at the same price - since it is impossible for a buyer to 
tell the difference between a good and a bad car.  Buyers will only be willing to pay 
for a bad car, and thus the sellers of ‘good’ cars must sell them for the price of the 
‘bad’ cars.  The analogy with food would be products with better safety but where 
higher prices cannot be commanded because of lack of differentiation.  Even 
worse is that safer products could fail in the marketplace.  For example, “consider 
two food products, one which is relatively safe, and the other which is relatively 
unsafe.  Sellers of the products can tell which foods are safe and which are 
dangerous, but consumers cannot.  Therefore although the safer product costs 
more to produce, it can only be sold in the market at the same price as the riskier 
product.  As a consequence, food manufacturers only supply the risky product 
(because it can be produced at a lower cost and so will generate more profit) and 
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the safer product is forced from the market” (Henson and Traill 1993:158).  The 
problem is that if consumers could recognise the value of the safer product then 
they may be willing to pay extra for it.  However, because consumers cannot 
discover the safer product then they do not buy it.  Thus, producers of safer 
products are not getting the benefit of selling safer products.  Asymmetric 
information may be causing inefficiency as purchases of safer products may not 
take place (Molho 1997:7).   
 
Information asymmetry could alternatively lead to food safety being overpriced.  
This situation could occur in the context of organic food if it is perceived as being 
safer than conventional food.  It could be argued that if organic food is promoted for 
safety reasons, then it does not justify its price premium (Food Standards Agency 
2000a).   Consequently, this subject provides another example of market failure 
and another justification for government intervention; such as the Agency’s 
pronouncement on organic food (see above).  Also, considering a broad view of 
food safety to include nutrition, then some manufacturers may 'oversell' the 
benefits of their products.  There is the danger of some producers misinforming 
consumers over risk reduction.  “Safety issues are a major part of the marketing 
strategies of food manufacturers and retailers.  In order to emphasise the benefits 
of their products, food producers may over-emphasize particular risks in 
competing products.  Manufacturers of low and reduced sugar products may 
overemphasize the risks of sugar consumption” (Henson and Traill 1993:158). 
 
When both the producer and consumer are unaware of the potential hazard, then 
the firm will overproduce the good.  Antle in Segerson (1999:66) characterises this 
as “symmetric imperfect information” because neither producers nor consumers 
are aware of the potential damages from consumption of the product.  “Even the 
seller will not necessarily be perfectly informed about, say the carcinogenic risk 
associated with a particular additive or production process” (Swinbank 1993:90).  
Market failure, is occurring if the production of potentially dangerous food is 
continued.  But “symmetric imperfect information” is a particular challenge as there 
is no guidance on whether intervention is needed. 
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6.3.2. Search, Experience and Credence Goods 
 
The concept of information asymmetry can be understood by the distinction 
between 'search', 'experience' and 'credence' goods.  In chapter 1 an idealised 
market for food safety was presented which was based on the assumption of 
perfect competition.  It was suggested that if consumers were fully informed they 
would be able to trade off food safety against other food characteristics.  In this 
context, the food is defined as a “search good” because safety can be detected by 
appearance (Caswell ed. 1991:20); perhaps because the food, for example fruit, is 
bruised.  However, food safety is rarely a search good.  Food safety is not an 
explicitly measurable food product characteristic (Ritson and Li Wei 1998:255) with 
the hazards and risks listed.  In reality, safety is rarely observed at the time of 
purchase; so this simplifying assumption needs to be dropped. 
 
Food safety therefore tends to be either an “experience good” or a ”credence 
good”.  The characteristic of an experience good is that safety can only be 
detected by consuming it.  For example, food poisoning which occurs after eating a 
takeaway which on inspection seems acceptable.  The characteristic of a credence 
good is that safety cannot be evaluated fully by the consumer even after 
consumption e.g. “the risk from unseen pesticide residues on fresh produce” 
(Caswell ed. 1991:20).  Loader and Hobbs (1999:690) state: “in some cases, the 
consumer may only be aware of a food safety problem over the very long term, an 
example would be BSE, which appears to have an undetermined incubation period 
of several years.  It could be argued that beef in the UK became a credence good 
in the wake of the BSE crisis”.  This concept is thus highly relevant to market failure 
and the major food concerns of recent years.  These concerns could have made 
“food safety (increasingly) an important characteristic in a consumer’s purchasing 
decision”.  For foods such as beef, in the wake of BSE, the consumer now has to 
“incur high information or measurement costs in determining whether the ‘food 
safety’ characteristic is present” (Loader and Hobbs 1999:690). 
 
Segerson (1999:54) suggests that the market may encourage voluntary adoption 
of food safety measures for search and experience goods but not for credence 
  
 
 
 
89 
goods.  For search goods “consumers have near perfect information about product 
safety before purchasing the good” (Segerson 1999:61).  For experience goods 
“while the information set of the consumer may not be complete at the time of the 
initial purchase, in long run equilibrium the consumer will have near perfect 
information about product quality”.  “If a firm is the sole producer of an identifiable 
product (e.g. a fast food chain) consumers will know the source of the product (at 
least with regard to the final preparation) and if they correctly perceive the risks 
associated with the product source, can adjust their demand accordingly” 
(Segerson 1999:65). For both search and experience goods, it would be expected 
that consumers would use the information available to them and alter their 
purchasing in accordance to changes in product safety (Segerson 1999:61).  
Producers should then respond to consumer demands, say for better food safety, 
otherwise they will lose custom. 
 
However, for credence goods, consumers will not be able to discern changes in 
safety.  In this context, consumers have to rely on information from scientific 
experts, although ultimately this advice cannot be verified at the time of 
consumption (Griffith et. al.  1999:8).  The situation is similar to the market for used 
cars.  The demand for a food product will not be responsive to changes in the 
safety of that product because consumers will be unaware of those changes.  If 
consumers are unable to discern increases in safety for specific products (i.e. 
products from specific producers) then they will not adjust their demand for that 
product.  Demand will instead reflect average (i.e.  industry wide) product safety 
(Segerson 1999:61).  Given this situation, there is market failure as consumers 
would not be able to encourage firms to invest in more food safety.  Firms will be 
discouraged from safety investment because they cannot demonstrate such 
added value to the public (Viscusi 1989 in Segerson 1999:68).  Nevertheless, 
individual businesses selling higher quality products will want to signal to 
consumers that their product is ‘safer’ than the industry average (Segerson 
1999:61).  For example, assume that organic milk is ‘safer’ than conventional milk 
but that consumers cannot recognise that quality.  The problem for organic dairy 
producers is that there is little incentive to produce organic milk, at a higher price, 
because the ‘higher’ safety level may not be recognised. 
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6.3.3.  The debate over food labelling 
 
With credence goods, it may therefore be difficult for individual producers to signal 
high levels of safety to consumers.  While producers may attempt to do so by, for 
example, labelling products as organic, consumers have no easy means of 
verifying these claims when safety characteristics are not readily discernable 
(Segerson 1999:62).  However, it is argued that mandatory labelling or 
independent certification programmes can convert credence goods into search 
goods, by providing consumers with the information necessary to discern product 
quality accurately (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996:1251). 
 
A way out of this under-supply of quality problem could therefore be to rely on the 
costly process of quality certification.  Certification is where, say, organic food is 
tested so that it meets the specified requirements.  It could be done by ‘a credible 
authority’; the Soil Association is an example, regarding organic food.  For a 
private set of businesses, certification may be too costly, or they may not have the 
credibility.  Therefore, an independent agency may be needed (Schillizzi 1999).  
This suggests that certification implies a fixed cost which has to be paid.  The Food 
Standards Agency could act as such an independent agency which consumers 
would need to be willing to pay for. 
 
The cost of a labelling system is not the only problem with credence goods.  There 
are also potential failures related to the law.  “If consumers are unaware of, or even 
simply underestimate, potential damages, then even when producers are fully 
aware, anything less than full liability will lead to overproduction of (an unsound) 
good and the under provision of food safety.  In practice it is unlikely that firms will 
always be held fully liable even under a strict liability rule, due for example, to the 
difficulty of proving causation for credence goods" Loader and Hobbs (1999:690).  
Loader and Hobbs (1999:690) suggest that “in the event of a food safety break 
down an individual firm could be subject to civil legal action on the part of those 
who have become ill or on the part of the families.  However, it may be difficult for 
consumers to prove which firm is at fault.  Thus, Segerson (1999:68) suggests that 
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adequate consumer protection is likely to be achieved only with some form of 
government intervention.  The need for government intervention is likely to be 
increased by affluence.  In affluent societies where “the quality attribute being 
supplied is not transparent to consumers, consumers might reasonably insist on 
an increase in the quality standard set by their regulators” (Kinsey 1993:171). 
 
There are two main ways the government could intervene.  First, government 
could prohibit the marketing of foods containing certain characteristics.  This is 
said to be economically irrational and costly (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996:1251).  
It will be economically irrational when the risk attribute is of concern only to some 
consumers.  It will be costly to some producers and so there is an increase in 
prices.  However, Caswell (2000:122) qualifies this argument, in the context of 
genetically modified food.  “The benefits and costs of a labelling policy will depend, 
in part, on the majority consumer viewpoint on a technology in a country.  For 
example, if a large majority of consumers want to select against agricultural 
biotechnologies, then labelling may be an inferior approach to banning from a 
domestic benefit / cost perspective”. 
 
The second solution is legislation to improve information flow and labelling.  For 
example, mandatory disclosure of information about the nature of a product; such 
as ‘produced in a factory using nuts’.  Labelling involves the specification of the 
source of the product, a list of the ingredients and the degree of certainty the 
labelling conveys (e.g. does contain, may contain, does not contain) (Caswell 
2000:122). 
 
Labelling may not, though, provide a satisfactory solution.  Labels may not provide 
all the information.  “Consumers may have a right to know everything about the 
products they are buying but there are practical (label size) and economic (cost 
versus benefits) reasons for not requiring all information to be provided on labels 
(Caswell 2000:121). 
 
Alternatively, there could be too much information on labels.  “Solutions to the 
consumer (lack of) information problem may impede one another if they create an 
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information overload problem for consumers.  If, in addition to legislated labelling, 
individual firms employ their own certification and quality labelling standards, 
consumers will find it difficult to decipher the mass of product quality and safety 
claims.  Ultimately, a label is only as effective as the clarity of its message.  If 
consumers do not understand the message then their information costs will 
increase, not decrease” (Loader and Hobbs 1999:691). 
 
A ‘second best’ solution is needed here; that is, government intervention is needed 
if the ‘first best’, the market fails.  But there are problems with a government led 
information solution such as labelling.  The complexity of modern food supply 
chains presents a challenge for food safety communication.  For example 
microbiological safety presents a problem when pathogen levels change in the 
food chain (Ritson and Li Wei 1998:255).  Labels for “natural” or “organic” 
Aberdeen Angus beef (Loader and Hobbs 1999:703) can be verified as the meat 
can be traced through the bloodlines of the cattle.  In contrast labels for prepared 
meals, which have ingredients which have been added at different stages 
throughout the supply chain, are more difficult to evaluate. 
 
6.3.4. The difficulty in the evaluation of beef products. 
 
This discussion has outlined the serious informational asymmetries which are 
present.  The concept of beef becoming a credence good after BSE is particularly 
relevant.  Poor quality meat products, which may have been infected with BSE, 
provide an example of such credence goods as the average incubation of the 
disease could be 25 years (Diringer 1999).  Thus the safety of a poor quality beef 
product may not be fully known until decades after consumption.   
 
In the context of beef and BSE, market failures were not corrected properly by 
‘market forces’ or the ‘the law’.  The public was unaware of where or when 
precisely BSE infected meat was being sold.  Therefore they did not have the 
relevant safety information to inform their beef purchasing decision.  Consequently 
families affected by BSE have been unable to take legal action against relevant 
meat businesses.  Labelling policies have been inadequate in the context of poor 
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quality meat products such as mechanically recovered meat.  For example, “in 
Britain, a certain percentage of mechanically recovered meat (a ‘sludge’ made 
from the by products of bones and the by-products of butchery) was allowed in 
meat products without declaration” (Lang 1995:6).  Also it is unclear whether the 
absence of MRM on labels meant that it was not in the food.  This is because 
companies may have had labelling policies of non-declaration (Lang 1995:7). 
The purpose of this BSE example is to highlight the difficulty that would occur if the 
public were asked to evaluate the nature of the BSE hazard, and the probability of 
the BSE risk.  In particular, it would be difficult for the public to evaluate the quality 
of a government labelling initiative, in terms of BSE.  In terms of Aberdeen Angus 
the quality of the beef suggests that it should not be considered as a credence 
good.  In that case, the market is working, as the labelling is likely to be accurate, 
and so there is little need for intervention.  Loader and Hobbs’ description of beef 
as a credence good is better applied to mechanically recovered meat.  Intervention 
is needed here such as the banning of the product which has now occurred.  
Nevertheless past failures perhaps still make the labelling of credence goods a 
difficult issue for the public to consider. 
 
6.4.  The challenge from risk perception and information asymmetry 
 
This section will begin with a discussion of how risk perception can affect valuation.  
First, risk perception may cause hazards, with the same scientifically assessed 
level of severity, to be appraised differently by consumers.  For example, reducing 
risks from pesticide residues in food may be valued differently from the value of 
reducing microbiological contamination.  This could be the case even if pesticides 
and microbiological contamination presented the same level of hazard to the public.  
Second, a reduction in the risk from say microbial contamination may be valued 
differently, depending on which control strategy is used to achieve the risk 
reduction (Ives et. al.  1995:110).  Third, credence good attributes increase the 
potential for consumers to misjudge food risks, thus increasing the difficulty of 
placing a monetary valuation on food risk reduction (Lin 1994 in Ives et. al. 
1995:110). 
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The next discussion will argue that food safety may be similar to transport safety in 
terms of risk perception.  However, the information asymmetry concept makes 
food safety valuation more difficult than transport safety appraisal.  The theme 
here is the public or private context of the food risk.  Although examples from 
transport safety policy are useful as they provide a contrast between rail and road 
safety risk perceptions.  Such a direct contrast may not be available in the context 
of food safety.   
 
Jones-Lee and Loomes found that people’s willingness to pay to avoid a fatality on 
the London Underground was 69% greater than their WTP to pay to avoid a road 
fatality.  It is argued that “the context effect accounted for most of the additional 
WTP: holding scale constant, WTP to reduce the risk of an accident on The 
London Underground was 58% greater compared with such accidents on roads.  
People abhor the notion of dying underground in a train crash or fire, a catastrophic 
event, over which they have no control” (Garrod and Willis 1999:158). 
 
Factors such as risk perception may cause the public to overvalue risks where they 
have less control, such as on The Underground.  The problem of the involuntary 
nature of risk is a relevant concern in the valuation of transport safety.  There are 
higher valuations on involuntary hazards so rail safety is valued more highly than 
road safety for the same level of risk.  Rail hazard is about the public having little 
control over safety as responsibility for safety has been contracted out to the rail 
companies.  In contrast the public feel that they have more choice over road safety, 
as many motorists report that their driving skills are above average; suggesting 
that their motoring ability gives them control over safety.  Moreover, motorists may 
see road accidents as being caused by other people i.e. other motorists (Carthy et. 
al. 1993:95).  In contrast, rail accidents are attributed to the industry. 
 
Arguably, the difference in risk perception between rail and road means that 
people are more likely to put a higher value on improved railway safety.  If an 
individual travels by train then they expect it to be safe because they have 
‘contracted out’ the responsibility for the safety to the rail industry.  These high 
expectations could lead to relatively high public valuations of rail safety, which 
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provide an incentive for substantial investment in rail safety.  Thus government 
spending may favour public [rail user] safety over private [motorist] safety 
(Newbery 1995:235 in Corkindale and Willis eds 1995).  The problem is that risk 
perception may be leading to large differences in the amount of money needed to 
save a life.  Government figures suggest that “to save one life on the roads you 
need to spend between £100,000 and £1 million while it is estimated to cost £14 
million to prevent a single rail death.  It is suggested that if the government came 
up with billions of pounds for rail safety then their priorities could be questioned 
(Observer 2002). 
 
The public versus private safety examples from, transport policy could be applied 
to food safety.  Public food safety could be defined as concern over eating out or 
risks from food bought in from major retailers.  This may take precedence over 
private food safety; this could be described as food produced privately such as that 
grown on allotments.  Food prepared in the home would also come into this latter 
category.  The increase in the proportion of ‘public food’ compared to ‘private food’ 
may help explain why concern over food safety may have increased in recent 
years. The demand for food safety, can be explained by an increase in affluence 
and a growth in public safety (involuntary risk; with responsibility for safety 
contracted out to the industry) at the expense of private safety (i.e. more voluntary 
risks).  To summarise, the public's valuation of safety could be distorted by 
increased 'public' food consumption. 
 
Information asymmetry appears to be less of a concern in transport safety 
compared with food safety valuation.  Information about transport accidents is less 
of a problem because road and rail fatalities can be clearly identified.  Thus there is 
a case for transport safety to be appraised using contingent valuation.  The 
causation of accidents in transport can be clear, e.g. trains going through red lights.  
The public can know in detail what issues need to be addressed, e.g. signalling 
improvements on the railway, and at what cost.  Therefore, they have firm 
information upon which to value a reduction in risks.  Transport accidents can be 
clearly identified, unlike credence good characteristics.  A rail accident could be 
understood fully in a matter of days or weeks.  In contrast food hazards may take 
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years or even decades to diagnose.  This seems to be the case with BSE and also 
with the effect of chemical contamination, in food, on health.  In the food safety 
context there are epidemiological issues which need to be addressed before 
monetary valuation can be undertaken.  Arguably longer life expectancy has 
increased the level of perceived risk making people more concerned about 
hazards such as cancer.  Credence good attributes could affect public concern 
over safety, 60 years after consumption.  For example, it is estimated that the lifting 
of the Over Thirty Month Rule would lead to an additional 0.04 deaths over a 60 
year period (Food Standards Agency 2003b).  It is this time lag which could make 
food safety valuation such a challenge. 
 
6.5.  Control over involuntary hazard and Information Asymmetry related to 
credence goods 
 
This section outlines how risk perception and information asymmetry affected a 
contingent valuation study.  The public’s risk perception can be affected by their 
feelings of control.  Griffith et. al.  (1999:6) suggest that “the risks from chemical 
contamination may be regarded as involuntary by consumers, which tends to 
increase the level of risk perceived”.  This emphasizes the problem of trying to 
value reductions in involuntary risk.  The risk from food contaminated with 
chemicals is likely to be overestimated, relative to the ‘actual’ risk because of the 
involuntary nature of the danger. 
 
Moreover, Griffith et. al’s report (1999:85) describes the surveillance programme 
as aiming to reduce the incidence of unacceptable concentrations of chemical 
contaminants in food.  The public may perceive a different solution.  In the context 
of known carcinogens, policy could instead aim to eliminate rather than reduce 
chemical contaminants. 
 
Information asymmetry is also relevant given chemical contaminants.  The food 
which is assessed, under the programme, can be considered as a credence good.  
This is because “chemical contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants in food 
are not observable by the consumer at the point of purchase” (Griffith et. al. 
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1999:11).  The characteristics of the food examined, under the programme, can 
only be assessed using scientific knowledge.  Therefore, consumers have to rely 
on expert advice (Griffith et. al.  1999:8) which they have to take on trust.  
Consumers are often reliant on information provided “by food suppliers, the 
government or some other agency regarding levels of contamination” (Griffith et. al. 
1999:11). 
 
MAFF’s chemical surveillance programme may be hindered because limited 
information may have been given to respondents.  Griffith et. al. (1999:74) suggest 
that consumers were made aware of potential problems associated with food but 
there was no feedback on what had been done to control these problems, to date.  
Consequently, it would be difficult for consumers to evaluate the outputs of the 
programme; such as enforcement actions taken.  Consumers would be unaware of 
such enforcement.  The public not only has less information than producers in the 
market, but also is less informed than public officials given government 
intervention.  State intervention is arguably failing for the same reason that market 
failure is said to occur; that there is information asymmetry; this time between the 
public and state officials. 
Another concern is that the public may not be able to comprehend some of the 
contaminants.  The term dioxin is shorthand for many different types of the 
contaminant.  To illustrate the information asymmetry the most potent form of 
dioxin is “2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)” and is now classified by 
the American Environmental Protection Agency as a “human carcinogen” 
(Skrzycki and Warrick 2000).   
 
6.6.  The measurement and communication of risk  
 
This chapter so far has shown how risk perception and information asymmetry, or 
insufficient information, could affect a valuation study.  This section will show how 
[1] the measurement of risk, and [2] the communication of the level of risk to 
respondents, presents challenges to researchers.  These challenges suggest that 
the development of a food safety study could be informed by how environmental 
valuations have been undertaken. 
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An understanding of food risk, with the purpose of measuring it, would appear to be 
central to an investigation in this area.  The problem is that there may not be a 
consensus between scientists on the ‘actual’ level of risk.  Scientific estimates of 
food borne dangers are often subject to a degree of uncertainty and may be no 
more than educated guesses by experts (Ives et. al. 1995:108-9).  Scientific 
identification of risk may not be sufficiently timely to give the public enough 
information to make a decision on their ‘real’ willingness to pay.  The prospect is 
remote of scientifically informing most [credence good] controversies fully within 
the time available to make decisions (Adams 1995:45).  Epidemiology may not 
provide causal links between possible food hazards and subsequent ill-health, in 
sufficient time for policy makers to make a fully informed decision. 
 
In terms of communicating risk, one of the earliest major contingent valuation 
studies attempted to put monetary valuations on specified reductions in risk (Jones 
- Lee et. al 1985).  However, conveying risk levels and risk reductions, to 
respondents, presented a major challenge.  This was because risk was 
communicated in probabilities of “x in 100,000”.  This proved difficult to do because 
respondents found such minute levels of risk difficult to comprehend (Mitchell and 
Carson 1989:8).   
 
The attempt to value reductions in risk using probabilities (Jones - Lee et. al 1985) 
could be improved upon.  Griffith et. al’s research (1999) is a departure from this 
approach.  They suggest that the quantification of a reduction in risk is difficult, in 
the case of chemical contaminants, because there is insufficient epidemiological 
data to support such a measurement (Griffith et. al. 1999:38).  It is hard to measure 
the effectiveness of the monitoring and controls in terms of reductions in the risk of 
contaminant related disease (Griffith et. al. 1999:38).  It was a sensible decision, 
by Griffith et. al. (1999), not to attempt to measure risk reduction, say, in dioxin.  
Dioxin is measured in minute detail such as nanograms per kilogram (10-9) (Pless 
Mulloli and Edwards 2000:2).  One nanogram is equal to, a teaspoon full of salt in 
a small lake. 
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Jones-Lee et. al.’s study from 1985 highlighted another problem.  One danger is 
that contingent valuation may be too abstract from the public’s experience (Carthy 
et. al. 1990:7).  It may seem like an unreal ‘laboratory experiment’.  This is because 
it is difficult to ask an individual to weigh up the costs and benefits of food safety 
regulation; particularly when these are intangible and difficult to convert into 
monetary amounts (Henson and Caswell 1999:593).  Indeed it is difficult to think of 
an example outside a laboratory where consumers might consider many 
possibilities and probabilities; and then proceed logically on some optimal cost - 
benefit ratio (Roe in Singleton and Hovden eds 1987:221).  Participants would 
need to consider the severity of say food poisoning, a hazard which they may not 
have experienced recently.  They would also need to estimate the probability of 
getting food poisoning; the risk.  Finally, they would need to trade off these two 
factors against their willingness to pay. 
 
6.7.  Bounded Rationality 
 
The concept of bounded rationality is relevant.  Consumers have “limited cognitive 
capacity which reduces their ability to absorb and process complex information".  
They "tend to generate simplistic pictures of the real world upon which to base 
decisions” (Griffith et al. 1999:5).  In a multi-dimensional valuation situation, the 
respondent has to process unfamiliar information in a short time.  Therefore, the 
respondent will think about the question in a way that reduces the difficulty of the 
decision making.  "The respondent is tempted to favour a simplified decision rule 
instead of a thorough consideration of all possible alternatives and their outcomes" 
(Aakkula 1999:104).  Thus the respondent can come to a simplistic decision on 
food safety valuation.  People may just judge the 'food safety public good' on the 
basis of whether it is a “good thing” or not; or whether they can afford the good or 
not. 
 
6.8.  The application of environmental valuation to food safety 
 
Given the problems associated with conveying risk reductions, then an alternative 
way of conducting the research could be considered.  There could be the potential 
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of applying environmental valuation to food safety valuation (Ritson and Li Wei 
1998:256).  Since environmental valuation examines an improvement to an 
environmental amenity, then it could be possible to replicate this in the food 
context.  The aim could be to focus on the improvement to food safety, with less 
emphasis on the reduction of food risks.  The public could be asked a valuation 
question on how much they would be willing to pay for additional enforcement of 
food safety regulations.  This could be achieved through the employment of 
additional environmental health officers.  The public would be paying for food 
safety enforcement on a similar basis to an environmental amenity. 
 
The issue of risk reduction cannot be avoided completely as the purpose of the 
exercise is to value food safety.  Perhaps the best that can be done is to value food 
safety regulation, rather than food safety as a reduction in the probability of 
food-borne risks.  A method is needed which describes a meaningful food hazard, 
and its associated risk, without over-complicating the exercise.  
 
6.9.  The challenge of the definition of the good 
 
Environmental valuation may be useful for informing how a food safety valuation 
could be undertaken.  However, criticisms have been made of economic 
valuations of the environment.  For example, Holland (1995:25), suggests that only 
artefacts are capable of monetary appraisal.  Only products of human 
workmanship, such as nails and screws, can be valued because they have a 
clearly defined function.  In contrast, the natural environment is “not for anything”.  
Environmental goods can be assigned value but the price is guided by the purpose 
which it is taken to have. 
 
If land is used for housing then the price of the land, in a market, is determined by 
its use for property.  However, land could have a different function as a park, or a 
farm, in which case the price would be different.  Holland (1995:25) challenges 
economic valuation by suggesting that descriptions, say of land, are built into 
questions which the respondents of a survey are asked.  It is argued that “a 
prejudgement affecting the valuation of the natural good is already built into what 
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purports to be a discovery of value”.  A question asking for people’s willingness to 
pay to protect greenbelt land from house building could be criticized.  Respondents 
could reply by arguing that land should instead be used for a park or a farm.  Thus 
people may challenge the property rights basis of the question.  Although 
respondents may not own the land, and the associated property rights, they may 
reject the notion that they should have to pay more to preserve it as green belt land.  
There is an introductory issue, about what land is for, which shapes the 
subsequent valuation question.  The use of the land needs to be addressed, and a 
consensus reached on its purpose, before a question can be asked about its 
valuation.  Otherwise the basis of the valuation question could be challenged and 
respondents may not be giving a proper bid value or ‘price’ for the good.  For 
example, people may give a willingness to pay response of £0; described as a 
‘zero bid’.  The problem is potential ambiguity.  People may give a zero bid 
because they do not value the greenbelt or because they do not think they should 
have to pay more to preserve it.  The practitioner then has the difficulty of what to 
do with the responses, which reject the notion of having to pay more for the 
preservation of the greenbelt, because interviewees may believe the land should 
be used as a park or for a farm. 
 
6.10. The definition of the food safety public good 
 
This section continues the theme of definition and how a food safety question 
could be framed.  Two particular concerns are outlined which affect how food 
safety could be defined in the valuation question.  The Food Standards Agency's 
limited international role and the complexity of the food supply chain are relevant.     
 
First, it is difficult to value government measures because the scope for 
intervention is constrained by international food policy.  It is difficult to evaluate the 
contribution of the Food Standards Agency when the World Trade Organisation 
restricts its freedom of manoeuvre (Lang 2000).  If the Codex commission, part of 
the World Trade Organisation, is influential in decision making, then the UK 
agency appears to be constrained by international bodies.  Moreover, the United 
Kingdom Food Standards Agency is now also restricted by an intermediate agency 
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operating at the European level; the European Food Authority.  Thus many of the 
major, credence good, issues are decided at the European or World level which 
limits the government at the domestic level. 
 
A second challenge is how far the government should intervene.  Although the 
Food Standards Agency has sought to focus on food consumption and consumer 
health, there are broader concerns which could be relevant.  One such concern 
could be hygiene on farms and in abattoirs.  The cleanliness of abattoirs could be 
traced back to dirty cattle.  If farmers are paid for the weight of the cattle, then the 
cattle are likely to be presented for slaughter with a full gut; which, it is argued, 
increases the risk of contamination by E-coli (Foster 1997).  The problem is how far 
the FSA, needs to become involved with an 'agricultural issue' such as the prices 
farmers are paid for cattle when they are slaughtered. 
 
There is a debate between the 'business' and 'consumer' lobby over how far 
intervention is needed.  Different viewpoints may be offered over say food 
poisoning.  A ‘business’ view could be taken that consumer education is needed to 
reduce food poisoning (The Grocer 1998).  However, consumer critics suggest that 
“it is no good blaming whoever cooks the food.  The problem is at source on the 
farm” (Independent 1997a).  The Consumer’s Association argues that too much of 
a burden has been put on the consumer.  They argue that: “the consumer has 
been looked at as the last line of defence (often) the only line of defence” 
(Independent 1997a).   
 
The combination of a more international and more complex food system makes the 
topic a challenging one to convey to the public.  It is said that there has been an 
increasing separation of consumers and producers in modern food supply systems.  
“Agriculture has become a highly specialised activity remote from the experience 
of most consumers.  Industrial scale processing transforms food into forms which 
may be unrecognisable from primary inputs.  Finally, the majority of food is now 
retailed through large supermarkets which again seems to increase the perceptual 
distance between consumers and primary producers” (Kneafsey 2003).   
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The complicated nature of the food supply chain makes it more difficult for food 
safety characteristics to be signalled.  A cause of this signalling problem is the 
development and industrialisation of society.  Through the public’s division of 
labour and their own job specialisation people are less able to trace the origin, or 
control the composition, of their consumption goods.  It is then difficult for people to 
assess the impact of their consumption, especially when the individual’s health is 
concerned (Schilizi 1999). 
 
The complexity of the food system suggests that a question, to the public, may not 
be well understood.  There is the problem of ‘industrial food’ which may cause 
respondent's concern, because it was not communicated successfully to the 
consumer.  For example, major meat producers failed to divulge how much 
mechanically recovered meat was produced in the 1980's and the 1990's 
(Independent 2001). 
 
A solution to this problem could be to ask the public if they want locally produced 
food.  The relevance of this is that the public may see food safety as associated 
with characteristics such as ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ food (Ritson and Li Wei 1997:11).  
Local food sold through a farmer’s market may help to signal food characteristics 
to the consumer.  Consumers may be able to identify local attributes of food, such 
as the close proximity of production, which could encourage more trust in the 
product.   
 
However, local food is not a proxy for ‘safe’ food.  Safe food is defined as, at the 
start of chapter 1, as a reduction in risk say in food poisoning.  Therefore an 
examination of food hygiene and food poisoning is now relevant.  Food hygiene 
legislation is another factor which could affect how the valuation question is framed 
by the researcher and answered by respondents.   
 
The 1989 European Union official control of Foodstuffs Directive provided for 
consistent food inspection across member states.  The Directive was implemented 
in the UK with the 1990 Food Safety Act.  The Food Safety Act strengthened the 
powers of enforcement for environmental health officers.  There were also tougher 
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penalties, and an increased legal responsibility for all food firms, to make sure that 
they complied with the Act (Loader and Hobbs 1999:686-687).  The Food 
Standards Agency “introduced schemes throughout the UK for setting and auditing 
standards for the enforcement of food law by local authorities” (Hemingway 
2000:5).  However, the Agency faces a challenge in conveying to the public that its 
auditing of local authorities standards represents an improvement on the work 
undertaken since 1990.  Thus, there could be a challenge with asking the public to 
pay more for food standards, when there was already a Food Safety Act from 
1990.  
 
This discussion has suggested that the definition of the 'food safety public good' is 
crucial.  A large part of the original research for this thesis attempted to resolve 
how the good is defined.  This is because, before attempting to value food safety, it 
is necessary to clearly specify its scope. 
 
6.11. Contingent valuation and the food supply chain 
 
In the food safety context, the contingent valuation method should be used 
selectively.  This is because, as will be shown, studies related to farming, and food 
manufacturing, could be fraught.  Food safety is complicated as it can include 
issues such as animal welfare.  Thus, an investigation could be better applied to 
the end of the supply chain; namely the sale of food and its consumption.  
 
It is suggested that farmers have put animal welfare measures in place at a cost to 
themselves (Edwards 2001a).  But farmers fear that consumers may overlook this 
investment.  The problem is that until people have a full understanding of the 
connection between meat and animals then the public may not demand proper 
animal welfare.  This is relevant because “good welfare practice ... will have 
important consequences for improving food safety” (Mepham 2001). 
 
The aim of an empirical study is to measure willingness to pay.  The problem is that 
if farming was included, as part of the study, then the researcher may become 
drawn into a debate, say, over whether consumers overlook animal welfare.  A 
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debate which is awkward given that the public is unlikely to have direct experience 
of farming practices.  Issues such as animal welfare may complicate food safety 
concerns, so respondents may be distracted from making economic trade offs.   
 
People do, though, make trade offs when purchasing consumer goods, such as 
clothing.  This is despite knowing little about how the garment was produced.  
Perhaps, therefore, people should be able to state a valuation for food safety 
without full background knowledge.  There is a fundamental difference though; 
clothing can be described as a search good; quality can be discerned from 
inspection.  Moreover, if it is found to be damaged, based on experience, it can 
often be replaced at no cost.  In this way, lack of information on the production 
process is not relevant.  This assumes the discussion is focussed on the quality of 
the product; the basis upon which the valuation is made (the conditions of clothing 
workers is another issue).  In contrast, foods, such as beef, are credence goods.  
This is what makes food safety a special case, in terms of valuation.  Food safety is 
rarely capable of inspection, and often adverse effects take time to occur.  
Moreover, once these ill effects occur they can be irreversible.  Consequently, the 
production process can be fundamental. 
 
Chapter 2 argued that consistent standards are expected by the public.  In this 
situation, the public, when making a food purchasing decision, is often not required 
to consider food safety as it is taken as a constant.  However, a contingent 
valuation study would treat food safety as a separate attribute from the product, 
capable of variation.  To value food safety, therefore, it would seem necessary to 
consider farming practices and food manufacturing standards, and variations in 
the quality of these.  Food safety contingent valuation can, therefore, not be 
compared with the kind of purchase decisions which consumers normally make; 
where consistent standards are expected.  Food safety valuation is potentially a 
much more difficult thought process which may have to evaluate the start of the 
food supply chain, about which the public may know little.  For that reason the 
decision making, in the empirical study, should be simplified by concentrating on 
safety issues related to the consumer’s final place of purchase. 
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The consumer needs information on farming, to make an overall decision on food 
safety; but the public rarely has this knowledge.  Food consumers could be asked 
to give valuations, related to farming, but they would be questioned in the context 
of them having largely imperfect information.  Indeed, many respondents may be 
unable to offer willingness to pay responses.  For this reason farming, and food 
manufacturing, could be excluded from the empirical study.  This could 
significantly limit the scope of the valuation study, but the alternative is a poor 
quality response or a failure to answer. 
 
6.12.  The valuation of BSE  
 
The previous analysis that consumers find it difficult to value safety concerns, 
related to farming, is supported by a French study on BSE (Latouche et. al. 1998).  
There were a range of problems in this study which appear to be due to the 
complexity of the subject of BSE.  First, many respondents refused to pay because 
they did not think that higher prices should be paid by consumers.  Latouche et. al. 
(1998:352) admit that the health risk being assessed, which is likely to be related to 
contaminated beef, is very uncommon.  “Normally, food safety is included in the 
livestock products purchased by the consumer.  The disassociation between the 
two components can seem artificial to the interviewee” (Latouche et. al.  
1998:354). 
 
Latouche et al. (1998:354) state that “the hypothetical scenario might be improved 
and to avoid any misunderstanding respondents have to be better informed”.  
However, there is not a consensus of expert opinion over BSE.  Indeed, better 
information may only highlight the difference between various scientific 
explanations, which may confuse respondent’s views and so their willingness to 
pay.  The other problem is that it may be difficult to separate BSE from other 
broader issues; such as animal welfare.  It is suggested that “BSE questions the 
whole food and farm system because of contaminated farm animals entering the 
food chain” (Latouche et al. 1998:354).  People may protest and offer a 'zero bid'; 
as a way of not participating in the survey; which implicitly could be a protest vote 
against how “the whole food and farm system” is being operated (Latouche et al. 
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1998:354).  If people feel obliged to consider safer beef then they may protest with 
zero bids.  This is a particular problem with the contentious nature of the topic.  
Alternatively, massive valuations could be elicited because the scope of the good; 
“the whole food and farm system”, could appear unlimited. 
 
The fundamental problem with a contingent valuation on topics like BSE is that 
such a study will go beyond economic issues, such as what consumer’s are willing 
to pay for food safety to keep utility unchanged.  It requires respondents to make a 
judgement about epidemiology and animal diseases called zoonoses.  “Zoonoses 
are defined as diseases and infections, which are transmitted naturally between 
vertebrate animals and man” (MAFF 2001: v).  A question related to zoonoses, 
could be too demanding for respondents.  For example, apart from BSE, the MAFF 
report (2001:22) describes anthrax; it is a “peracute” disease which will be unclear 
to respondents as it does not seem to have a standard dictionary definition.  
Moreover, anthrax seems too emotive for respondents as the disease causes 
blood to frequently ooze from the diseased animal’s body (MAFF 2001:22).  
Policies to control zoonoses are public goods, as diseased animals may well have 
harmful implications for human health if consumed.  It would be useful therefore to 
estimate the demand, or usefulness of these public goods.  However, the 
complexity and controversy over zoonoses particularly for the public, suggests that 
contingent valuation is not the way to achieve this demand revelation. 
 
A valuation study on a complex subject such as BSE may not conform to economic 
theory well.  An increase in consumer’s willingness to pay will lead to an increase 
in the marginal cost of food safety with the purchase of ‘extra units’ of safety.  For 
explanation see Swinbank’s analysis in chapter 1.  It is inappropriate to interpret 
being willing to pay more to avoid BSE, as purchasing ‘extra units’ of food safety.  
This is because it is difficult to specify a direct relationship between expenditure 
and less BSE; on the margin at least.  Although, it should be acknowledged that 
Swinbank was writing in 1993, before a link was suggested between BSE and CJD 
in 1996, and did not attempt to apply an equilibrium food safety model to BSE.  
BSE may be an example of where respondents have a "lexicographic preference"; 
where it is not possible to make trade-offs and so BSE as a topic is inconsistent 
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with the standard neo-classical model (Aakkula 1999:100). 
 
6.13.  The decision over which food safety concept should be valued 
 
Meat products are likely to be difficult to value, in terms of the reduction of food 
borne risk, because of animal welfare issues and the complexity of the supply 
chain.  Also, given averting behaviour contingent valuation is better directed, not at 
food products, but at specific public policies such as the chemical contaminants 
programme.  This is because such programmes have public good properties 
whereby the whole of the public benefits collectively; and individuals cannot avoid 
the benefits.  In contrast the public can choose whether or not to buy food products 
and so avoid the valuation question. 
 
The decision over which food safety concerns should be valued can be further 
discussed.  To consider this decision it should first be re-stated that there is a case 
for the valuation of safety.  For example, when governments decide on a road 
safety scheme rather than a hospital then they are implicitly valuing life (Swinbank 
1993:92).  Complete food safety is not possible and the huge costs which would be 
needed to attempt this are better allocated elsewhere.  Thus the question of 
whether food can be completely safe is meaningless.  A more relevant question is 
whether say, beef, is as safe as it can be.  This does not seem to be the case with 
the recommendation that the Over Thirty Month rule should be ended.  Unlike the 
1980’s the increased CJD risk is now understood in advance.  The possible 
increase in death(s) due to a relaxation in BSE safety policy has been 
acknowledged.  Thus the zero - infinity problem, discussed earlier in this chapter, 
is shown again to be a fundamental challenge in this context. 
 
Aakkula (1999:47) describes a philosophical conflict between a teleological 
perspective and a deontological one.  A teleological theory is that all things or 
processes were designed to fulfil a purpose.  “Teleogical theories, including 
utilitarian ones, place the ultimate criterion of morality in some non moral value.  
For example, the utility or welfare that results from act(ion)s” (Aakkula 1999:47).  
Deontology is the science of duty or ethics.  “Deontological ethical theories 
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attribute ‘intrinsic’ value to features of the act(ion)s themselves.  In this sense 
behaviour violating certain ethical rules is always considered inappropriate and 
unacceptable, even if it would produce the best possible outcome in terms of 
monetary welfare measures” (Aakkula 1999:47).  Perhaps, the London 
Underground fire violated ‘certain ethical rules’ as not enough action was taken to 
deal with slight fires.  Ethical rules were also broken in the context of BSE, such as 
feeding dead cows to cows. 
 
If the deontological view is taken then the ‘ethical rules’ need to be confronted, and 
adhered to.  The valuation of risk reduction, particularly in terms of valuing life, is 
less relevant in this context.  Although BSE is perhaps the most significant issue in 
British food safety policy in the last twenty years, the potential for contingent 
valuation may be limited.  In cases where food borne risks can be seen as an 
‘occupational hazard’ such as common cases of food poisoning, then there are 
fewer, and less important, ethical rules to break.  For example if food has not been 
cooked long enough and an individual is slightly ill then this is a relatively minor 
problem.  Thus common cases of food poisoning are easier to consider and value. 
 
6.14.  Irradiation: a method of reducing food poisoning? 
 
A problem remains with how 'common cases of food poisoning' could be reduced.  
A 'mechanism' is needed to show how food poisoning could be reduced.  Food 
technologies, such as irradiation, could reduce food poisoning.  However, this 
raises a series of issues.  First, there are concerns over who benefits from the 
technology.  Irradiated food could benefit manufacturers and retailers who could 
store food for longer.  If it is industry who is benefiting and consumers who are 
paying then the public would not be willing to pay for irradiation.  Only if the 
technology is perceived to be beneficial to consumers would irradiation be suitable 
for valuation, as a way of reducing food poisoning.  This is possible as irradiation 
could reduce food borne risk such as by killing salmonella.  However, critics of 
irradiation would suggest that it avoids the need to tackle problems, such as 
salmonella, at source on farms.  This returns to the complexity of the food system 
and respondents not being able to understand it.   
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A second concern is people's perceptions of safety.  Government officials have 
argued that on scientific grounds there was no reason for not approving the 
irradiation process; whether this is accepted by the public is another matter.  
Thirdly, the government leaves the ultimate decision making, in terms of whether 
irradiated food is sold, to the supermarkets.  The government has been willing to 
share authority for food safety with the major food retailers because the state 
regards the supermarkets as being able to represent consumers (Marsden et. al. 
1997:27).  The role of the Food Standards Agency is limited, in the context of 
reducing food poisoning through the use of irradiation.  Therefore, irradiation would 
not be a convincing 'mechanism' to reduce food poisoning. 
 
6.15.  Summary of chapter 6 
 
The previous discussion suggests that conveying how food risk could be reduced 
will be a challenge.  Topics such as irradiated food, or genetically modified could 
be controversial to convey to the public.  Credence goods, such as beef after BSE 
or food containing pesticides, where the effects of food consumption could last well 
into the future are also contentious.  An assessment of food safety, in the context 
of the whole supply chain, could be problematic too.   
 
A valuation exercise should not be directed at specific food products because 
people can choose whether or not to purchase them and so avoid a valuation 
question.  Instead a monetary appraisal needs to be directed at a public 
programme of intervention.  Such programmes are collective in nature and so 
people cannot avoid the benefits and have to confront the question.     
  
 
 
 
111 
Part 3:  The research study 
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Chapter 7:  Exploratory research to inform the empirical study 
 
7.1.  Introduction to the research study 
 
The previous discussion has not provided unequivocal evidence on the way to 
undertake this study.  Thus there is uncertainty over what would be an appropriate 
method for the design of willingness to pay research in the case of food safety.  
Reservations over the reliability of contingent valuation, for food safety, leads to 
the decision that it would be necessary to undertake some experimental work in 
order to design the questionnaire for the empirical study.  The purpose here, 
therefore, is to develop a suitable approach for contingent valuation when applied 
to food safety.  This chapter details the start of the exploratory research which was 
undertaken.  Table 7.1 outlines the different stages of the research study 
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Table 7.1.  Explanation of the research design 
 
Preliminary questions:  exploring the food safety issues 
[Start of chapter 7:  Short survey to 65 respondents] 
 
Focus Groups:  to refine the food safety concepts 
[End of chapter 7:  2 focus groups of 6-8 respondents] 
 
Piloting the food hygiene valuation question 
[Chapter 8:  6 sets of questionnaires [iterations] to 10-30 respondents] 
 
Pilot valuation question 1 - 20 respondents 
Pilot valuation question 2 - 20 respondents 
Pilot valuation question 3 - 20 respondents 
Pilot valuation question 4 - 30 respondents 
Pilot valuation question 5 - 20 respondents 
Pilot valuation question 6 - 10 respondents 
 
[Total number of respondents: 120] 
 
Empirical research 
[Chapter 9: 1 final questionnaire of 312 respondents] 
 
The questionnaire was asked at 6 different 'bid' levels of £100, £150, £200, £250, 
£350 and £450 
 
Likert scale results, willingness to pay results and demographic data 
 
Analysis of the empirical study 
[Chapter 10: Qualitative commentary arising from the main empirical study] 
[Chapter 11: Cost-benefit analysis with discussion] 
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In theory there are four stages which need to be followed.  These are: 
 
1) Selection of the food safety concepts for the WTP question [chapter 7] 
2) Refinement and improvement of the valuation question [chapter 8] 
3) Valuation question using the open-ended format [chapter 8] 
4) Valuation question using the closed-ended format [chapter 9] 
 
First, there is a need to select the food safety concepts which, it is argued, are 
appropriate for valuation.  This involved piloting a preliminary willingness to pay 
question (7.2 and 7.3) and two focus groups (7.4).  The conclusions from this first 
stage of research are then outlined in section 7.5.  Second, once the food safety 
issues have been clarified it is then possible to refine the valuation question.  
Several iterations were needed to improve the willingness to pay question (see 
chapter 8).   
 
In theory, a third open - ended stage is required to help guide the closed-ended 
study.  However, this open-ended stage was not undertaken.  This was because; 
the open - ended approach places too much of a cognitive burden on the 
respondent.  The respondent has to consider what would be an appropriate 
valuation; whereas in the dichotomous closed-ended approach, the respondent is 
given a monetary amount and only has to make a yes/no choice.  The open-ended 
approach is not well suited to the food safety context, as safety is not a separate 
characteristic from the food sold.  Respondents do not have the experience of 
‘purchasing’ food safety and this makes it difficult for the public to consider what 
would be an appropriate valuation.  The respondents, in this study, were often not 
able to provide monetary figures when they gave affirmative responses to the 
open-ended question.  Thus the open-ended format, employed when refining the 
valuation question, did not yield much numerical data.  Therefore, a formal third 
stage was not undertaken.  The starting point for the closed-ended study, the 
fourth stage, was estimated instead.  Chapter 9 outlines the closed-ended study.  
The reason for using a referendum approach rather than a payment card was 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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7.2.  Selection of food safety concepts which are relevant for contingent valuation 
research 
 
7.2.1. Introduction to how the research method was undertaken 
 
Throughout, the survey questionnaire was undertaken as a face-to-face interview.  
This is because the good can be defined and explained more thoroughly in a 
face-to-face interview and also non response can be reduced.  It is superior to 
telephone surveys where it is more difficult to maintain the interest of the 
respondent (Garrod and Willis 1999:137).  Face-to-face interviews would be 
expensive to conduct if undertaken by market researchers.  The length of time 
taken to conduct face-to-face questionnaires is a greater consideration in this 
study.  This reason provides the main justification for relatively small samples of 
respondents at each stage of the research.  Also to prevent the survey from 
becoming too time consuming, repeat visits were not made. 
 
Face-to-face interviews also enable the researcher to elicit more information from 
respondents, than perhaps would be possible in a telephone interview.  There is 
greater opportunity to encourage respondents to comment on the questions. 
 
7.2.2. Work related to the preliminary valuation question 
 
These household surveys were undertaken, in 1999, using the National Statistics 
website as a basis for the research.  The National Statistics website 
(www.statistics.gov.uk) is useful for neighbourhood statistics which rank all 8414 
electoral wards nationwide according to various indices such as income and 
education.  This research used the measure, or index, of multiple deprivation 
which combines the different indices.  The survey was done in two electoral wards 
on Tyneside.  Most of the work (46 of the 65 short interviews) was done in a ward 
which was ranked 7251 out of 8414; with ward 8414 being the most prosperous 
ward in the country.  The rest of the work was done (19/65) in a ward which was 
ranked 3154 out of 8414.  The main purpose here was to undertake some pilot 
research to help learn what would be appropriate questions for a later, more 
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detailed, study. 
 
7.2.3.  Newspaper readership (see appendix 1) 
A question was asked on newspaper readership.  The main aim was to find out 
whether a newspaper readership question could be used in the main empirical 
study in chapter 9.  The purpose would be to discover whether newspaper 
readership could be related to willingness to pay for food safety; that is whether it 
could be used as a predictor of willingness to pay.  For example, a hypothesis 
could be that readers of ‘middle market’ newspapers, such as the Daily Mail and 
the Daily Express, are more willing to pay for food safety compared to readers of 
other newspapers.  This could be because these newspapers tend to have more 
‘banner headlines’ on ‘food scares’.  For example, The Daily Mail (1998) 
highlighted the danger of food poisoning which could encourage its readership to 
be more willing to pay for food safety.  However, this can only be a hypothesis; 
these two newspapers have headlines for many other policy issues; such as rail 
safety.  Thus with the potential for saturation coverage and with so many public 
goods which could deserve more money, then perhaps these banner headlines 
would not have much influence on willingness to pay.  Indeed there may even be a 
negative effect; perhaps with people feeling disillusioned, through the 
sensationalist coverage, and becoming less willing to contribute towards public 
services. 
 
The question which was asked to 65 people was: “Which newspaper do you read 
the most?  Respondents were asked this question which was guided by the use of 
four different categories (A - D) with examples.  The categories were inclusive; for 
example, the Daily Star could have gone in category (A).  The Independent or 
Financial Times could have gone in category (C).  Two respondents did not answer 
this question because they did not buy newspapers and bought television guides 
or other magazines instead. 
 
The results were: 
 
A)  Tabloids   [5/63] 
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B)    Middle Market           [9/63] 
 
C)  Broadsheet    [34/63] 
 
D)  Local    [15/63] 
It would be difficult to examine the relationship between 'middle market' readership 
and willingness to pay, in this survey, because there may not be enough 'middle 
market' readers.  To simplify the analysis, categories A (tabloids) and B (middle 
market) can be merged.  The Mail and The Express could be viewed as tabloids 
with the difference that they place more emphasis on policy issues than say The 
Sun.  The regional newspapers may have a readership throughout the population 
because of their local coverage.  Thus, taking the local papers out, there is a 
dichotomy between tabloid and broadsheet newspapers.  If this categorisation is 
used then the results can be split between tabloids and broadsheets.  Thus the 
results become: 
 
Tabloids (including middle market) :  14/48 
Broadsheets     :  34/48 
 
The results from this question suggest that affluent electoral wards have high 
broadsheet readerships.  The usefulness of this question will be shown with the 
interpretation of the final results. 
 
7.2.4. Food Attributes 
 
A question was asked to stimulate respondents so that they would think about 
individual food characteristics.  The purpose was to find out whether people could 
perceive food attributes separately.  The characteristics for consideration were 
convenience, freshness and taste.  If these food attributes could be perceived 
separately then the study is easier to implement.  This is because people could be 
encouraged to consider food safety as another, theoretically isolated, food 
characteristic.  If this perceived separation of safety could be achieved then safety 
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would be easier to value because it would not be embedded, or entangled, 
amongst other concepts.  It would theoretically be a separate concept capable of 
valuation in its own right. 
 
In this question respondents were asked to choose which food attribute they 
thought was the most important.  The question asked: Out of the following 3 food 
attributes of convenience[a], freshness [b] and taste [c] which characteristic do you 
think is the most important? 
 
a) Convenient food.  For example, pre prepared meals 
b) Fresh food.  For example, local produce 
c) Tasty food.  For example, food with a good flavour 
 
The results were: 
a) 2 
b) 33 
c) 22 
 
both b and c) 6 
 
all)  2 
 
Again, the results are not intended to be representative as they are based on the 
affluent electoral ward as described above.  The relevant finding is that, even 
under the artificial scenario where food attributes are separated, several people 
chose more than one characteristic.  Some people were unable to separate the 
food attributes although they were clearly asked to choose which characteristic 
they thought was the most important.  This question is useful because it highlights 
the difficulty of trying to separate food attributes for valuation purposes.  In practice, 
attributes can be inextricably linked e.g. taste and freshness.  This concept of the 
difficulty of separating, or disaggregating, food attributes, in particular safety, is a 
recurrent theme throughout the research.  A valuation question which attempts to 
separate food safety into different component parts may be difficult to undertake. 
  
 
 
 
119 
 
7.2.5. Household food shopping bills 
 
The question was “how much is your weekly household food shopping bill"?  This 
was difficult for people to answer because of substantial food storage and so 
variable purchasing patterns.  However, this is not a great concern.  The data from 
this question is not significant.  The purpose of the question is to guide 
respondent’s decision making.  Market prices were going to be used as the 
payment method, for food safety, so weekly food spending could help guide 
people’s willingness to pay amount.  The question could help respondents think 
about what might be an appropriate willingness to pay amount because it would 
help them think about their expenditure and budget constraints.  The question was 
retained for the main closed-ended study, outlined in chapter 9, for that reason. 
 
7.2.6.  The preliminary valuation question 
 
The preliminary valuation question was based on a conclusion from Marsden et. 
al’s work (1997, 1999).  They argue that the major grocery chains determine their 
own standards of food safety which generally exceed the state’s baseline 
standards.  They suggest that Environmental Health Officers adopt a different 
approach, to the regulation of food standards, depending upon whether they are 
inspecting major supermarkets or the independents.  For the major retailers the 
health officers take an auditing approach.  The health officer acts as an external 
guarantor of the retailers internal quality control procedures.  Civil servants at the 
Department of Health believe that the major supermarkets are largely capable of 
regulating themselves.  Thus the role of local environmental health officers, in the 
case of the supermarkets, is often merely to oversee their safety procedures 
(Marsden et. al. 1997:23).  However, for the large number of small independent 
retail outlets the situation is quite different.  They have to make efforts to identify, 
and control hazards, within their operations but are more reliant on Environmental 
Health Officers for supervision.  Thus, Marsden et. al. suggest that state regulation 
remains important for maintaining food standards in the independent sector 
(Marsden et. al. 1999:443). Consequently, the customers of small food outlets are 
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more reliant on Environmental Health Officers to police ‘the independents’ than the 
supermarkets.  Thus, Marsden et. al.’s conclusion is that the Food Standards 
Agency should concentrate on the independent sector (Independent 1997b). 
 
This analysis was used as the basis for the valuation question, that supermarket 
standards can be used as a benchmark, to which the standards of the independent 
sector could be improved.  Previous studies have attempted to value a reduction in 
risk (Covey et. al. 1998). Attempts to convey less risk, in terms of a reduced 
probability, have been difficult in a contingent valuation questionnaire.   
 
One of the purposes of this research is to examine whether an alternative 
approach would be more appropriate for a safety valuation study.  Therefore, this 
survey takes an alternative approach to the more traditional method of the 
valuation of the reduction in risk.  It explores whether ‘food safety’ can be 
perceived as an improvement in the independent sector up to the standard of the 
supermarkets. 
 
The preliminary valuation question is in appendix 1.  The question attempted to 
elicit a willingness to pay response using an open-ended format: 
 
“If you are willing to pay; what is the most you would be willing to pay on top of your 
weekly food shopping bill? 
 
This open-ended question was substituted by a closed-ended question after 16 
open-ended responses were obtained.  Data from the open-ended question was 
used to derive a figure, £8, for the closed-ended question.  This process is 
explained below.  The closed-ended question was: 
“Would you be willing to pay £8 on top of your weekly food shopping bill: Yes or 
No? 
 
7.2.7.  Results from the preliminary valuation question 
 
Open-ended questions were asked to 16 respondents.  Four respondents failed to 
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give an answer and complained that they did not know how much they would be 
willing to pay, or that they found the question too difficult to answer.  This shows 
the difficulty of the open-ended question to respondents.  Therefore there are only 
12 willingness to pay amounts left.  These were:  £20, £20, £5.50, £6.50, £12, 
£2.50, £10, £5, £3.80, £2.50, £5.00, £5.00.  The average was rounded down to £8.  
Thus the closed-ended question asked if respondents would be willing to pay £8 a 
week on top of their weekly food shopping bills. 
 
Closed-ended questions were asked to 49 respondents.  At this stage the main 
aim was to learn lessons to develop the questionnaire. 
 
7.2.8.  Newspaper readership and willingness to pay 
 
Statistical analysis, using chi square, can be employed to examine the relationship 
between newspaper readership and (non) willingness to pay for food safety.  The 
result was not statistically significant at the 5% level (see appendix 1b).  
Newspaper readership does not appear to act as a good explanatory variable for 
the public’s willingness to pay for food safety.  Therefore, the question on 
newspaper readership was not repeated again.  It was concluded that there could 
be better ways to measure public knowledge or awareness than through 
newspaper readership. 
 
An alternative method of measuring public knowledge, and potentially the public’s 
understanding of food safety concerns, could be to ask for the respondent’s level 
of education.  Indeed, Henson’s study on salmonella (Henson 1996) used 
education as an explanatory variable.  The justification for using newspaper 
readership as a possible explanatory variable, in preference to education, was that 
qualifications can be a sensitive subject for respondents.  Respondents may be 
less defensive about the newspaper they read, than about their level of education.  
The problem is that, the result, of the above chi-square, suggests that, newspaper 
readership could be inferior to education as an explanatory variable.  It would 
appear preferable to use education which was used in Henson’s (1996) study. 
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7.3.1  Issues arising from the preliminary valuation question 
 
This discussion will begin by examining some of the more difficult themes.  The 
first challenge is that the open-ended method may not require enough thought on 
the respondent’s part.  People can express their willingness to pay as a 
percentage, say 5%, on top of their food shopping bill.  This perhaps does not 
require respondents to give sufficient consideration to the task.  People only 
provide a heuristic.  Heuristics can be defined as “a system of generally simple 
rules or procedures which may be applied to a situation with the objective of 
achieving a satisfactory outcome” (Carthy et al. 1993:98).  The respondent 
provides a simple percentage so although they have answered the question 
adequately they have not considered a clearly defined additional monetary amount, 
on top of their shopping bill.  Thus, the research method can be challenged for 
eliciting simplistic responses. 
 
The valuation question can also be criticized on the grounds that respondents may 
have wanted to challenge the property rights basis of the question.  The question’s 
underlying assumption was that food safety needs improvement; otherwise there 
would be nothing to pay for.  For example, a respondent stated that “it (the 
question) assumes that the food industry isn’t safe”.  Also respondents complained, 
in reply to the question, that “it (safety) is already in place”.  People imply that 
private provision is enough.  Public enforcement of food safety standards may not 
be needed when food purchases are made from supermarkets.  Arguably, 
supermarkets ensure that food standards are adequate.   
 
This raises the challenge of valuing the ‘food safety public good’.  Major investment 
in food safety by the supermarkets means that regulation, the public good, is only 
'modifying' the market (see 2.3).  Enforcement officers may only be checking the 
supermarkets standards which the supermarkets already monitor themselves 
(Marsden et. al. 1997, 1999). 
 
Some respondents believed that they do not need additional food safety.  Many 
people were not willing to pay because they tended to be satisfied with the 
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supermarkets food safety record.  In this context, respondents are giving an 
appropriate response answer when they state that they would not be willing to pay 
for government intervention.  Moreover, supermarket shoppers are paying twice 
over for food standards; once through their purchases at the till and secondly out of 
public funds.   People seemed to challenge the question on the basis that safety is 
already included in the [supermarket] price; which it is, in the context of Marsden et 
al’s (Marsden et. al. 1997, 1999) research. This raises the difficulty that Latouche 
et. al. found (1998:354) that safety is seen as part of the product and it is unfamiliar 
to see them separated. 
 
Another difficult, possibly intractable, issue is that some people answer the 
question based on the needs of others.  One respondent complained that, 
although they would pay, the question was unfair on people with low incomes who 
are unable to pay.  Although the question is the same for all respondents, there 
may be variation in the way it is being answered.  Some people may answer the 
question from their own perspective, whereas a few individuals may consider the 
needs of others, as the previous example showed. 
 
On the subject of poverty, hypothetical markets, like private markets, have 
situations where people have different marginal utilities of money.  The poor have 
a higher marginal utility of money making their trade-offs more difficult as they 
have to give up more, of other goods and services, to ‘purchase’ increased food 
safety.  It is therefore difficult to question people on low incomes.   
 
However, it was encouraging that the valuation question could generally be 
answered.  This justifies the use of market prices as the payment method, for while 
many people do not pay income tax virtually everyone pays for food.  If people 
shop at supermarkets then the payment mechanism implies an increase in 
supermarket prices.  However, the question implies that it is takeaways, or 
restaurants which need to be improved so perhaps food ‘eaten out’ should 
increase in price instead.  Thus there was a need to improve the valuation question 
on that point. 
 
  
 
 
 
124 
Concern can be expressed over the broad scope of the question since farming was 
included as part of the valuation question.  One respondent stated that they would 
be willing to pay to “support the farmers”.  People could feel pleased that they are 
contributing to farmer’s welfare.  The problem is that although the question aims to 
elicit responses on food safety this may not be what respondents are ‘bidding’ for.  
People are responding affirmatively because of external issues such as farmer's 
welfare.  This problem could be avoided by restricting the valuation concept to just 
food safety. 
 
The definition of safety in the question also presented problems.  Respondents 
were informally invited to comment on the valuation question.  This was done by 
asking the respondent what food concerns they thought needed to be improved.  
The main finding was that the food safety concept needed to be specified more 
clearly, because the existing question left the safety concept open to interpretation.  
For example, one respondent said “you mean GM and that”; whereas other people 
could have different concerns and base their valuation on those other issues.  The 
question was also criticized as “too generic”.  The characteristics of food risk 
needed to be specified so that respondents could understand which risks were 
being reduced. 
 
The previous shortcomings can be rectified by narrowing down the food safety 
concept.  Also ambiguous responses can be resolved.  For example, one 
respondent said yes to the willingness to pay question, then qualified their 
response; saying that “the government may say irradiated food is safe”.  This 
returns to the debate over what is meant by safety.  Safety can be defined as a 
reduction in risk.  This view would be that of “the World Health Organisation [which] 
recommended food irradiation as a technique for preserving and improving the 
safety of food; that is killing off pathogens (Diehl 1993 in Ritson and Li Wei 
1998:254)”.  People could be willing to pay for more safety because they think 
irradiation will make food safer according to the WHO definition.  However, this 
respondent had a different interpretation that ‘safety’ is a concept related to the 
public’s control over food production.  Also that irradiation would not make food 
safer and perhaps the reverse.   In this case, respondents could be willing to pay 
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for more safety on the assumption that they are in control; that they have influence 
over the use of potentially harmful technologies, such as irradiation.  People would 
be able to make sure that irradiation is not permitted, or included, as part of 
reducing the risk of food borne illness.  Contentious issues such as irradiated food 
could be removed from the valuation exercise for the purpose of simplification. 
 
7.3.2.  Conclusions from the preliminary survey 
 
The general lesson from this preliminary survey was the need for qualitative 
research to refine the valuation question.  The preliminary survey often elicited 
brief comments on the suitability of the valuation question.  Also brief points were 
made by respondents on what they thought were relevant food safety issues.  The 
problem was that a detailed insight into public perceptions of food safety was 
required.  This was because the survey had left unclear what food safety concepts 
were capable of valuation.  A method such as focus groups could perhaps 
differentiate various food safety concepts and assess their relevance for valuation.  
Focus groups demand that the subject is discussed in depth for at least an hour.  
The researcher can then learn what issues respondents feel that they are 
comfortable with.  These issues can then be drawn out and assessed to see 
whether they are appropriate for valuation. 
 
The preliminary survey was nevertheless useful, as it identified how the research 
needed to be developed.  It highlighted the need to describe familiar areas to 
respondents.  It is necessary to describe understandable safety concepts, so that 
the valuation exercise does not become too involved in contested debates over 
definitions of food safety.  The irradiation of food is a prime example.  The survey 
also emphasised the need for a more specific valuation question.  Thus it helped 
identify what would be needed from qualitative research.  The qualitative research 
would need to identify food safety concepts which the public are familiar with, 
which they are comfortable with and which can be defined in specific terms.  Thus 
the valuation question was informed by two focus groups, the next area for 
discussion. 
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7.4. Focus Groups: to help select the appropriate food safety concepts 
 
7.4.1. Background to the focus groups used in this study 
 
The introduction at the beginning of the thesis stated that the aim of the research 
was to obtain a monetary valuation, for food safety, which could contribute to policy 
making.  Arguably such a [rational] quantitative input into policy is in contrast to 
qualitative research.  A rational input can be defined as a contribution to policy 
which is able to focus only on the safety attribute of food and separate it from other 
food characteristics.  Moreover, a rational input implies a cross section of 
representative views taken from throughout the population.  Qualitative research, 
such as a focus group, is unlikely to be able to focus on a specific food safety 
attribute or be representative.  This is because focus groups are intended to be 
general discussions to see what issues emerge.  They are also time consuming 
and so it is not possible to have enough respondents from a large sample of the 
population for the results to be representative  
 
The use of focus groups here needs to contribute to contingent valuation, as an aid 
to rational decision making.  The following discussion outlines how focus groups 
could assist a contingent valuation exercise.  “The focus group is a qualitative 
methodology that is not intended to provide definite answers to questions”.  It can 
though be helpful in the design of a research instrument, such as contingent 
valuation, that can provide statistically reliable data (Greenbaum 1998:59).  The 
focus groups will attempt to highlight food safety issues which are of concern to 
respondents and in particular emphasise those concerns which are controversial.  
The interpretation of the subjective and qualitative values, from the focus groups, 
acts as a filter to remove the contentious food safety concerns which respondents 
find difficult to evaluate.  In other words those concerns which could hinder a 
‘rational’ economic valuation can be removed.  This filtering process, as section 
6.11 also argued, suggests that there will not be many food safety issues left for 
consideration.  The hope though is that those concerns which do remain are 
capable of ‘rational’ valuation.  In other words, that people can make trade offs 
between money and safety, for those food safety issues that remain. 
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Arguably, focus groups have been under theorised, as much of the literature 
concentrates on their conduct rather than how they can inform policy (Davies 
1999:295).  However, if focus groups are to contribute to policy, via contingent 
valuation in this case, then the conduct of the groups is relevant.  Greenbaum 
(1998:62) outlines some factors which need to be considered for the successful 
implementation of focus groups.  It is suggested that “the more homogeneous the 
group is, the better the participants will relate to each other”.  Thus respondents 
should generate a higher quality of input.  It is argued that people from different 
socio-economic groups or with different educational levels should be in separate 
groups even if they are all consumers of the same food product.  Another relevant 
feature according to Greenbaum (1998:66), related to the conduct of the group, is 
the need for interaction among participants.  It is thought that interaction should be 
encouraged to increase the quality of the output from the session.  The range of 
ideas given to the researcher may increase through interaction. 
 
The focus groups, undertaken in this study, were conducted amongst 
homogenous groups.  The groups were a residents group and a church group.  
The selection of the groups were chosen to make sure that there would be a good 
interaction between the group members, as the participants knew each other.  This 
helped the continuity of the discussion because people were able to give each 
other constructive criticism.  Both the groups were made up of middle-aged and 
retired respondents and the socio-economic class of the respondents was from the 
electoral ward, which was 3154 out of 8414.  The groups do not need to be 
representative of the population as a whole.  This is because the groups can be 
considered as an "informal device for developing more valid and refined 
[contingent valuation] surveys" (Chilton and Hutchinson 1999:468).   
 
Potential shortcomings of focus groups need to be identified as these help to 
improve the conduct of the groups and the interpretation from them.  Greenbaum 
(1998:66) suggests that one of the greatest disadvantages of the focus group 
technique is its subjective nature because it allows observers to interpret what 
happened during the session.  It is thought that the moderator should maintain an 
objective perspective, throughout the process, so that the final report is an 
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accurate representation of what happened (Greenbaum 1998:69).  Moreover, it is 
suggested that the analysis should focus on the big picture rather than on 
individual comments. “The most effective way to evaluate focus groups is to try to 
identify the few really important findings of the group, considering the group’s 
overall feelings” (Greenbaum 1998:69).  Perhaps, one way to be objective and to 
look at the few important findings is to interpret the groups using a filter based on 
the literature review on search, experience and credence goods.  If the issues are 
separated between [1] search and experience goods and [2] credence goods then 
there is a way of classifying the concepts, particularly given that respondents find 
the credence goods difficult to consider or controversial.  The previous 
identification of irradiated food as a contentious food safety concern is relevant 
here. 
 
7.4.2.  The use of focus groups for environmental policy 
 
Focus groups have been used with contingent valuation, in the context of 
environmental policy.  First, contingent valuation studies can be informed by 
conclusions from focus groups undertaken prior to valuation studies.  
Environmental economists have used this qualitative research to provide insights 
into respondent’s attitudes towards particular environmental goods say National 
Parks (Garrod and Willis 1999:133).  Focus groups have also discussed the 
context of a good; say where flood protection may be needed.  Moreover, people 
have discussed the payment method and how much respondents might be willing 
to pay (Garrod and Willis 1999:133).  Consequently, it seems focus groups can be 
useful for developing the questions in a contingent valuation study and this is the 
purpose of the focus groups in this thesis. 
 
However, another option is to use focus groups, after a survey, to test the quality of 
the valuation.  The aim is to find out whether respondents answers are consistent 
with the question.  For example, to assess respondents understanding; or to 
uncover potential shortcomings of the methodology such as part-whole bias.  The 
overall aim of post-survey focus groups is to discover how useful the survey 
responses are for decision making (Brouwer et. al. 1999:326). 
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Problems have been identified with the use of focus groups, in conjunction, with 
contingent valuation.  These shortcomings suggest that focus groups may not 
contribute significantly to the quality of the overall study.  This is because there are 
contrasts between how focus groups are conducted and how a contingent 
valuation study is undertaken.  Individuals are known to behave differently in group 
scenarios, compared to situations where they decide alone, which is typical in 
willingness to pay surveys (Garrod and Willis 1999:133).  Also, “in both pre and 
post focus group meetings participants have more information about the good and 
about other individual’s responses” (Garrod and Willis 1999:133).  Therefore, 
information yielded from focus groups may be different from that obtained from the 
contingent valuation study.  Respondents may have a better understanding of the 
good in the focus group context because there is more time, and more people, to 
debate the issue.  This may lead to a false assumption that respondents had the 
same level of understanding in the contingent valuation situation.  This is unlikely 
to be the case because a questionnaire scenario would offer less time for thought 
and interaction. 
 
7.4.3. The use of focus groups for food policy 
 
Focus groups can inform contingent valuation, but the integration of these two 
types of approach will be a challenge for food economists if they want to contribute 
to policy making.  There is a question about how focus groups should be used to 
inform the later willingness to pay study.  Henson’s study (1996:7) on salmonella 
used focus groups to identify an appropriate format for the willingness to pay 
question.  Respondents were asked how risk reductions should be conveyed in a 
valuation question.  The focus groups, used for this research, serve a different 
purpose; to find out which food safety issues are capable of being valued.  It is 
possible that salmonella may not be the most appropriate application for 
contingent valuation, in the context of food safety.  The contention here is that the 
researcher needs to find out what food safety issues are capable of valuation 
before undertaking any other work.  The appropriate format for the willingness to 
pay question can then be developed by doing more piloting of the valuation 
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question.  This is the subject for chapter 8.  At this stage, the basic issues which 
are capable of valuation need to be identified. 
 
7.4.4. Focus Group data (appendix 2) 
 
Information was obtained by asking people about the food issues which concerned 
them [appendix 2].  The issues can be divided between credence and 
non-credence goods as outlined below. 
 
7.4.5. Examples of credence good issues from the focus group 
 
BSE:  “By the latest results they’ve got ... it’s just going to keep going and going” 
GM food: “They were supposed to be regulating GM food and asking people to say 
on the labels” 
Irradiated food: “The Government says irradiated food is safe” 
Chemicals in food: “You can’t taste pesticides on food” 
 
7.4.6. Examples of search and experience good issues  
 
The following examples are based on problems which arise through inadequate 
food hygiene regulation.  Marsden et. al. (1999:443) argued that environmental 
health officers are relevant for the enforcement of food standards at small 
independent premises such as kebab shops.  Therefore, the following are sources 
of food hygiene problems which environmental health officers could be expected to 
deal with. 
 
Storage of food: “The correct temperature for refrigeration (is needed)” 
Preparation of food: “(It’s) people's personal hygiene and food hygiene (that) 
brings out  
the food poisoning” 
Cooking of food: “In some restaurants the fish doesn’t seem to be cooked 
sufficiently” 
Handling of food: “The trainee was wearing plastic gloves but touched a piece of 
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meat” 
 
7.4.7. The selection of the food safety concepts 
 
It was clear, from the focus groups, that it would be difficult to evaluate issues, 
where there is significant uncertainty.  In particular, BSE which could be intractable.  
For example, it was stated that “it’s not wholly propagated through animal feed ... it 
may start that way ...  but it’s been carried on ... through the whole cycle and now 
it’s in the ground.  By the latest results they’ve got across the world it's going to 
keep going and going”.  It is difficult to ask people to value reductions in risk where 
it may not be possible to deliver a specified decrease in the BSE risk. 
Consequently, a contingent valuation question, on BSE, would not be incentive 
compatible.  It would not offer a realistic incentive to the respondent to provide a 
useful willingness to pay response.  Contingent valuation should outline questions 
on the basis that if a respondent paid X then they would receive Y benefit; but this 
type of question would not work in the context of BSE. 
 
BSE emphasises the relevance of the literature on risk perception; in particular the 
uncertainty and ‘dread’ factors.  People may not like to think about risks related to 
BSE.  It was stated “isn’t the most important thing the meat situation, as it was and 
we hope it’s cured”.  This response from the focus group, with implied uncertainty, 
i.e. “we hope it’s cured”, emphasises the credence good nature of beef now.  
Moreover, if people were to consider BSE then they may be unable to offer a 
rational value; their valuation may be influenced by previous apparent policy 
failures.  It was stated that “the bad things stick in your mind - the fiasco over 
scrapie in sheep; we’ve been allowing that to go on for years”.  Respondents may 
not be able to give valuations for a reduction in BSE risk.  They may not be able to 
address the measures that are needed to reduce risk in the present; they may be 
preoccupied with past failures. 
 
Scepticism of the European Union was mentioned in both the focus groups.  This 
may suggest that it is difficult to value the broader, international issues such as GM 
food.  Respondents imply that ‘Europe’ is remote or even operates against their 
  
 
 
 
132 
interests:  “Brussels says we’ve got to have” or “They (the European Union) set the 
rules but don’t adhere to them”.  Also it was stated that “this World Trade 
Organisation is really getting a grip on people now”.  Valuations related to an 
international issue, such as GM food, may be overly influenced by scepticism of 
the European Union rather than based on a valuation of food safety.  A question 
related to a broad international issue, such as GM, seems to be an invitation for an 
embedded response. Both the food issue, GM food, and the governance issue, the 
European Union, may be included in the valuation decision.  Nevertheless, the 
Food Standards Agency (Krebs 2001) stated that the Advisory Committee’s advice 
is that GM food is safe; in which case it would be inappropriate to try and value 
reductions in risk in terms of GM food.  The issue of property rights is relevant as 
respondents cannot realistically be asked to pay more for GM food which is said to 
be safe. 
 
 
Finally, there is another opaque food safety concept which is “not being able to 
taste pesticides”.  This raises a fundamental question of how credence goods can 
be assessed in the context of contingent valuation; and how the public can be 
asked to value improvements which they cannot sense such as through taste.  The 
corollary is that there is now a case for removing credence goods from the 
valuation study. 
 
The focus groups highlighted was the need to try and remove political issues from 
the valuation question.  Concern about political issues was a difficult theme in the 
focus groups.  However, an attempt to remove public policy, from a valuation 
question, would take away the public body, the mechanism, providing the public 
good.  If the mechanism is removed from the valuation question then the public 
cannot see how the food safety improvement can be delivered.  This is discussed 
in more detail, in the next chapter, where the description of the Food Standards 
Agency, creates problems for rational valuation.  The focus groups expressed 
concern over political issues; which could influence a willingness to pay response.  
For example “what worries me is that they (the government) keep on trying to jump 
on the bandwagon and get everyone revved about it and then suddenly find there’s 
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something wrong”.  Perhaps, research methods such as contingent valuation can 
only be as rational as the given political situation.  Willingness to pay, in this 
context, may well be influenced by the aspirations that the public had for the 
agency and whether these expectations are met. 
 
Another theme linked to the political context is media involvement which may 
cause confusion over food safety.  It was said that “food poisoning grabs the 
headlines” which could discourage respondents from considering safety versus 
money trade offs; and instead focus attention on the media ‘story’.  This problem 
could be mitigated by offering the respondent a clearly defined ‘public good’, in the 
valuation question:  that is a good which people can see being delivered; and 
which could be unaffected by media attention.  For example, the kind of food safety 
work that the respondent can see being undertaken locally by environmental 
health officers. 
 
This leads into contingent valuation being used to value just local food hygiene 
regulation; the enforcement of regulations and the monitoring of food safety related 
to the storage, handling, and preparation and cooking of food.  The advantage of 
this approach is that it fits in with the classical economic model of food safety.  As 
stated in chapter 1 “the provision of safer food will require the use of more 
resources [which will be needed if] more hygienic handling procedures [are to be 
introduced]”.  It is suggested therefore, that food hygiene regulation is an example 
of a food safety public good which does conform to the classical economic model 
and could be valued using contingent valuation.  This is unlike food safety public 
goods which monitor credence goods. 
 
A different theme raised at the focus groups was the Agency’s monitoring of local 
authority standards which would require additional funding.  As one respondent 
said, there would have to be “an audit of the auditors”.  That is, the Agency is 
undertaking an audit of the local authorities who are the auditors of the food 
premises.  This implied criticism from the focus groups suggests that the public 
have concerns about the additional bureaucracy which is being implemented.  
Moreover, the agency is reliant on Environmental Health Officers who were 
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already being employed by local authorities.  Thus the additional benefit provided 
by the government, in terms of the Agency auditing and overseeing local 
authorities may not be clear to the public.  This is because they are not receiving a 
quantifiable benefit as would be the case with a tangible pure public good such as 
a flood wall. 
 
7.4.8. Main lessons from the focus groups 
 
The ideas from the focus groups have led to a useful conclusion.  Food safety 
issues, such as common cases of food poisoning, can be comprehended by the 
general public.  Respondents may have seen examples of poor food hygiene 
practice, such as food which has been improperly stored, and have been able to 
link this to the possibility of mild food poisoning.  This basic understanding of the 
link between poor food hygiene and food poisoning suggests that it is possible to 
undertake a contingent valuation, using food hygiene as the concept to be 
improved.  Simple examples of food borne risk, which may occur through the 
improper cooking, preparation, storage and handling of food, could be appropriate 
for economic valuation. 
 
In contrast, many of the credence goods issues are difficult to evaluate, by the 
public, in economic terms.  The credence good issues raise problems of 
uncertainty, such as the uncertainty over the severity of the hazard.  This makes it 
difficult for the respondent to specify how much money should be devoted to safety 
measures.  Moreover, the respondent cannot sense the food safety problem, for 
example through taste, therefore they may not be able to identify whether there is a 
problem or not.  Finally, some credence goods raise problems related to control; 
that it is unrealistic to ask respondents to pay more for a food which they do not 
have control over. 
 
7.5.   Conclusions from the preliminary experiment and focus groups 
 
The analysis from Holland (1995:25) is now relevant.  A simple food safety public 
good, such as the enforcement of food hygiene regulations, is perhaps not open to 
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ambiguity in the way that a plot of land could be.  Therefore, the public good could 
be valued like a private market artefact, such as a screw, which has a clearly 
defined function.  “A screw (or a nail) is an item with a particular function; the only 
question is how many are needed” (Holland 1995:25).  The enforcement of food 
hygiene regulations is intended to be analogous to a screw.  The only question is 
how much, food hygiene regulation, is required which could be elicited through a 
contingent valuation study. 
 
The link between inadequate food hygiene and common examples of food 
poisoning is now relevant.  Common cases of food poisoning are the closest 
example, in food safety policy, to a consensus.  The Food Standards Agency has 
estimated the annual cost of all food poisoning at £350 million (Food Standards 
Agency 2000c) compared to a cost of about £750 million according to an unofficial 
report (Daily Mail 1998).  The point about a consensus, or at least a partial 
consensus, is that the food poisoning hazards are capable of being costed.  
Moreover, the costs could be closer if only common cases of food poisoning were 
considered.  This is because there is not the ambiguity involved with major causes 
of food poisoning.  This ambiguity is caused by the uncertainty over temporary 
versus chronic cases of major food poisoning.  This was highlighted in the 
salmonella in eggs case study. 
 
In contrast there is not a consensus over credence goods because, by their nature, 
the scientific evidence is inconclusive.  A study on credence goods could obtain 
contrasting valuations because the public may read different scientific forecasts 
say on the severity of BSE or CJD.  People’s valuations may vary because of 
different scientific predictions rather than because of contrasting consumer 
preferences.  The science underlying food safety can be interpreted differently, in 
the same way that environmental goods, such as land, are open to alternative 
purposes. 
 
Credence goods pose a similar problem to the land example.  In this case, there is 
a problem over how much of the food safety public good is needed.  There is a 
preliminary issue over epidemiology, given credence goods, which needs to be 
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addressed before it is possible to undertake a valuation.  For example, given BSE 
and CJD, the seriousness of the disease needs to be determined before 
respondents can be asked to value reductions in risk.  This cannot be done at 
present, in the context of BSE, because the scientific evidence is inconclusive.  At 
present it is suggested that the epidemiological jury is still out on BSE.  The precise 
length of the incubation period for CJD is still uncertain.  There is the zero - infinity 
problem described in chapter 6.  The valuation is zero if the respondent does not 
perceive any risk from BSE because they may have read scientific reports that the 
BSE risk is minimal.  This zero valuation may occur despite the respondent being 
willing to pay for public goods to reduce safety risks say from transport accidents.  
Alternatively, a respondent may give an infinite valuation if they are overly 
concerned about the BSE risk.  This is because they may have read alternative 
scientific reports which have suggested that many people could die from CJD. 
 
It is possible to attempt to 'value life' i.e. the valuation of the prevention of a 
statistical fatality.  Indeed, the Latouche et. al. (1998) study, attempted a 
contingent valuation on BSE.  The question is the extent to which such a study 
could realistically inform policy.  The emphasis of this research is to undertake 
work which, although limited to food hygiene regulation, does offer the possibility of 
informing decision making. 
 
Severe instances of food poisoning could be construed as having credence good 
characteristics.  The case study on eggs is again relevant with the complexity over 
temporary versus chronic episodes of food poisoning.  Egg safety could be seen 
as a credence good because it is unclear how long a potential consequent illness 
is likely to last. 
 
This provides another reason for not attempting the valuation of credence goods.  
For the purposes of valuation, major types of food poisoning such as botulism are 
not considered.  Again, the respondent does not know how serious the food 
poisoning is going to be, and therefore does not have much guidance on what an 
appropriate valuation should be.  This uncertainty emphasises how economics, in 
this area, is dependent upon a scientific or epidemiological foundation.  To 
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summarise, it is better to concentrate on common cases of food poisoning where 
the epidemiology is generally not being contested. 
 
This analysis has been used to mitigate the criticism of the economic valuation of 
the environment, by academics such as Holland, which could be used to challenge 
an economic valuation of food safety.  The removal of credence goods should 
reduce some of the criticism of the empirical valuation.  The advantage of 
narrowing down the concepts, to common cases of food poisoning, is that the 
valuation of food safety should now be possible. 
 
Common cases of food poisoning can be understood in different contexts e.g. 
across different local authority boundaries.  This is unlike e-coli which could have 
greater significance for people from Scotland given the outbreak in Lanarkshire in 
1997.  Also understanding of simple food hygiene issues should be consistent 
across time.  This is because; simple cases of food borne illness should lead to ill - 
health of a known duration.  The impact of a minor case of food poisoning can be 
understood as a stomach upset lasting say 12, 24 or 48 hours. 
 
To summarise, a public good to reduce common cases of food poisoning, can 
make similar contributions to consumer welfare regardless of location and time.  
The enforcement of food hygiene regulations has a uniform function which should 
ensure that it is consistently understood by respondents; making it suitable for 
valuation.  For this reason, in the empirical study outlined in chapter 9, food 
poisoning is not a credence good but an experience good.  It will be defined as an 
experience good, where the safety of the food can be determined 12, 24 or 48 
hours after consumption. 
 
The rationale for the valuation of food hygiene regulation, in the context of common 
cases of food poisoning, is that arguably the public should be willing to pay for 
more enforcement.  If people eat out more, food poisoning could increase as a gap 
opens up between [a] the level of eating out and [b] the amount of enforcement.  
Therefore, more resources are needed for investment in, food safety enforcement, 
to close this gap.  This approach conforms to the conventional view of property 
  
 
 
 
138 
rights that if people want additional food hygiene enforcement, to close this gap, 
then they will have to pay more.  Respondents are not being asked to pay more to 
keep the situation the same, the new property rights approach, which is a 
contentious methodology. 
 
The above argument suggests that there is a case for investment in greater 
standards inspection by Environmental Health Officers.  The demand for this 
investment could be measured through a contingent valuation study.  Two 
shortcomings, though, will be briefly addressed. Firstly, the question has the 
challenge of being relevant to the public.  The 'food safety gap' may be occurring 
beneath the public’s perception.  There is concern about higher food poisoning, 
from the Food Standards Agency, but respondents may not recognise the need for 
increased investment in safety.  For example, at the start of the first focus group 
people were asked what their main food safety concerns were; the first response 
was “I think we live in such a sanitised environment that there are very few”.   
 
Secondly, if the proposed improvements in food safety were introduced then 
consumers may have less choice.  In theory, improved food hygiene and safety in 
small food outlets should offer people more choice.  The public may trust small 
food premises more, so they may be more willing to purchase food from them.  
However, the small outlets would have to comply with regulations, which could 
increase prices.  If prices rose then the small premises could lose competitive 
advantage, compared to the supermarkets and so go out of business.  This may 
ultimately reduce choice rather than improve it as first thought.  This assumes that 
small shops compete with the supermarkets on price, which is one factor which will 
affect competition. 
 
Despite these problems, the valuation of food hygiene regulation was attempted.  
The research up to now has led to a proposed course of study; that by restricting 
food safety issues to food hygiene then a valuation can be undertaken.  Further 
exploratory studies were completed to refine the food hygiene concept.  The first of 
these is detailed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8:  Refinement of the valuation question 
 
8.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter reports on a series of pilot exercises undertaken on Tyneside, in 
2000 and 2001, with the purpose of trying to develop the valuation question; 
given the methodological challenges identified.  There were 6 different iterations 
of the valuation question.  In variations 1 to 3 and 6 the pilot questionnaire also 
included a series of questions to assess respondent’s food consumption 
behaviour and their attitudes towards food safety.  These questions were 
generally asked in the form of a Likert scale to see whether attitudes towards 
food and safety in particular, are related to willingness to pay.  The relationship 
between the likert scales and willingness to pay is outlined in chapter 9.  At this 
stage the Likert Scales were piloted to make sure that they could be used in the 
main study.  Respondents were asked to answer on a 5 point scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  The disagreement side of the likert 
scale was put on the left hand side of the scale to discourage ‘yes-saying’, 
whereby respondents automatically agree with the question. 
 
The six iterations are described below.  The 6 versions of the pilot questionnaire 
are in the appendix.  In each case the description of the pilot survey is as follows: 
 
1) Discussion of food consumption behaviour and attitude questions, where 
they were included. 
2) Introduction to the valuation question and the valuation question. 
3) Results from the valuation question. 
4) A commentary which includes the justification for aspects of the question. 
5) The discussion which emerges from the question. 
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8.2.  and 8.3:  Iteration 1 
 
8.2.1.  Question 1:  Location of main food shopping (see appendix 3) 
 
A question was asked to find out where people did most of their food shopping.  
The purpose of this was to find out how significant the state is when enforcing 
food standards.   
 
The question asked: where do you do most of your food shopping? 
 
A) Large supermarket or superstore. 
B) Small supermarket 
C) Local food shop; for example corner shop 
D) Market stall 
 
All respondents (20 out of 20) gave (a) the large supermarket as their answer.  
The question does suggest that people are purchasing their food, to a large 
extent, from the major supermarkets.  The implication for state intervention is that 
it is limited given the supermarkets domination of the food purchasing market 
shown here and their substantial influence in setting standards.  Thus, large 
measures of willingness to pay for state intervention in the food sector should be 
viewed with caution. 
 
8.2.2. Question 2:  Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
The purpose of the question was to measure people’s confidence in food safety.  
The aim was to see whether people feel that they can purchase safe food. 
 
There were 20 responses to this likert scale.  The mean was 3.4 and higher than 
3 indicates agreement. 
 
8.2.3. Question 3:  Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
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The purpose of this question was to measure the public’s perception of the 
government and perhaps also their attitude towards public goods. 
 
From the 20 responses the mean was 2.75 
 
8.2.4. Question 4: 
 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
The purpose of this question was to identify the public’s attitudes towards the 
food industry.  In particular, to try and find out whether people think that the food 
industry puts its own interests before the public’s interests. 
 
From the 20 responses the mean was 4.1 
 
8.2.5. Question 5: 
 
Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
The purpose of this question was to find out whether people perceive differences 
in the levels of food safety between small and large outlets. 
 
From the 20 responses the mean was 2.28 
 
8.2.6. Question 6 
 
Have you, or anyone in your household had food poisoning recently (in the last 6 
months (Yes or No)?   
 
The purpose was to measure personal experience of food poisoning as this could 
explain willingness to pay for food hygiene.  It would be expected that experience 
of food poisoning would lead to a greater willingness to pay.  In theory “the more 
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concerned an individual is about the potential impact of food poisoning, on their 
health, the greater the amount they are willing to pay to reduce the risk of food 
poisoning” (Henson 1996:16).  However, Henson suggests that some food 
consumers have a distorted concept of probability.  Some of Henson’s 
respondents expressed the belief that having suffered from food poisoning in the 
recent past, then this would reduce the probability that they would suffer food 
poisoning in the future (Henson 1999:16).  
 
The period of 6 months was thought to be acceptable for common cases of food 
poisoning although very serious cases of food poisoning could traumatise people 
for decades.  Four people said yes while the other 16 said no.  This question was 
later changed because it was believed that a likert scale would be more 
appropriate for measuring attitudes. 
 
8.2.7. Question 7 
 
About how much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets? 
From any other food outlets? 
(including eating out from canteens, restaurants and takeaways) 
 
Again the sole purpose of this question was help respondents think about what 
would be an appropriate willingness to pay figure.  Therefore, the data is not given 
as the main focus is on question 8, which is the valuation question. 
 
8.3.1. Question 8 (Iteration 1: appendix 3) 
 
The last chapter, which outlined the exploratory research, concluded that it would 
be appropriate to try and value experience goods.  Therefore the aim of the 
question was to separate experience goods from credence goods.  The factors 
which were meant to be valued were the storage, handling, preparation and 
cooking of food under the generic heading of food hygiene.  These hygiene 
concepts were separated from the credence goods issues as outlined in the 
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question below: 
 
Question 
 
The new Food Safety Agency will improve food hygiene. 
For example the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food. 
Assume there is no impact on other issues like BSE, Genetically Modified Food, 
irradiated food and chemicals in food. 
 
Because of the Agency: 
1. The food you buy will be less likely to cause food poisoning. 
2. Food safety in small shops, takeaways and restaurants would improve to 
the same level as the big supermarkets. 
3. Improvements in food hygiene would have to be made across the whole 
food industry. 
4. This would mean that food prices would go up wherever it was bought. 
 
Question:  Are you willing to pay more for your food to get better food safety? 
Remember! 
This money could be spent on other products or on tastier food. 
It’s the same food at the same place it’s just safer to eat! 
If yes, you are willing to pay, what is the most you would expect to pay on top of 
your weekly shopping bill to support the Food Safety Agency? 
Follow up question:  Please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not”. 
 
8.3.2. Willingness to pay results 
 
There were 12 yes responses and 8 no responses.  The average willingness to pay 
from the 12 yes responses was £7.31. 
 
8.3.3 Commentary: the justification for various aspects of the question 
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The description of the “Food Safety Agency” was an attempt to provide 
respondents with information on the public good to be valued.  It was decided to 
label the agency a “safety agency” rather than a “standards agency” for clarity.  
The line stating that there would be “no impact on other issues such as BSE and 
Genetically Modified Food” was an attempt to discourage respondents from 
including credence goods as part of the valuation. 
 
Descriptions were then made, points 1-3 above, to give the respondent information 
on the scope of the public good.  The aim was to provide the respondent with an 
incentive to value it.  It was then stated, point 4, “this would mean that food prices 
would go up wherever it was bought”.  This outlined the payment method and 
indicated that the benefit was conditional, and consequential, upon a payment 
being made. 
 
The question contained qualifying statements.  Respondents were encouraged to 
remember the alternative ways that they could spend their money.  This statement 
is based on the argument in chapter 1 that people and societies have scarce 
resources.  The aim is to urge respondents to consider the trade offs that they are 
theoretically making.  Safer food has an opportunity cost which is [1] to forgo other 
products available in private markets or [2] to potentially forgo other food attributes, 
such as taste, which cost money.  For example, money could be spent on 
enhanced flavourings rather than safety.   
 
The purpose of the slogan “the same food in the same place” was devised to try 
and get the respondent to focus only on the safety characteristic.  The aim was to 
encourage them, in their mind, to see it as a separate attribute.  The other 
characteristics, such as the type of food and the place where it is bought, are 
theoretically controlled.  The other factors remain fixed while money can be used to 
improve safety.  After all, the purpose of the exercise is to find out how much 
money people want to spend on additional safety. 
 
The term “most” was used to elicit the whole of the consumer’s surplus.  The term 
“expect” you would have to pay was included to provide context, as it is food bills 
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which respondents would anticipate having to rise, to pay for the food safety.  The 
use of “expect” gives the impression that the food industry would increase the food 
prices with the respondent saying what would be a reasonable increase in prices.  
The “support [of] the agency” is used to indicate that the extra money would go into 
funding the public good.  This does have some practical relevance as the 
government did propose a levy on food retailers to pay for the Food Standards 
Agency. 
 
8.3.4. Discussion: lessons which emerge from the question 
 
The discussion is based on the follow up question which was “please can you give 
me a reason for being willing to pay or not”.  The following themes are addressed.  
First, that people are only able to give short responses and straightforward 
reasons for their valuation.  The second theme is the issue of property rights.  The 
third theme examines the problems caused by the use of market prices as the 
payment method.  The fourth area is that people find it difficult to make valuations.  
The fifth issue is that some people’s responses offered clear guidance on how to 
reduce the problems related to the embedding concept.  This leads into a summary 
of how the question could be improved. 
 
The first theme is that a door to door resident’s survey of this type may only yield 
short responses when people are asked to justify their willingness to pay.  For 
example, it was stated: “food safety and hygiene - I would pay for that”.  Also, it was 
said that “good food is important; the (food production) process is important”.  
Another example was “to make sure the food you are eating is safer”.  The problem 
here is that people are giving simple yes responses and so their preferences 
appear not to be well formed.  The answers may be more of a yes signal, rather 
than carefully thought out willingness to pay responses. 
 
A second problem is the difficulty over property rights as some respondents 
rejected the basis of the question.  It was stated that “it (food safety) should be at 
an acceptable level” and “you should get it anyway, you shouldn’t have to pay 
more”.  This is a rejection of the notion that the public should have to pay extra to 
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secure an improvement in food hygiene.  A respondent argued that “everything [all 
food safety] should be in place”.  The relevant word here is “should” as it may 
indicate free riding.  The respondent could be expecting the food industry to deliver 
all aspects of food safety when some independent state monitoring may be 
required.  There does seem to be the fundamental challenge that food safety can 
be perceived as ‘non-negotiable’.  A concept which should be fixed at an 
‘acceptable level’.  Food safety is often judged as though it should not be capable 
of improvement, even if more resources can be invested in it.  This supports 
Loader and Hobbs (1999:692-3) argument that food safety is seen as a right and 
not a privilege. 
 
Responses can be ambiguous because of the property rights concept.  An 
example of this was the response: “yes (I would be willing to pay more) but I don’t 
think I should (pay more to acquire the 'right' to food safety) - I (already) buy 
organic”.  The mention of organic food is not relevant if food poisoning is narrowly 
defined as a micro-biological issue.  Thus, the question may not have been well 
understood.  Indeed, the respondent complained about the difficulty of the 
question.  The respondent implied that they are already paying enough for food 
safety.  The private sector, market price, perspective of the question left scope for 
the respondent to indulge in averting behaviour, e.g.  buying organic food, as a 
way of avoiding having to pay more.  The payment method of food prices led the 
respondent to circumvent the question, by implying that they can meet their safety 
needs solely through their choice of food purchases.  This is analogous to paying 
for double glazing to mitigate the need for payment for reduced noise pollution.  To 
summarise averting behaviour arises from impure public goods such as food 
safety regulation.  This problem would not occur so easily with a pure public good 
such as defence expenditure.  Respondents are forced to confront a defence 
valuation question because there is no private alternative. 
 
The third problem is market prices.  Although reference is made to the government 
agency; the emphasis on respondent’s shopping bills elicits a comment on the 
food industry and not on public goods and their provision.  Arguably, if the aim is to 
measure the consumer’s surplus then the choice of payment method is immaterial.  
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However, people’s views on the food industry will affect their bid values.  For 
example, a no response was justified on the basis that the food industry is making 
profits already and the implication was that food prices should not be any higher.  It 
was also said that “food hygiene is important but that it (food safety) could be used 
as an opportunity (for the food industry) to put prices up”.  Moreover, it was said 
“let’s hope they (the food industry) don’t charge more when it (food safety) stays 
the same”.  Thus, the use of market prices, as the payment method again leads to 
problems over the property rights which could affect the valuation.  People may 
feel that they have to pay more even though safety could “stay the same”. 
 
A fourth problem is the difficulty people have in providing valuations.  There is an 
ambiguity in people’s responses.  There are conflicting concerns and it is difficult to 
see how these can be integrated to reach an overall judgement.  For example, a 
yes response was qualified because the respondent seemed concerned about the 
budget constraint.  They said that they would be willing to pay “a small percentage” 
extra.  However, the justification for being willing to pay, “because you do not put a 
price on health”, appears to contradict the earlier statement.  There appears to be 
a major challenge that respondents are unable to give clear responses.  Covey et. 
al’s study (1998) was able to elicit clear willingness to pay values.  However, it 
should be recognised that respondents in that study were paid £20 for participation 
(at middle 1990’s prices).  Perhaps, they felt obliged to give clear monetary 
valuations.  In this research, respondents were not offered any financial incentive 
to participate so perhaps they were more willing to unwittingly challenge the 
premise of the research.  Respondents implicitly criticized the basis of the 
‘economics of food safety’ that it is not possible to “put a price on health”.  
Consequently, the responses here are useful as they give uninhibited challenges 
to the notion that money can be traded for additional food safety.  This perhaps 
gives an insight into how respondents perceive the valuation of food safety in 
practice. 
 
The fifth point is on embedding.  Helpful information was obtained, which provided 
some explanations for people’s willingness to pay.  Some respondents expressed 
concern for their children e.g. “[I would be] willing to pay more for [my] children”; 
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and would be willing to pay “if food is going to be safer; for the little ones; for the 
kids; for peace of mind with everything you hear about”.  This last response is of 
concern because the aim of the question was to narrow the food safety concept 
down to the cooking, handling, storage and preparation of food; in the places 
where the respondent bought their food.  The question described this as the “same 
food” coming from the “same place” but that it would be “just safer to eat”.  
However, “everything you hear about” was mentioned.  Thus, there is the danger 
that respondents have included every conceivable food safety issue which can be 
brought to mind.  The embedding concept which was discussed theoretically in the 
literature, and in the food safety case studies, now appears as a practical 
challenge in this research.  For example, another respondent said that they would 
be willing to pay “if I knew it was going to be safe - but this may include all factors”.  
The respondent was interpreting the question generically rather than specifically. 
 
Another respondent gave reasons for not being willing to pay.  They said that they 
were happy with food safety as it was and that concern over GM food was over 
hyped.  Thus, the question was interpreted as a general question on food safety.  
The discussion here is not on the introduction of novel foods, but that genetic 
modification may have distracted the respondent from the valuation of food 
hygiene regulation.  The corollary is that the valuation question needed to be 
improved; particularly given the respondent who mentioned buying organic food 
which was not directly part of the question.   
 
The question outlined food safety issues which were not supposed to be included 
in the public’s thinking; “assume there is no impact on BSE, genetically modified 
food, irradiated food, chemicals in food”.  However, by listing these concepts, the 
question had inadvertently led respondents to contemplate these major issues.  
Therefore, the next valuation question removed these challenging subjects so 
another attempt could be made at resolving the embedding problem.  The 
modification of the question could perhaps deal with some of the other problems 
too. 
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8.4.  and 8.5.  Iteration 2 
 
8.4.1.1.  Introduction to iteration 2 
 
The first part of the questionnaire was similar to iteration 1.  The first part 
[questions 1-6] was retained to make sure that it could be used in the main study, 
detailed in chapter 9.  Question 1 was changed to a different question which might 
better explain willingness to pay. 
 
8.4.1.2. Question 1 
 
How many (from 0 to 5) of the following (small food outlets) have you used in the 
last week? 
 
This question on small food outlets was used on the basis that supermarkets have 
less need for the services of enforcement officers.  It was introduced to examine 
whether greater use of small food outlets is related to greater demand (willingness 
to pay) for food safety regulation.  The use of the term “last week” was used as it 
was hoped that respondents could recall the answer quickly.  It was hoped that the 
results would be similar to an average week. 
The mean number of outlets visited was 1.74 from 19 respondents.  There was one 
non-response because the respondent had been on holiday. 
 
8.4.2. Question 2  
 
Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
The mean was 3.2 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.4.3. Question 3  
 
Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
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The mean was 2.95 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.4.4. Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
The mean was 4 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.4.5. Question 5   
 
Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
The mean was 1.88 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.4.6. Question 6  
 
Have you, or anyone in your household had food poisoning recently (in the last 6 
months?) 
 
There were 4 yes responses and 16 no responses.  Again, with such a small 
number of people suggesting that they have had food poisoning recently then 
there is little data to work with.  Thus this question was later removed.  The 
question on the respondent’s food shopping bill (question 7) remained unchanged 
throughout the rest of the iterations. 
 
8.5.1.  Question 8:  (iteration 2: appendix 4) 
 
The aim of the question [in the case of iteration 2] was to focus exclusively on the 
food hygiene concepts.  This was to reduce the 'embedding' problem.  In the 
preliminary valuation question, undertaken before the focus groups, people 
complained that they had no choice over being willing to pay.  Therefore a decision 
was taken to loosen the assumption that food would be bought “at the same place”.  
  
 
 
 
151 
Instead respondents were asked whether they are willing to pay more to shop at a 
hypothetical supermarket which has 20% less food poisoning.  This reduction in 
food poisoning was based on the Food Standards Agency’s target to reduce food 
poisoning by 20% by 2006 (Food Standards Agency 2000b).  Although reference 
to the Food Standards Agency was omitted because the question is about 
supermarkets. 
Question  
 
The point of this question is to find out if you are willing to pay extra for lower food 
poisoning. 
Assume that a new supermarket, which includes a takeaway and restaurant, is 
opened up. 
This new supermarket has better food hygiene compared to other shops. 
It has better monitoring and control of the food businesses which supply it. 
So that the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food is better than 
existing at food shops. 
As a result, the amount of food poisoning, associated with this new supermarket is 
expected to be 20% lower than in existing food shops. 
But, food prices, throughout the supply chain, are higher to pay for these 
improvements in food hygiene. 
Would you be willing to pay more to shop at this new supermarket? 
Which is likely to lead to 20% less food poisoning. 
If you would be willing to pay more, then, what is the most you would be willing to 
pay on top of your total food bill? 
Follow up question: please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not? 
 
8.5.2. Willingness to pay results 
 
The question was open-ended and 3 out of the 10 positive responses were unable 
to give a valuation with their response.  This shows the difficulty in answering the 
open-ended question.  Therefore, the willingness to pay data is not given.  
However, there were 10 affirmative responses and 10 negative responses out of a 
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sample of 20 people. 
 
8.5.3. Commentary: the justification for various aspects of the question 
 
The statement, “it (the new supermarket) has better monitoring and control of the 
food businesses which supply it”, is based on the conclusions by Marsden et. al. 
(1999).  They argue that the leading supermarkets have sophisticated systems to 
oversee their food suppliers.  In comparison, it is suggested that independent, 
often small food retailers do not have the same quality controls over their food 
suppliers. 
 
8.5.4. Discussion: lessons which emerge from the question 
 
The first issue to address is the fundamental problem with the question.  It does not 
separate food safety from other food purchases.  In particular the characteristics of 
different supermarkets!  Second, the recurrent challenges, such as embedding, 
property rights and the difficulty that respondents have with putting a value on food 
safety, are then addressed.  Thirdly, examples are given where the research 
method did work. 
 
First, the fundamental problem with the question is that it encouraged respondents 
to digress from just the food hygiene concept and instead consider supermarket 
attributes.  For example, one respondent said “I use the Co-op and it’s no problem”.  
In other words another external factor, that people may like a traditional grocer 
such as the Co-op, is influencing the interviewee’s response; which is supposed to 
only be about food safety.  Another respondent said “I trust the other ones (the 
other supermarkets) anyway” which is again examining the attributes of the 
supermarkets which was not the purpose of the question.  This exploratory 
question does though highlight that it is essential to focus the respondent’s 
attention solely on the characteristic of food safety.  It is necessary to focus solely 
on food hygiene and food poisoning as that will make sure that the 'embedding' 
problem is confined to food safety and not supermarket attributes.  
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However, the public's understanding of food poisoning was, arguably, still 
interpreted in a general manner.  For example, one respondent said that they 
would be willing to pay “a bit extra for health as e-coli can cause death”.  Thus, the 
question had to be clarified as the question was unclear over whether the subject 
of e-coli was covered by the question.  In the empirical study in chapter 9, a clearer 
definition was used to define the benefit arising from the hypothetical payment. 
 
A recurrent problem is that respondents reject the notion that the public should 
have to pay for food safety.  In other words, the property rights basis of the 
question was rejected.  For example, it was stated that “I expect food hygiene and 
food safety from everybody”.  Moreover, the question was challenged because a 
respondent believed that responsibility should be taken by the individual.  For 
example: “not particularly (willing to pay), you can’t guarantee it, (food safety) it’s 
only as good as the staff (and) it’s not the shops, it’s the way people (individual 
food consumers) are cooking”.  This emphasises that there are food hygiene 
problems, in people’s homes, which are beyond the scope of the state regulation of 
food outlets.  This highlights the impure nature of the public good.  Again, people 
can be reluctant to value risks related to health.  One respondent said that they 
were willing to pay “because health is important” but then qualified their response 
by saying that “it is difficult to place a value on human life”. 
 
However, useful information was obtained.  One respondent, which is 
representative of some other opinion, said: “yes, I would be willing to pay for higher 
standards for a guarantee and to make sure that food is safe”.  This is an 
interesting response because it returns to the concept of whether credence goods 
can be turned into certified search goods.  This concept is doubtful as it seems 
unlikely that food safety can be "guaranteed". 
 
Some non responses were obtained, which were genuine with regard to food 
safety.  For example, one respondent said that they had no food poisoning and so 
were not willing to pay.  Another said that there was a satisfactory level of hygiene 
anyway while another said that they could not afford to pay more.  These reasons 
for not being willing to pay were used in the final version of the valuation question 
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in the main study in chapter 9.  These valid non-responses provided here were 
used in the main study, to test the validity of the non-responses, in the main 
empirical study. 
 
8.6. and 8.7.  Iteration 3 
 
8.6.1.1.  Introduction to iteration 3 
 
Questions 1 to 5 remained unchanged.  Question 6 was changed to a likert scale 
as such a question, could be a better indicator of attitudes towards food poisoning.   
 
8.6.1.2.  Question 1  
 
How many of the following have you used in the last week? 
 
The mean was 1.63 from 19 respondents.  The other respondent did not know. 
 
8.6.2. Question 2  
 
Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
The mean was 3.23 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.6.3. Question 3  
 
Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
The mean was 2.55 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.6.4. Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
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The mean was 3.9 from 20 respondents 
 
8.6.5. Question 5  
 
Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
The mean was 2.1 from 20 respondents. 
 
8.6.6. Question 6 
 
Do food safety issues, such as food poisoning, influence where you do your food 
shopping? 
 
Disagree Disagree  Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly        Strongly 
1  2   3  4  5 
 
This question aimed to improve on the previous version of question 6.  The 
question aimed to uncover whether the location of people’s food purchasing 
decision is affected by the need to avoid food poisoning.  The mean was 3.65 from 
20 respondents. 
 
8.7.1 Question 8 (iteration 3:appendix 5) 
 
The purpose here was to have a question which is more relevant to the public good 
in question.  Thus, the description describes the government as working with the 
food industry. 
 
Question 
 
The government has brought in a new Food Safety Department 
called - The Food Standards Agency 
One of the aims (of this) is to improve hygiene in food outlets.  So that, by 2006, 
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food poisoning will be reduced by 20%. 
Food hygiene will be improved as the Government will be working with the food 
Industry and local councils to improve the 
Storage 
Handling 
Preparation  
and cooking of food   up to the point of sale 
in the food outlets where you buy your food. 
To pay for these improvements in food hygiene, food prices would go up wherever 
it was bought. 
But, this would make sure small food shops were brought up to the same standard 
as the big supermarkets. 
Would you prefer to pay the same amount for food as you do now? 
With no reduction in food poisoning.  Or 
 
Would you be willing to pay more? 
 
So that food poisoning, in the places where you buy your food, is reduced by 20%. 
 
If you would be willing to pay more, then what is the most you would be willing to 
pay on top of your total food bill? 
Follow up question: please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not? 
 
8.7.2. Willingness to pay results 
 
There were 13 respondents who were willing to pay; 8 stated an agreement but 
with no valuation while 5 stated an agreement with a valuation.  There were 6 no 
responses while one respondent said that that they felt they had no choice over 
their answer.  It would be unwise to draw any conclusions from these 20 responses 
as will be argued in the discussion section. 
 
8.7.3. Commentary:  the justification for various aspects of the question 
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This question attempted to make sure that only safety attributes were considered.  
The statement: “the places where you buy your food” was used so that the location 
of food purchasing was held constant in the question.  Therefore this would stop 
respondents from digressing onto supermarket attributes.  The question also 
attempted to be relevant by outlining the Food Standards Agency’s target for the 
reduction of food poisoning. 
 
The scope of the public good was described as “up to the point of sale” to stop 
people interpreting the question as if it included cooking in their own home.  
However, perhaps this provides too much detail in the context of a relatively short 
questionnaire.  Again it was stated “to pay for these improvements in food hygiene, 
food prices would go up wherever it was bought”.  This was done to make the 
question coercive so that improved safety is contingent upon extra payment.  Thus 
the aim was to make sure that the payment for safety concept was confronted.  
This was in theory at least, so the respondent could not avoid payment by 
suggesting that they would buy their food from elsewhere.  Again the question 
reverts to “this would make sure small food shops were brought up to the same 
standard as the big supermarkets”.  The use of the term “would” is definite whereas 
the term “likely” used before [8.5.1] is ambiguous. 
 
8.7.4. Discussion: lessons which emerge from the question 
 
Four issues will be discussed here.  The first issue is the coercive nature of the 
question which left respondents feeling that they did not have a choice.  Second, is 
the theme of property rights.  The third point is the difficulty of valuing health.  
Fourth, useful information was obtained although there is the challenge that some 
consumers do not believe that food safety can be guaranteed. 
 
The coercive element of the question - “food prices would go up wherever it was 
bought” led people to complain about insufficient choice.  Indeed one respondent 
said “do I have any say; they (the food industry) have a control over food prices.  I 
suppose yes, just have to pay for it”.  Another said that they would be willing to pay 
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1% extra on top of their food shopping bill because it needs investment.  Although 
this could be a sensible amount; it could alternatively be an attempt by the 
respondent to reduce the amount they feel they are ‘obliged to pay’.  In other words, 
what is being measured is what people think they are supposed to pay or feel that 
they obliged to pay, rather than what they are willing to pay.  If this is correct then 
there is an over-estimation of the value of the ‘food safety public good’.  The 
problem here is that the open-ended question seems to leave people feeling that 
they have little choice.  It is not contributing much in terms of quantitative 
willingness to pay amounts for that reason.  Thus the open-ended question here 
serves a purpose only for refining the eventual study question. 
 
Again respondents criticized the property rights basis of the question that people 
should have to pay more for safety.  For example, one respondent stated that “it 
[food safety] has nothing to do with money”.  Another said, “You shouldn’t have to 
pay more; customers should have proper (food) handling to start off with”.  This 
implies that the public should have the ‘right’ to food hygiene standards from the 
outset.  Another respondent stated that “it’s (food standards) highly priced as it is 
for the standard you get now”. 
 
Another problem is that although some people are willing to pay they are not able 
to put a value on improved safety.  Perhaps they are over preoccupied with their 
beliefs, so they are unable to offer a valuation.  This is a concern when people 
have friends or family who have been affected by food poisoning.  One respondent 
said: “yes food poisoning is not a good thing; my son suffered from food poisoning 
from cooked sausages”.  Another said “I know someone who nearly died of food 
poisoning”.  Thus sensitive health issues may discourage respondents from 
offering monetary valuations on food safety. 
The above sections highlighted some concerns that respondents had with the 
question.  However, the research method can yield responses where people can 
give reasons for or against payment which do not criticize the question.  For 
example, one respondent said that they would not be willing to pay because “the 
causes of food poisoning are not enough to cause great concern”.  Another 
respondent stated a willingness to pay of £2 - £3 extra for the benefit of improving 
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small food premises in terms of storage or preparation e.g. in “takeaways where 
chips and kebabs are sold because some salad was off so I would pay more”.  
Some respondents can understand the question properly and give a proportional 
valuation given the justification for their answer. 
 
The concern is that these responses do not occur frequently enough to justify the 
use of the research method.  In particular, there is the perennial difficulty of being 
able to define food safety exactly.  For example one respondent said that they 
were not be willing to pay; but would be if it (food) was definitely safer; if it (safety) 
was at a definite standard.  Again, there is the issue of “guarantees” as one 
respondent said no because “if they were willing to pay then they would want a 
guarantee but  you cannot say it would be guaranteed to be 20% lower (in food 
poisoning)” 
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8.8.  and 8.9.  Iteration 4 
 
8.8.  Introduction to iteration 4  
 
No likert scales were used at this stage.  This was because the sole aim was to 
improve the valuation question.  The household food expenditure question was 
retained to guide the willingness to pay response. 
 
The previous approach to the question was continued because it had the 
advantage of being relevant to respondents.  This is because additional food 
hygiene regulation is capable of being delivered by the food agency working with 
local councils.  It does not require institutional changes which could be difficult to 
implement.  The question does not need changes to be made to the structure of 
the food industry, such as bans on the imports of foods characterised as credence 
goods. 
 
The purpose of this question, initially, was to obtain some open-ended values 
which could be used as figures for the closed-ended question in the main study.  
However, in the event it was necessary to further refine the question. 
 
8.9.1 Valuation question (iteration 4: appendix 6) 
 
A national agency has been set up to deal with food safety. 
One of its aims is to improve hygiene in food outlets. 
Food hygiene could be improved by the new agency working closely with local 
councils. 
This will improve the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food in the food 
outlets where you buy your food. 
These improvements in food hygiene: would make sure that small food outlets 
were brought up to the same standard as the big supermarket. 
But food prices would have to go up, wherever it was bought, to pay for these 
improvements 
Would you be willing to pay these higher prices, for better food hygiene? 
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Yes, I would be willing to pay higher prices for better food hygiene. 
[Remember this extra money could be spent on other goods and services instead] 
No, I would not be willing to pay higher prices for better food hygiene. 
[This might be because you are satisfied with current levels of food hygiene] 
If you would be willing to pay higher prices for better food hygiene: 
What is the most you would be willing to pay on top of your weekly household food 
shopping bill? [Please state money amount] 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not? 
 
8.9.2. Commentary 
 
Food poisoning was not mentioned explicitly to avoid the emotive issues, such as 
friends and family suffering from major food poisoning, which arose from the last 
valuation question.  The “20% reduction in food poisoning” was removed as it 
could complicate the question as people may become overly concerned with the 
percentage.  Moreover, the literature on embedding would suggest that it may not 
make any difference whether the percentage was 20% or 40%.  If there is a 
part-whole bias operating then 20% may be interpreted in the same way as 40%.  
The Food Standards Agency was not described directly as people may pause too 
much to try and think about its role.  The description of the Agency may distract the 
respondent from the main valuation part of the question.  The question was 
clarified so that there was a clear yes or no choice to the question.  This was to try 
and make sure that people felt that they had a choice when answering the question.  
The “please state money amount” was added to the end of the question to try and 
get the respondents to think about a clear monetary amount rather than just a 
percentage. 
 
8.9.3 Willingness to pay results 
 
There were 30 responses at this stage as there were many no responses where 
the question was rejected.  There were 16 yes responses although 4 were willing 
to pay without being able to give a monetary figure.  The mean willingness to pay 
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was £8.87 from the remaining 12 yes responses.  There were 11 no responses and 
3 responses where people did not know; one of which stated that they did not feel 
that had had choice over the answer. 
 
8.9.4. Discussion 
 
This question needed to be changed for two main reasons.  First, too much 
emphasis was put on small food premises.  Second, the question needed to be 
modified to give respondents more choice over whether they were willing to pay. 
 
The emphasis on small food premises led to many respondents not being willing to 
pay.  For example, it was stated, “I wouldn’t pay more (for improvements) at small 
food shops.  We shop cost effectively at supermarkets”.  Moreover, one 
respondent complained “but I spend a lot at supermarkets already.  The reason 
why I don’t shop at small food outlets - isn’t because they’re not clean.  It’s because 
of the availability of supermarkets.  I would spend more [in independent food 
outlets] if there were more local food premises”.  Thus, although Marsden et. al. 
(Independent 1997b) suggest that the agency should direct its efforts towards the 
small, independent sector; there does not seem to be much support for the public 
paying more to finance the agencies activities related to small business.  People 
feel that additional money to improve the independent sector is not worth it or 
unnecessary because the number of small food premises is limited. 
 
Respondents found it difficult to answer the question.  It seems this would be the 
case regardless of how many times the question was improved.  One example, of 
such difficulty, is as follows:  “yes, (for) better food hygiene, but (I) would expect 
those things to be all right anyway.  Small food outlets could be better anyway 
because they’re handling food, making their own produce from raw ingredients, 
whereas the supermarkets rely on their suppliers for their food.  That’s as clear as 
mud".  The complexity of the food chain makes it difficult for respondents to value 
improvements in food safety.  The description of handling is meant to limit the 
concept to the small food outlets.  However, its interpretation was broadened to 
include the food supply chain. 
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Second, respondents felt that the question did not offer them enough choice over 
being willing to pay.  One respondent criticized the question saying that “you 
wouldn’t get a choice (over paying more); it (the agency) has been set up”.  The 
question attempted to provide a realistic mechanism, the agency, to show how the 
food safety benefit could be delivered.  This should have offered a credible 
scenario to respondents but the drawback was that it led respondents to believe 
that a decision had already been made.  Although, the agency was only described 
indirectly, it appeared to have an influence on willingness to pay.  For example, 
one respondent who rejected the valuation question said “you can’t say how much 
people would pay; with these independent agencies; with these quangos trying to 
pass the buck; as it was in the 1980’s”.  Other respondents asked who the money 
would be [theoretically] paid to.  The problem is that the delivery of the public good, 
through the agency or quango, affects the respondent's judgement of the question.   
 
Perhaps, respondents need to be given more time and more information than is 
possible in a contingent valuation study; given that respondent’s preferences may 
not be well formed.  For example it was said “I would pay 5-10% more - although I 
haven’t thought about it to be perfectly honest”.  Again, the respondent may not 
have thought about the valuation of food safety because it is unusual, and perhaps 
artificial, to see safety as a separate attribute capable of being valued.   
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8.10. and 8.11. Iteration 5 
 
8.10.   Valuation question (iteration 5: appendix 7) 
 
Again, there were no likert scales while the question on food purchasing spend 
remained unchanged.  Responses were obtained from 20 respondents. 
 
8.11.1.  Question 
 
Food hygiene, in the question, means the storage, handling, preparation and 
cooking of food. 
To improve consumer choice and food safety a new food agency has been brought 
in. 
It is possible that the agency could bring in new regulations on food hygiene. 
This would bring standards of hygiene in small food outlets up to the level of the big 
supermarkets. 
So food hygiene would be improved mainly at the small food outlets. 
Food hygiene in the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be 
monitored. 
It would lead to increased food costs, wherever it was bought. 
Not just at the corner shop and local cafe but also at the big supermarkets and 
restaurants. 
Based on this: what is the most, if anything; you would be willing to spend on top of 
your food bill in a year? 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not? 
 
8.11.2.  Commentary 
 
The question was amended to try and provide respondents with choice over their 
answer.  The question stated that “it is possible that the agency could bring in new 
regulations on food hygiene”.  The question was broadened out to cover small 
premises and also large supermarkets so respondents would think that the 
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question was relevant, as it covered all food outlets.  It was stated: “food hygiene in 
the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be monitored”.  Moreover, 
to try and make the question consequential and coercive; the following line was 
introduced “(food costs would be increased) not just at the corner shop and local 
cafe but also at the big supermarkets and restaurants”.  The argument is that if the 
large food outlets are to be monitored then costs would rise as a consequence, 
and would have to rise otherwise the improvement would not be delivered. 
 
To reduce embedding; the concept of food hygiene was defined at the start of the 
question.  Thus, the start of the question was clarified, and narrowed down to “food 
hygiene in the question means the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of 
food”.  Also, for the purpose of clarity an explanation was given of the Agency’s 
objectives.  This line in the question was: “to improve consumer choice and food 
safety a new food agency has been brought in”. 
 
The question was changed from yes/no to “what is the most you would be willing to 
pay, if anything”.  This was done to try and obtain open-ended responses 
 
8.11.3.  Willingness to pay results 
 
There were 20 responses; of which 11 were willing to pay and gave monetary 
amounts.  The mean willingness to pay was £6.45.  There were also 3 yes 
responses but no valuation; 4 no responses and 2 don’t know response. 
 
8.11.4.  Discussion 
 
Issues which emerged were property rights, embedding, and food poisoning as an 
experience good and that people find it difficult to value safety. 
 
In particular, respondents seemed to reject the property rights associated with the 
question; that the public does not ‘own’ the right to hygiene and should have to pay 
more to acquire that right.  One respondent strongly rejected being willing to pay 
for the food agency and strongly refuted the notion that consumer choice would be 
  
 
 
 
166 
improved.  “It’s just an excuse to get you to pay more.  The hygiene is fine.  You 
pay whatever, you need for your family; whatever, it takes”.  However, when 
probed the respondent would not pay anything more for extra food hygiene.  "No, 
you’re paying more for something you can’t see”.  This is a concern, for the 
success of the research method, because although the concept has been 
narrowed down; the respondent still believed that they cannot see or perceive 
improvements to food hygiene.  Another respondent strongly rejected the question 
by forcefully criticizing the food environment: “I think it’s too clean now”.  A different 
aspect of the property rights theme was when another member of the public said 
they would be willing to pay 10% extra for “any improvement, because I’ve got 3 
young children.  But it has got to be worth it”.  Thus, there is the challenge that 
consumers cannot clearly ‘purchase’ the right to food safety because they are 
unsure whether additional money would ‘be worth it’.  This is unlike purchasing the 
right to a clearly defined private market good say satellite television; where it is 
possible to purchase the ‘right’ to the transmission. 
 
The embedding issue also remained a perennial challenge.  One respondent 
reported that they would be willing to pay because “there’s too much pressure 
being put on suppliers and food retailers at the expense of the health of the nation”.  
There were more clearly defined responses e.g. “to make sure that the food is 
handled properly [in the food outlets] and so that you wouldn’t catch anything from 
it”.  However, if respondents are aware that food poisoning is being caused by poor 
food hygiene practices in the food outlets then they can perceive such food 
poisoning as an experience good.  For example, another respondent said “I 
wouldn’t (be willing to pay).  If the shop wasn’t hygienic I wouldn’t go in there.  The 
big supermarkets are inspected regularly anyway”.  Thus, perhaps there is little 
need for state intervention as the public can simply “not go into” any below 
standard food premises.  If this is the case, then the market can correct itself 
automatically as food outlets which are unsafe will close.  This is because the 
demand for the food products sold will fall if people ‘experience’ food poisoning as 
people will purchase their food elsewhere. 
 
Finally, many people find it difficult to answer open-ended questions.  For example, 
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one respondent said “there wouldn’t be a ceiling on it (payment) for food hygiene”.  
Also, another said “yes  ... for food hygiene if it was better; but I can’t answer in 
direct figures”.  Lastly, one respondent said “whatever it takes ... you’re questions 
are too open-ended”.  At this stage, it was clear that open-ended questions would 
not yield sufficient quality data for this stage of the exercise to be continued.  
Therefore, a closed-ended question was devised. 
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8.12. and 8.13.  Iteration 6 
 
8.12. Introduction  
 
There were 10 valid responses at this stage.  The purpose of this valuation 
question was to pilot the main empirical study.  The likert scale questions were 
asked at this stage.  A closed-ended referendum style format was employed.  The 
question offered a clearer delineation of the issues with headings of [1] a definition, 
[2] the background and [3] the question.  The question was devised using a 
polychotomous choice approach to provide respondents with the choice they 
needed. 
 
The shopping bill section of the question was changed from a week to a year.  This 
was because the responses to the valuation question, based on a weekly shopping 
bill, were viewed as excessive.  A payment figure of around £8 a week would 
appear excessive in the context of other goods and services forgone.  Perhaps, it 
is ‘too easy’ to give a relatively low figure of £8.  Therefore the question was 
changed to what is the most, if anything, you would be willing to spend on top of 
your food bill in a year. 
 
8.13.1.  Valuation question (iteration 6: appendix 8) 
 
Definition 
 
Food hygiene covers the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food. 
 
Background 
 
A national food agency has been set up. 
It is possible that it will bring in new regulations on food hygiene. 
These new regulations, if introduced, would monitor the standards of hygiene in 
small food outlets. 
Food hygiene in the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be looked 
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at. 
The hygiene of all the food you buy would be at the standard you expect from the 
big supermarkets. 
But improved food standards would lead to increased food costs at every outlet - 
From the corner store to the supermarket 
From the local cafe to major restaurants. 
 
Question 
 
Would you be willing to spend an extra £100 per year? 
On top of your food spending for improved food hygiene? 
This money, for investment in food hygiene, could be spent on other goods and 
services instead. 
 
1)  Definitely No 
 
2)  Probably No 
 
3)  Probably Yes 
 
4)  Definitely Yes 
 
Please give a reason for your answer to the question. 
 
No reasons 
 
1)  I am satisfied with the food hygiene available. 
 
2) I don’t think extra spending on food hygiene would be worth it. 
 
3) The food outlets should pay for improvements in food hygiene. 
(I do not want to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets). 
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4) Other - PLEASE STATE 
 
Yes reasons 
 
1) It could give me more choice over where I buy my food. 
 I would be more likely to use small food outlets. 
 
2) I think food hygiene needs to be better [more consistent] at the 
 large food outlets. 
 
3) Other - PLEASE STATE 
 
8.13.2.   Commentary 
 
The question was clarified e.g. “the hygiene of all the food you buy would be at the 
standard you expect from the big supermarkets”.  This was in preference to 
describing a situation where small food outlets are improved to the level of the 
supermarkets.  The question asked about willingness to pay, on top of food 
expenditure, in a year.  This was done because people appear too willing to pay, 
when they are being asked about a minor amount of money.  For example, a small 
percentage on top of their food shopping bill. 
 
The no reasons were derived from appropriate negative responses from the 
open-ended survey.  The third no reason was an attempt to reduce the ‘yes saying’ 
where respondents automatically agree with the question.  The purpose of this was 
to give people the opportunity to say no, to cut down on too many yes responses; 
otherwise the benefit estimation could be excessive.  It could be viewed as an 
invalid no response and as ‘free riding’ by expecting only the industry to pay.  Also 
it could be viewed as a valid no response as the statement was qualified with:” I do 
not want to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets”.  This statement, 
which is open to interpretation, is discussed in chapter 9.  
 
8.13.3.  Willingness to pay results 
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There were 10 valid responses; of which 6 were yes responses and 4 were no 
responses.  There was also a yes response followed by a no reason.   
 
8.13.4.  Discussion 
 
There was useful feedback which described the ease of understanding: “I’ve never 
seen one like that before, it’s much easier than the normal questionnaires”.  This 
was helpful as it showed that it was possible to design a questionnaire, as a [low] 
common denominator, so that it could be understood throughout a cross section of 
the population.   
 
Also, one respondent said “(food) it needs to be monitored - it’s not just about 
improvements - its not just about paying more”.  This was useful for the 
development of the valuation question.  The problem with "improved standards" is 
that people often believe that they should have the ‘property right’ to food safety 
standards already.  It was previously argued that respondents perceive safety as a 
right and not a privilege.  Thus, it should be recognised that the property rights 
concept poses a significant challenge to the research method.  Perhaps, therefore, 
the best that can be done is to ask people if they want more consistent standards 
rather than improved standards.  This is because it may not infringe the public’s 
property rights.  However, the conventional property rights basis for the question is 
that people should pay more money for an improvement in the public good.  Thus, 
there is now a challenge of whether people would be willing to pay at all for 
consistent standards.  The concept of consistent standards may not be perceived 
to be any different from the status quo. 
 
Finally, an inconsistency in respondent’s answers was noticed.  This occurred 
when a respondent said yes, willing to pay, but then chose a no reason.  Thus 
there was a justification for outlining the no reasons as part of valuation question.  
The no reasons would be put before the “would you be willing to spend question” to 
legitimise a no response, and to aim to remove the inconsistency.  These lessons 
were incorporated into the main empirical study which is the next area for 
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discussion. 
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Chapter 9  Main Empirical Study 
 
9.1. Questionnaire discussion 
 
This chapter outlines the main closed-ended study which attempted a valuation of 
the food safety public good.  The contingent valuation exercise outlined in this 
thesis was rigorous.  It is analogous to a laboratory experiment where all other 
factors are held constant except for food hygiene standards; which can be varied.  
The assumption was that the value of more consistent standards can be measured.  
In practice there are many factors which affect the contingent valuation exercise 
and make the measurement of “consistent” standards problematic.  These factors 
are discussed in chapter 10. 
 
9.2.  The questionnaire (Appendix 9) 
 
Chapter 8 explained the reasons for incorporating questions 1 to 6 into the 
questionnaire.  In particular, questions 2 to 5 worked sufficiently well to be retained 
throughout the piloting stages.  Question 7 on the shopping bill was kept to guide 
the willingness to pay amount.  The purpose of questions 8 through to 13 is now 
outlined and considered below. 
 
Question 8 
 
Definition 
 
Food hygiene, in the question, is only about the storage, handling, preparation and 
cooking of food   only   in the food outlets.  These outlets are small food shops, 
small takeaways or cafes, big supermarkets and major restaurants. 
 
The question refers only to common cases of food poisoning lasting less than 24 
hours. 
 
Background 
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A national food agency has been set up. 
It is possible that it will bring in new regulations on food hygiene. 
These new regulations would monitor the standards of hygiene in small food 
outlets. 
Food hygiene in the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be looked 
at. 
The hygiene of the food you buy would be at the standard you expect from the big 
supermarkets. 
But consistent standards would lead to increased food costs at every outlet. 
 
Background continued 
 
Reasons can be given against spending more money on food hygiene. 
Here are some reasons against spending more money. 
I am satisfied with the food hygiene available. 
I don’t think extra spending on food hygiene would be worth it. 
I think the food outlets should pay for all the checking of food hygiene. I do not want 
to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets. 
Remember that money spent on consistent food hygiene could be spent on other 
goods and services instead. 
 
Question 
 
Would you be willing to spend an extra £100 per year? 
 
On top of your food spending for consistent   food hygiene? 
 
1) Definitely No 
2) Probably No 
3) Probably Yes 
4) Definitely Yes 
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Please give 1 reason for your last answer 
 
Reasons if you said no 
 
1) I am satisfied with the food hygiene available. 
2) I don’t think extra spending on food hygiene would be worth it. 
3) The food outlets should pay for all the checking of food hygiene. 
 I do not want to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets. 
4) Other reason - please state 
 
Reasons if you said yes 
 
1) It could give me more choice over where I buy my food.  I would be more 
likely to use small food outlets. 
2) I think food hygiene needs to be more consistent or more reliable at the 
large food outlets. 
3) Other reason - please state 
 
Question 9 Household Composition 
 
How many people in your household are? 
 
A) under the age of 5  : 
B) between the ages of 5-16 :  
C) 16+ 
 
Question 10 Age Group of respondent 
 
A) 16-24   B) 25-34   C) 35-44 
D) 45-54   E)  55-65   F) 66+ 
 
Question 11 Education of respondent 
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Which of these categories best describes the stage 
where you left education     or 
where you have reached in your education? 
 
A) Completed Secondary Education       
B) [G]CSE  / O Level /  GNVQ   
C) BTEC   / A Level / Advanced GNVQ  
D) Certificate / Diploma e.g. HNC /   HND  
E) Professional Qualification       
F) Degree  / Higher Degree     
 
The letters were numbered as follows: A [1], B [2], C [3], D [4], E [4.5], F [5].  E was 
numbered as 4.5; a professional qualification was thought to be of a level between 
a diploma and a degree. 
 
Question 12 
 
What is the occupation of the main income earners in the household? 
 
Householder 1:      Householder 2: 
 
Question 13 Income of household 
 
What is the total household income before tax? 
 
A) less than         £ 10,000  E) £40,000   -   £49,999 
B) £10, 000   -     £ 19,999  F) £50,000   -   £59,999 
C) £20,000    -     £ 29,999  G) £60,000 + 
D) £30,000    -     £ 39,999 
 
The final chosen valuation question, for question 8, requires further justification.  
Henson (1996:3) suggests that there are a range of features which should be 
incorporated.  It is suggested that respondents need to be carefully informed about 
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the public good.  The emphasis on consistent food hygiene standards should 
mean that respondents should only give attention to that concept, which should 
reduce the problem of embedding.  The definition of food hygiene was restricted to 
the four aspects listed and limited to only the outlets where the food is sold.  For 
example, food which is not stored at the correct temperature in a takeaway is an 
issue which would conform to the definition.  The purpose of the description was to 
try and stop people from generalising and thinking about more serious examples of 
food poisoning which could be traced back to farms. 
 
Chapter 8 suggested that people were sensitive about food poisoning and serious 
cases of illness in particular.  However, the term "food poisoning" needed to be 
included in the valuation question.  This was because respondents had to be made 
clear about the limited scope of the benefit.  This was achieved through the 
description of the duration of the food poisoning.  It was stated that illness lasting 
less than 24 hours would be dealt with.  Again the purpose was to try to avoid the 
‘part whole bias’.  In theory, respondents should only be willing to pay for the 
narrow concept given.  Respondents should know exactly what they are paying for; 
a reduction in common cases of food poisoning defined as lasting less than 24 
hours. 
 
The question did not make the suggestion that all food hygiene issues would be 
resolved.  It only outlined that hygiene standards would be at the standard the 
respondent expects from the supermarkets.  This is an attempt to convey a level of 
food hygiene which is understandable to respondents.  This level or ‘benchmark’ is 
a standard which people can understand in the supermarkets; in terms of the food 
hygiene, in the supermarkets, being a search or an experience good.  The 
question was therefore an attempt to elicit the extent to which people are willing to 
pay for standards which can be monitored. 
 
The payment method also needed to be articulated properly.  This was achieved 
through the method of market prices which showed that shopping bills would have 
to rise to pay for the benefit.  The budget constraint also needed to be emphasised.  
This was addressed through a statement on the trade offs that respondents are 
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making; that money spent on food hygiene “could be spent on other goods and 
services instead”.  
 
The shopping bill question, question 7, was intended to act as a budget constraint.  
It was meant to guide the amount that the respondent could afford to pay.  The 
purpose was to encourage people to think about the opportunity costs of spending 
money on food hygiene.  The opportunity costs are the goods and services being 
forgone if respondents are willing to pay for food hygiene. 
 
The refinement of the valuation question, in chapter 8, clarified the context for 
payment.  The food hygiene concept statement covers both small and large food 
outlets which should be pertinent to all respondents, because it covers all shopping 
patterns.  Moreover, the question was made relevant as respondents should not 
be able to circumvent the question.  They are not able to state that they would buy 
food from a supermarket rather than a small shop to avoid the cost.  The 
respondent if they are willing to pay has to pay, regardless of the size of the outlets.  
This is because the statement “increased food costs at every [food] outlet” was 
used. 
 
The question was constructed to make sure that respondents gave a consistent 
answer to the willingness to pay question.  This was achieved by listing the “no 
reasons” as part of the question.  The end of chapter 8, suggested that this 
approach was needed.  This was to avoid the problem of a respondent saying yes, 
they would be willing to pay, and then choosing a no reason.  The aim was to give 
respondents a choice of not being willing to pay.  The purpose was to legitimise a 
no response and, in particular, to make sure that respondents did not feel that they 
were obliged to pay.  The exploratory work suggested that the question should 
make sure that people do not feel that they have to pay.  Otherwise the researcher 
is measuring ‘obligation to pay’ rather than ‘willingness to pay’. 
 
The use of the "definitely no", "probably no", "probably yes" and "definitely yes" 
format is an example of a polychotomous approach, where there are multiple 
choices.  This is rather than a dichotomous choice question which is just yes or no.  
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The advantage of the polychotomous format is that it gives respondents the 
opportunity to express the intensity of their preferences (Garrod and Willis 
1999:136). 
 
The question referred to the food agency.  The aim was to add realism to the 
question so that the respondent could understand what the good is and what they 
are paying for.  That is a food agency to deliver food hygiene enforcement.  
Descriptions such as a “government agency” or the “Food Standards Agency” 
were omitted to try and make sure that respondents would focus on the valuation 
exercise and not on political issues related to government agencies.  The purpose 
was to try to prevent digression, such as onto a discussion about quangos. 
 
After the valuation question, a follow up question was asked to explore 
respondent’s reasons for their answers.  The third no reason was capable of being 
interpreted as both an invalid no response, a ‘free ride’, but also a legitimate no 
response.  It could be a ‘free ride’ because the respondent could say that “the food 
outlets should pay”.  In this way, the respondent receives the benefit without 
having to pay, on the assumption that the costs are not passed on.  The end of the 
statement: “I am not willing to pay for independent enforcement” suggests that the 
respondent is not willing to pay for the public good.  This could be interpreted as a 
legitimate no response. 
 
It could have been possible to insert a "don't know” response as part of the 
polychotomous choices.   However, this was not done because it could have 
encouraged people to say “don’t know” too easily which could have hindered the 
later analysis.  The analysis could have suffered from too much ambivalence and 
so insufficient clear data. 
 
The willingness to pay figure was set at £100.  This was a first estimate which was 
increased at later stages.  This was meant to be undertaken in accordance to the 
procedure outlined in section 5.12.  However, the outcome of chapter 8 was only 
the refinement of the valuation question.  Therefore the best that could be done, at 
this stage, was to estimate the willingness to pay figure.  Substantial sums of 
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money starting from £100 were used because the questionnaire used the concept 
of a yearly payment.  A hypothetical yearly payment was preferable to a weekly 
payment.  This was because a weekly payment would imply too small an amount, 
such as £8 a week, which is perhaps too likely to lead to an affirmative answer.  In 
contrast a larger, yearly amount may be more meaningful to respondents and 
encourage them to think more seriously about their answer.  Respondents were 
asked whether they would be willing to pay for the ‘food hygiene public good’ at 
different increments of £100, £150, £200, £250, £350 and £450. 
 
After the valuation question five demographic questions were asked.  The aim was 
to find out whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the 
demographic variables and the stated willingness to pay for consistent food 
standards.  The main aims of question 9 were to find out how many people in the 
household, if any, were aged under the age of 5; and between the ages of 5 and 16.  
The purpose was to examine whether there was a statistically significant 
relationship between the number of children in the household, particularly young 
children, and willingness to pay for a reduced level of food poisoning.  If there was 
such a relationship then it would be worthwhile looking at some of the reasons for 
such a relationship.  For example, a hypothesis could be suggested that 
concerned parents are willing to pay for the health of their children. 
 
Question 10 asked for the age of respondents to examine whether certain age 
groups were willing to pay more for food safety.  If this is the case then it is possible 
that certain age groups could have a greater awareness of food safety or a greater 
concern about the impact of food poisoning on health (Henson 1996:18).  In 
Henson’s study there was a negative relationship between age and willingness to 
pay for safer food, suggesting that younger consumers are more concerned about 
food safety (Henson 1996:18).  The age groups, in this study, were based on a 
1991 census fact sheet from a local authority on Tyneside. 
 
Question 11 asked for the educational level of the respondent to see whether 
education had a statistically significant influence on willingness to pay.  Henson’s 
results suggested that the level of education was found to be negatively correlated 
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with willingness to pay to reduce the risk of food poisoning (Henson 1996:18).  This 
could be because individuals who have a higher level education are likely to be 
better informed about food poisoning.  Therefore they may be less concerned, or 
worried, about the risk (Henson 1996:18).  It is suggested that people who are 
educated may perceive a relatively minor risk of food poisoning, and therefore a 
significant willingness to pay would not be justified (Henson 1996:18).  However, 
Henson suggests that other studies have demonstrated a positive relationship 
between higher levels of education and willingness to pay.  Thus, the relationship 
between education and willingness to pay is not conclusive.  The question on 
education, in this study, listed professional qualifications as an option.  This was so 
that people with professional qualifications could answer the question even if they 
have few, and perhaps no formal, academic qualifications. 
 
The purpose of question 12 was to discover whether there was a correlation 
between the occupations of the main income earner(s) in the household and the 
‘willingness to pay’ of the respondent.  It was useful to examine whether certain 
occupations are more willing to pay.  This was because it could help explain 
whether certain types of occupation have a greater interest or concern with food 
safety. 
 
The last question, number 13, on income needed to be part of the questionnaire as 
it was likely to be the best explanatory variable of willingness to pay.  The 
relevance to willingness to pay is clear because it provides a measure of whether 
people can afford the public good.  Henson suggests that there is a significant 
positive relationship between income and willingness to pay.  “Consumers with 
higher incomes are obviously more able to pay a higher price for safer food 
products and have a lower marginal utility of money income” (Henson 1996:18).  
They forgo or ‘trade off’ fewer alternative goods and services than poorer people.  
Henson suggests that this is “in accordance with virtually all studies” (Henson 
1996:18).  The question was left to the end of the questionnaire because it is the 
most sensitive issue.  The reason for doing this was that if the respondent did not 
want to answer and rejects the questionnaire, then the interviewer is not forgoing 
the respondent answering any additional questions.  The danger is that if the 
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interviewer asks this sensitive question, at the beginning of the questionnaire, then 
the respondent could become annoyed and not answer any more questions. 
 
It was stated (The Times 2000) that plans to force people to give details of their 
income, in the 2001 census, were abandoned because of fears that many people 
would refuse to comply.  The objections were particularly strong in inner cities, 
where 15 per cent of the people surveyed, said they did not want to answer a 
question on income.  Thus, eliciting a response on income would be difficult.  
However, such a question is needed as chapter 7 outlined that it is not possible to 
elicit income indirectly e.g. from respondents shopping bills. 
 
9.3.1. The reasons for the style and length of the questionnaire 
 
A face-to-face interview was appropriate.  The lower response rate from postal 
questionnaires (Morris 1989:46), compared to face-to-face interviews, is the 
justification for a face-to-face interview.    
 
A relatively short questionnaire can be justified for 3 related reasons.  First, the 
research was undertaken as cold calling to avoid the complexity of repeat calls.  
Questions were answered at the time of the 'cold call’.  To improve the response 
rate of the 'cold calls', a short questionnaire was appropriate.  Respondents may 
have rejected the questionnaire if it was too long.  Secondly, to encourage full 
completion of the questionnaire from difficult to reach groups such as single young 
men and the elderly (Times 2001).  Given the challenge of reaching such groups, it 
was particularly important to keep them interested.  Third, the valuation question 
was involved and unfamiliar so respondents needed to be given the opportunity to 
discuss the question and ask for clarification if necessary.  The valuation question 
would take a few minutes to consider properly.  This only left time for a small 
number of likert scales and demographic questions, if the respondent's interest 
was to be retained.   
 
9.3.2. Sample size and the administration of the questionnaire 
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The willingness to pay amounts (or bids) needed to be varied across a range.  
Samples of 50 people were needed at each bid level.  In other words, 50 people 
were asked if they were willing to pay at the £100 level; 50 people were asked if 
they were willing to pay at the £150 level etc.  The sample was 312, slightly more 
than necessary (i.e. 300, 50 with 6 bid amounts).  This was because a few extra 
respondents were questioned to try and obtain responses from the younger age 
groups to improve the representativeness of the sample.   In particular, to try and 
increase the number of responses from young people aged under 25.  Also there 
were few responses from parents with young children presumably because they 
felt they were too preoccupied with their children to give up their time to do a 
questionnaire. 
 
9.4. Demographic data 
 
The purpose of the collection of demographic data is to allow some comparisons to 
be made between the 1991 census and the survey data; to examine the 
representativeness of the sample. 
 
The electoral ward was chosen for accessibility and also it was close to the 
national median, in terms of the rank index of multiple deprivation.  The ward was 
number 4647 out of 8414 wards (Office of National Statistics website 2001).  The 
two main demographic factors to be addressed, at this stage are age and social 
class by occupation.  The percentage of people in each age category is as follows: 
 
16-24   25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65+ 
 
13%  18%  17%  15%  10%  27% 
 
 
 
This compares with figures from the survey of: 
 
16-24   25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65+ 
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6.8%  16.9%  21.8%  17.9%  15.9%  20.8% 
 
The first and last group are under-represented but apart from those 2 age groups 
the sample is fairly accurate. 
 
The data for social class, based on occupation, was as follows: 
 
Professional Managerial   Clerical Skilled   Partly   Unskilled 
Technical       Manual Skilled 
(A)  (B)  (C1)     (C2)  (D)  (E) 
 
8%   42%  14%     26%  8%  2% 
 
A and B = 50%  C1 and C2 = 40%  D and E = 10% 
 
The data from the sample was as follows: 
 
A and B = 56%  C1 and C2 = 33%  D and E = 11% 
 
The sample therefore over-represents the A-B grouping and under-represents the 
C1-C2 occupational set but not significantly.  Moreover, the census data was ten 
years old; as a comparison is being made between 1991 and 2001.  The ward is 
affluent by Tyneside standards (Office of National Statistics 2001) as there are 
significant numbers of professional people in the ward.  However, there are 
enough C1-C2 [clerical or skilled manual] workers for comparisons to be made 
between the professional and semi-skilled occupational groups. 
 
To try and make sure that the survey was representative, stratified random 
sampling, was examined.  The total population to be sampled is divided into equal 
age groups.  If there are six age groups then 300 people would be interviewed with 
50 in each category.  Strictly speaking the number interviewed in each age group 
should be in proportion to its known size, relative to the total population (Waugh 
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1990:140).  Thus, if the known size of the 16-24 year old age group in the electoral 
ward is 13% then there should a minimum of 6 respondents from that age group in 
each [minimum] sample of 50.  In practice this was not possible to achieve.  This 
was due to the difficulty of finding members of that age group who were either 
present, when the survey was undertaken, or willing to participate.  It was not 
possible to have a representative sample in wealth terms because there is 
insufficient data on income.  In terms of the proportions, of the different 
occupations, at the different bid levels, the data was as follows: 
 
£100 bid level:   Managerial / Professional (Occupation=1)      26/55=47% 
   Clerical / Skilled Manual (Occupation=2)        12/55=22% 
   Retired/student / low waged (Occupation=3)  17/55=31% 
 
£150 bid level:   Managerial/ Professional (Occupation=1)       22/49=45% 
   Clerical/ Skilled Manual (Occupation=2)         10/49=20% 
   Retired/ student / low waged (Occupation=3) 17/49=35% 
 
£200 bid level:   Managerial / Professional (Occupation=1)      17/50=34% 
   Clerical / Skilled Manual (Occupation=2)        13/50=26% 
   Retired / student / low waged (Occupation=3) 20/50=40% 
 
£250 bid level:   Managerial / Professional (Occupation=1)      23/51=45% 
   Clerical / Skilled Manual (Occupation=2)        14/51=27% 
   Retired/ student / low waged (Occupation=3) 14/51=27% 
 
£350 bid level:   Managerial / Professional (Occupation=1)      18/49=37% 
   Clerical / Skilled Manual (Occupation=2)        14/49=29% 
   Retired/ student / low waged (Occupation=3) 17/49=35% 
 
£450 bid level:   Managerial / Professional (Occupation=1)      22/50=44% 
   Clerical / Skilled Manual (Occupation=2)        13/50=26% 
   Retired/ student / low waged (Occupation=3) 15/50=30% 
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9.5. Willingness to pay at different valuation amounts  
 
The figure chosen for the first bid level was £100 per year.  This was an estimate of 
what the public could be willing to pay because a full open-ended survey was not 
undertaken.  The justification for this was in chapter 8.  The aim was to find out 
whether the number of yes responses to the £100 figure was equal to the number 
of no responses as this would show that the median willingness to pay was about 
the £100 mark. 
 
The median is chosen because the mean would be affected by large valuations at 
the upper end of the willingness to pay distribution.  For example, mean willingness 
to pay would be affected by a respondent stating that they would be willing to pay, 
say £10,000, per year, for food hygiene.  Moreover, the median is the amount of 
money which a one person one vote system would allocate to the public good.  
This is because the median bid reflects the value of the median voter who decides 
on an issue in a simple majority voting system (Garrod and Willis 1999:139-40). 
 
The number of yes responses to the number of no responses, at the £100 level, 
was 47 (yes) and 9 (no).  Since the number of yes responses outnumbered the 
number of no responses then the bid amount was increased to £150 and then to 
£200, £250, £350 and £450.  The number of no responses only equalled or 
exceeded the yes responses at the £450 level.  The aim was to find out the 
valuation figure where the number of no responses is higher than, or equal to the 
number of yes responses.  This valuation indicates that the median willingness to 
pay will not be higher than this figure and that another increment in the valuation or 
bid amount was not necessary. 
 
Willingness to pay results were obtained at the following valuation amounts: 
 
The £100 bid amount: 47 (yes), 9 (no)     total - 56 
 
The £150 bid amount: 34 (yes), 16 (no)    total - 50 
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The £200 bid amount: 31 (yes), 22 (no), 2 did not answer  total - 55 
 
The £250 bid amount: 30 (yes), 20 (no), 1 did not answer total - 51 
 
The £350 bid amount: 27 (yes), 23 (no),     total - 50 
 
The £450 bid amount: 22 (yes), 28 (no),    total - 50 
 
Grand total - 312 
 
9.6.  The remainder of the questionnaire 
 
The last section outlined how the study was undertaken with valuation amounts 
varied from £100 to £450.  A more detailed analysis is undertaken later.  This 
section provides the descriptive statistics associated with the questions.  Also the 
results are summarised.  There were 144 (46.5%) male respondents and 166 
(53.5%) female respondents out of a total of 310.  There were 2 missing data 
items. 
 
Question 1: 
 
How many of the following food outlets have you used in the last week? 
 
A) Small food shop / corner shop 
B) Takeaway 
C) Cafe / Restaurant 
D) Canteen 
 
Outlets  - 0 Frequency  - 57 
  - 1   - 97 
  - 2   - 102 
  - 3   - 44 
  - 4   - 7 
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There were 5 missing items for this question.  The mode was 2 food outlets. 
 
Question 2 : 
 
Note that questions 2 to 6 were asked both to get a qualitative answer to the 
question and a response on the likert scale(s). 
 
Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
5  128  47  127  5 
 
There were no missing items.  The rounded up mean was 3 (neither); on a scale of 
1 to 5 as outlined in the previous chapter.  Therefore, the responses show an 
interesting equality between agree and disagree responses. 
 
Question 3:  Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
24  146  52  88  1 
 
There was 1 missing item.  The mean was 2.79 which shows that most 
respondents disagreed with the question. 
 
Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
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Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
0  12  19  197  83 
 
There was 1 missing item.  The mean was 4.13 which shows that most 
respondents agreed with the question. 
 
Question 5:  Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
62  223  11  15  0 
 
There was 1 missing item.  The mean was 1.93 which shows most respondents 
disagreed with the question. 
 
Question 6 
 
Do issues such as food hygiene influence where you buy your food? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
0  21  20  198  73 
 
There were no missing items.  The mean was 4.03 which shows most respondents 
agreed with the question. 
 
Question 7 
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How much does your household spend each week on food? 
 
From supermarkets and from any other food outlets - including eating out from 
canteens, restaurants and takeaways. 
 
The most frequent response (the mode) was £100 with 44 observations.  This 
summary statistic is relevant because there were many different spending 
amounts.  There were 15 missing items. 
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Question 8 (Valuation question) 
 
This was the willingness to pay question which requires further later analysis.  The 
categories of responses were as follows: 
 
Definitely no : 47 
Probably no : 77 
Probably yes : 125 
Definitely yes: 61 
There were 2 missing items. 
 
Question 9a 
 
Household Composition: How many people in your household are? 
 
Under the age of 5: 
 
Number -  0 267 
  1 33 
  2 9 
 
There were 3 missing items 
 
Question 9b 
 
Household Composition: How many people in your household are? 
Between the ages of 5-16 : 
 
Number - 0 235 
  1 44 
  2 25 
  3 5 
 
  
 
 
 
192 
There were 3 missing items. 
 
 
Question 9c 
 
Household Composition: How many people in your household are? 
 
Aged over 16: 
 
Number - 1 51 
  2 183 
  3 51 
  4 20 
  5 3 
 
There were 4 missing items. 
 
Question 10 
 
Which of the following age groups is the correct one? 
 
A) 16-24 [21]  B) 25-34 [52]  C) 35-44   [67] 
D) 45-54 [55]  E)  55-64 [49]  F) 65+  [64] 
 
There were 4 missing items. 
 
Question 11 
 
Education of respondent: 
 
Which of these categories best describes the stage? 
where you left education or where you have reached in your education 
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A) Completed Secondary Education      [62] 
 
B) [G]CSE  / O Level /  GNVQ  [63] 
 
C) BTEC   / A Level / Advanced GNVQ [30] 
 
D) Certificate / Diploma e.g. HNC /   HND [35] 
 
E) Professional Qualification      [23] 
 
F) Degree  / Higher Degree    [79] 
 
There were 20 missing items. 
 
Question 12 
 
What is the occupation of the main income earners in the household? 
Professional / Managerial (AB)  :- 131 
Clerical / Skilled Manual  (C1/C2):- 77 
Partly Skilled or Unskilled Manual [27] / Student / Retired [74] (D/E):- 101 
 
There were 3 missing items. 
 
Question 13:  Income of household 
 
What is the total household income before tax? 
 
A) Less than -   £ 10,000  [27] 
 
B) £10, 000 -   £ 19,999  [44] 
 
C) £20,000   -   £ 29,999  [60] 
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D) £30,000   -   £39,999  [59] 
 
E) £40,000   -   £49,999  [35] 
 
F) £50,000   -   £59,999  [16] 
 
G) £60,000 +    [7] 
 
There were 64 missing responses. 
9.7.  The estimation of willingness to pay  
 
All the data from the main empirical study is provided in appendix 10.  A logit model 
was used to estimate willingness to pay.  The logit model uses a theoretical 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables that resembles an 
S shaped curve.  At very low levels of the independent variable [say low ranking 
occupation]; the probability [of the respondent being willing to pay] is close to zero.  
“As the independent variable increases, the probability increases up the curve, but 
then the slope starts decreasing so that the probability will approach one but never 
exceed it”  (Hair et. al. 1998:277).  The most relevant variables which need to be 
considered are: 
 
Question 2: the belief in safety variable and  
  
Question 12: the occupation variable 
 
The occupation variable was statistically significant (0.88 in model 1).  This 
variable is relevant because it acts as a proxy for income; which cannot be used 
because of the high incidence of non response to the income question.  The 
variable on whether respondents believe that food is safe was statistically 
significant (-0.55 in model 2).  The belief that food is not safe, hence the negative 
sign, helps predict willingness to pay.   
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Intercept   -0.684  -0.057  -1.258 
    (-1.39) (0.11)  (-1.96) 
 
Bid amount   -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
    (-3.81) (-4.07) (-4.00) 
 
Food safe     -0.552  -0.466 
(Q2=4 or 5)     (2.12)  (-1.71) 
 
Food spend     0.018  0.010 
      (4.21)  (2.01) 
Influence      0.716  0.769 
(Q6=4 or 5)     (1.86)  (1.93) 
 
Household   0.8509    0.670 
Size    (4.42)    (3.12) 
 
Total Kids   -0.7973   -0.808 
Age 16    (-3.09)   (-3.03) 
or under 
 
Job (job=1)   0.8863   0.800 
    (3.19)    (2.82) 
 
Log likelihood  -171.07 -175.50 -165.69 
 
% Correctly predicted 68.1  67.1  71.5 
 
% Yes correctly predicted 47.9  46.2  55.6 
 
% No correctly predicted 81.5  80.9  82.0 
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Median WTP   £253.99 £247.95 £451.77 
 
The first logit model used the variables of: 
 
Bid amount (£100, £150 etc) 
Household size,  
The number of children aged under 16 and  
Occupation or job 
 
This suggested the median willingness to pay was £253.99. 
 
 
 
 
 
The second logit model used the variables of: 
Bid amount,  
Whether respondents believed food was safe,  
The household weekly food spend, 
Whether food hygiene influenced food shopping patterns.  
 
This suggested that the median willingness to pay was £247.95. 
 
The third logit model used the variables of: 
 
Bid amount 
Whether respondents believed food was safe,  
The household weekly food spend, 
Whether food hygiene influenced food shopping patterns.  
Household size,  
The number of children aged under 16 and  
Occupation or job 
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This suggested that the median willingness to pay was £451.77 
 
In model 3 a different assumption is made.  It is assumed unrealistic that food 
outlets will pay for all the checking of food hygiene.  Therefore people who gave 
that reason, for not being willing to pay, can be removed from the model.  It is 
viewed as an invalid justification for not paying.  With 50 observations removed 
then the median increases from about £250, in the first 2 models, to £451.77, in 
model 3. 
 
9.8.1.   Belief in food safety - cross tabulation 
 
The question on belief in food safety is relevant (Do you think all the food you buy 
is safe to eat?).  The following cross - tabulate [1] age and [2] occupation against 
belief in food safety: 
 
 
 
 
1)    Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Age Group   Disagree Neither Agree  Total 
 
16-34   Count  25  15  33  73  
  Expected 31  11.1  30.8  73 
 
35-54   Count  52  27  43  122 
  Expected 51.9  18.6  51.5  122 
 
55+      Count  54  5  54  113 
  Expected 48.1  17.2  47.7  113 
 
Total  Count  131  47  130  308 
Total  Expected 131  47  130  308 
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The Pearson chi-square value was 18.1 compared to 13.28 (the level of 
significance at the 0.01 level for 4 degrees of freedom) and is therefore statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
2)    Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Occupation   Disagree Neither Agree  Total 
Professional  Count  60  26  45  131 
Managerial Expected 55.5  19.9  55.5  131 
 
Clerical  Count  25  15  37  77 
Skilled   Expected 32.6  11.7  32.6  77 
Manual 
 
Student  Count  46  6  49  101 
Retired Expected 42.8  15.4  42.8  101 
Part / Unskilled Manual 
 
Total  Count  131  47  131  309 
Total  Expected 131  47  131  309 
The Pearson chi-square value was 14.3 compared to 13.28 (the level of 
significance at the 0.01 level for 4 degrees of freedom) and is therefore statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
Attitudes towards food safety may be relevant to willingness to pay.  This is 
because people who think food is not safe (question 2), seem to be those who are 
willing to pay for safety (see discussion on logit models).  Presumably those who 
think that food is not safe believe that there is a need for investment in safety 
measures.  However, the chi -square has shown that it is occupation and age 
group which appear to influence whether people think food is safe or not.  It was 
found that middle aged professional people tend to think that food was not safe.  
The middle aged professionals are likely to have higher incomes due to their more 
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highly paid occupations and their career progression.  Therefore, this category of 
people is likely to be able to afford additional food safety.  Thus, the significant 
relationship is between income and willingness to pay. 
 
The relationship between belief whether food is safe or not (variable X) and 
willingness to pay (variable Y) may appear to be related only because both may be 
influenced by a third variable (Z) which is occupation and so income.  Thus Z 
(occupation - which is also a proxy for income) is an extraneous variable which 
may influence X (beliefs about food safety) and Y (willingness to pay).  Thus the 
relationship between X (beliefs about food safety) and Y (willingness to pay) is 
somewhat spurious.  It could, for instance, have been the case that some people 
thought food was not safe but were too poor to be willing to pay for additional 
safety measures.  Finally, Z (occupation) may influence X (beliefs about food).  For 
example, middle aged professionals are more likely to read broadsheet 
newspapers (see chapter 7).  This may be due to the cost of the broadsheets.  
Although it may be better explained by the interest or educational level of someone 
with a professional occupation.  Therefore they will have a greater understanding 
of ‘credence good attributes’ which may cause them to believe that food is not safe.  
This category of respondent may be concerned about not knowing whether food is 
safe, well after consumption. 
 
 
 
 
9.8.2.  Trust in government food safety policy cross - tabulation 
 
The question on trust in government (Q3) is relevant (Do you trust The 
Government to make sure that the food you eat, or your family eats, is safe?).  The 
following cross-tabulates occupation against trust in the government. 
 
    Trust in government to make sure food is safe? 
 
Occupation   Disagree Neither Agree  Total 
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Professional  Count  80  22  29  131 
Managerial Expected 71.5  22.1  37.4  131 
 
Clerical  Count  35  13  29  77 
Skilled   Expected 42  13  22  77 
Manual 
 
Student  Count  53  17  30  100  
Retired Expected 54.5  16.9  28.6  100  
Part / Unskilled  
Manual 
 
Total  Count  168  52  88  308 
Total  Expected 168  52  88  308 
 
The Pearson chi-square value was 6.43 compared to 9.49 (the level of significance 
at the 0.05 level for 4 degrees of freedom) and is therefore not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
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9.8.3. Consistency of food outlets cross-tabulation 
 
Question 5 is relevant: all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety?  The 
following cross-tabulates age against belief in the consistency of the food outlets. 
 
    All food outlets offer the same levels of food safety  
 
    Strongly   Neither / 
Age Group   Disagree Disagree Agree  Total 
 
18-35  Count  18  45  10  73 
  Expected 14.5  52.8  5.7  73  
 
36-55  Count  26  90  6  122  
    Expected 24.2  88.2  9.5  122 
 
56+  Count  17  87  8  112  
  Expected 22.3  81  8.8  112   
  
Total  Count  61  222  24  307 
Total  Expected 61  222  24  307 
 
The Pearson chi-square value was 8.45 compared to 9.49 (the level of significance 
at the 0.05 level for 4 degrees of freedom) and is therefore not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
9.9. Discussion of demographic and attitudinal questions 
 
The demographic questions showed variations in their usefulness to the research.  
The question on household composition (question 9) was limited by non-response 
from the parents of young children, who were often unwilling to participate in the 
questionnaire.  The age group variable did not have a statistically significant 
relationship with willingness to pay.  In particular, there was a shortage of 
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respondents in the youngest age category.  This conforms to the earlier 
observation that young men could be under-represented in the census.  A young 
man in this study said: “I’m not interested - I’m not going to get paid”. 
The education variable was also not statistically significant with willingness to pay.  
There are three concerns which could be relevant.  These concerns suggest that 
education may be a poor explanatory variable of willingness to pay.  First, many of 
the older respondents did not believe that the question was relevant because 
many did not have formal academic qualifications.  Second, the value of an 
ordinary level (O level or GCSE) qualification may have changed over time so 
education may not be a consistent measurement standard.  If this is the case then 
it is not surprising that education does not have a statistically significant 
relationship with willingness to pay.  Third, there was the challenge of how to deal 
with professional qualifications.  Professional qualifications were included because 
respondents stated the question was not relevant without them being included.  
Thus, this study of a cross section of the public on Tyneside was more complex 
than Henson’s (1996) study which was based on people working at Reading 
University.  Employees of a university are likely to accept the level of academic 
education as an acceptable question, whereas the general public on Tyneside are 
likely to be more sceptical.  There was some mild criticism from respondents who 
felt that the question was not relevant or somewhat unfair.  For example, one 
respondent said “you’re trying to qualify me”.  The respondent may have been less 
defensive about their choice of newspaper.  However, that variable too did not 
seem to be correlated with willingness to pay in the exploratory research. 
 
The occupation variable did show a statistically significant relationship with 
willingness to pay.  It is likely that the income variable would also have shown such 
a relationship, on the basis that occupation and income variables are correlated 
themselves.  This is because people in professional occupations tend to have 
higher incomes.  However, there were too many missing data items to test the 
relationship between income and willingness to pay properly.  In particular, self 
employed people invariably failed to answer the income question, regardless of 
whether they were manual workers or company directors.  This helps to explain 
why the government made the decision not to include income as part of the 
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census. 
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Part 4:  Discussion and conclusions from the research  
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Chapter 10:  Discussion of themes which emerge from the study 
 
10.1:  Conclusions from questions 1 to 6 
 
This chapter outlines some lessons that can be drawn from the main questionnaire 
and the experience of undertaking a substantial contingent valuation study.  This 
section provides some qualitative information derived from the first 6 questions.  
The purpose is to provide a discussion which elaborates on the data provided in 
the last chapter.  Respondents were given the opportunity to comment on their 
answer and some comments provided useful insights as outlined below. 
 
The second question: “Do you think all the food you eat is safe?” was particularly 
useful as the results chapter identified.  Also by leaving the situation open to 
interpretation, respondents unwittingly provided some interesting insights into 
public perception.  In particular, there was a difference between respondents 
viewing food safety in terms of search and experience goods or credence goods. 
 
Some respondents appeared to interpret food safety as a search or experience 
good.  A typical response was to agree and then say “I wouldn’t buy it if it wasn’t 
safe”.  Thus, the respondent is assuming that they know whether the food is safe or 
not before purchase.  A variation on this was (agree) “I wouldn’t buy it if I didn’t 
think it was safe”.  Again, the public assume knowledge here; although this second 
answer appears to be about the respondent’s foresight.  Perhaps because it was 
believed that credence goods can be turned into certified search characteristics.  A 
clearer example of this process was “(agree) all the food I buy is (safe).  I read 
descriptions on labels to ensure food safety”.  To summarise, the previous 
quotations express the view that the public is able to choose safe food.  It is 
interesting to note that specific food safety problems were not mentioned rather an 
ability to take control and to exercise choice.  For example, “agree (because) I 
don’t shop at dodgy places” and also (agree strongly) “I’m very careful about what 
I buy” and finally (agree) “because I choose to buy it”. 
 
In contrast, perhaps concern over the food system led to some disagreement 
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responses.  For example, (disagree) “I’m as safe as I can be” which suggests that 
there are safety factors which are beyond people’s control.  This leads into public 
responses which interpret the question as being about credence goods.  These 
credence goods implicitly are not trusted through a certification authority and so 
cannot be turned into a credence good with search characteristics.  Many 
credence attributes were raised e.g. “You can’t prove it to be safe in the long run”.  
Specific examples include “(disagree) some food has too many preservatives” and 
“it depends what you think about pesticides; I’m not sure all food is safe”.   
Moreover, specific food products were identified.  For example, (disagree) “I like to 
think so but not really, you take a lot on trust (such as) meat, fish and eggs”. 
 
To summarise, in simple terms, there is a dichotomy between people who [1] view 
food as safe and [2] those that do not.  The former group appear to believe that 
food safety can be interpreted as a search good, an experience good or a 
credence good capable of being viewed as a certified search attribute.  Another 
reason why people may believe food is safe is that they have confidence in the 
food they eat.  Perhaps, some people feel that they do not need to go into much 
depth when considering their food consumption.  For example, it was said (agree) 
“I buy it and eat it but don’t look at labels”.  The latter group, are people who seem 
to think that some food has credence good characteristics.  Perhaps, this second 
group are making more considered decisions such as the identification of long 
term concerns such as preservatives and pesticides.  From the results, in the last 
chapter, it appears that people who are concerned about, the characteristics of 
credence goods tend to be in the highest occupational categories [A-B 
professional - managerial] and the middle age range.  This combined group of 
middle aged - professionals could have implications for how much the population 
as a whole is willing to pay.  This is because they are likely to be a group with 
substantial incomes.  They are likely to be well paid from their occupation but also 
are likely to be earning well due to their career experience.  They are concerned 
about food safety so they could be willing to pay as they can afford to do so.  
However, this group may also not trust the government or the food industry and so 
may not be willing to pay because they do not feel they would receive value for 
money. 
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There are two other relevant conclusions from the second question.  First, some of 
the agreement responses were qualified.  For example, a typical response was an 
agree followed by “hope it is”.  This shows a lack of certainty despite agreement.  
The following disagreement may suggest that some of the “agrees” may not be so 
certain: “(disagree) I would like to think so but I’m a bit sceptical”.  Second, food 
perceptions were being shaped by the media.  For example, one respondent said 
“(disagree) until you hear that’s its not safe; until you hear about things”.  Also, 
“(disagree) just seen on news - food poisoning (campylobacter) in chicken”.  Thus, 
the media can be responsible for more concerned decision making, by the public, 
over food consumption. 
 
This has implications for the Food Standards Agency.  Public attitudes could be 
influenced by the level of media coverage of food safety.  For example, if another 
issue dominated the news agenda then it is possible that concern over safety could 
decline.  Thus media interest may be as important a factor, in determining the level 
of concern over food safety, as any initiatives undertaken by the Food Standards 
Agency. 
 
The likert scale measuring trust in the government suggested that the public does 
not trust the government on food safety.  However, this conclusion requires some 
qualification on the basis of people’s qualitative attitudes.  First some respondents 
did not see the government as fully responsible for food safety.  For example, it 
was said “I don’t know if it’s up to the government; (but) they do have food 
standards”.  Also, “it’s not their business ... they can’t guarantee that it is (safe)... 
they try their best”.  Thus, these respondents support the literature that food safety 
is not a pure public good. 
 
There were also stronger challenges to the assumption behind the question, that 
the government’s role is relevant.  It was stated that “it’s my responsibility and not 
the governments” and “you’ve got to trust yourself not someone else”.  Perhaps, 
these quotations emphasise the difficulty that the government faces over the level 
of food safety that is demanded by the public.  The quotations raise the question of 
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who should provide and pay for independent enforcement; defined as enforcement 
undertaken outside of the food industry.   In contrast, the provision, and so 
valuation, of pure public goods such as national defence would be easier for the 
Government to undertake.  This is because national defence is a provided at a 
national level and so issues about individual responsibility are clearly not relevant. 
 
If the assumption is that the government is responsible for food safety then the 
general disagreement is accurate.  For example, one respondent stated (disagree) 
“pesticides were found in fruit last week (middle of August 2001)”.  This shows how 
media interest in a credence good can reduce trust in government.  Perhaps, 
credence goods make food safety more of a challenge for public authorities.  This 
is because fruit becomes such a good once it is applied with pesticides.  The 
corollary is that research is needed on the reasons for food safety concern.  Food 
safety research which just measures attitudes may be insufficient.   
 
The qualitative responses to question 5:  “Do you think all food outlets offer the 
same levels of food safety?” supports the numerical data.  This is because the 
responses were generally unequivocal.  A typical response was that “money is the 
prime the factor ... the first loyalty is to shareholders”.  Again media attention of 
extreme examples of malpractice may have influenced responses to this question.  
For example, “(agree strongly) a company ... they were selling condemned chicken 
into the food chain”.  Few people disagreed and were willing to “give benefit of the 
doubt”. 
 
There was some agreement, with question 5, such as “there is an excellent 
standard from small shops... people in small places are good because they need to 
keep their reputation”.  However, most sentiment was against e.g. (disagree) “it 
(food safety) varies a lot ... big shops have the same levels of food safety but small 
places leave a lot to be desired”.  The responses to this question may help to 
explain why there may be a lack of trust in government as indicated by the 
responses to the last [4th] question.  In response to the [5th] question, [Do you 
think all food outlets offer the same level of food safety?], it was stated (disagree) 
“that’s what the government says”.  The government may be perceived as trying to 
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achieve an unrealistic policy of consistent food standards across all food outlets. 
 
To summarise, the results suggest that respondents believe that there is 
inconsistency between different food outlets.  This concern, particularly with small 
outlets, may not translate into a willingness to pay for 'food safety public goods'.  
This is due to worries over the property rights; that is, it may be unclear to the 
public what benefit they are receiving say from more enforcement.  It appeared 
that some people used small outlets so infrequently that they “don’t know about 
small outlets and never find out”.  This returns to the theme of people not using 
small food outlets and so potentially not benefiting from their regulation.  The 
responses to question 6, led to overwhelming agreement.  However, there were 
some interesting insights into perceived differences between different food outlets.  
For example, (agree) “I go to the supermarket to avoid food poisoning” and (agree) 
“if it’s takeaways - yes (I am influenced) - if it’s supermarkets - no”. 
 
10.2. Conclusions from the valuation question 
 
There are 7 themes to be discussed for the rest of the chapter 
 
1) Respondents criticisms of the valuation question. 
2) The payment method of market prices and averting behaviour. 
3) The issue of embedding or part-whole bias. 
4) The budget constraint and the consumer cost of the proposed policy. 
5) Reasons for the public being willing to pay or not. 
6) Property rights and trust in the food system 
 
10.3.1.  Criticisms of the valuation question 
 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 prepared and researched the valuation question carefully.  
However, the main questionnaire revealed that there are still problems, even with 
the most careful and rigorous approach that was feasible. 
 
The decision to list the no responses, before the willingness to pay question, was 
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criticized.  For example, one respondent complained that the question was 
“loaded”.  The question was devised so that people would not make a contradictory 
response that is, being willing to pay and then choosing a no reason.  This was the 
problem identified at the end of chapter 8. 
 
Also the third no reason was challenged e.g. “they (food outlets) are more likely to 
put the price up so number 3 doesn’t make sense; it wouldn’t happen; I still think I’d 
be paying more”.  The third no reason can be interpreted in two ways.  First, as the 
respondent states, that the reasoning does not make sense.  Those respondents 
who choose it as a reason are looking to avoid the payment (free ride) when in 
practice the benefit would have to be paid for if the safety is demanded.  Second, 
“the third no reason” can be regarded as a legitimate reason for not paying.  This is 
because the respondent has said that the food outlets should pay which means 
that improvements may not be made.  The respondent has also implied that they 
are not willing to pay for independent enforcement.  Results were given, in the last 
chapter, on the basis of both interpretations. 
 
The second yes reason was also criticized as it was said that: “it wouldn’t give 
more choice because there are few small shops”.  This is relevant because it 
emphasises that the benefit, of more rigorous food hygiene enforcement, may be 
insignificant.  This is because, in terms of food shopping, most people shop at the 
supermarkets so better monitoring of small shops could be of little relevance to 
consumers. 
 
10.3.2. Public responses to the valuation question 
 
The payment method of market prices, and the attempt to put the question in the 
context of the market for food, was discussed in chapter 7.  It will be referred to 
again now because it can have a major influence on how people respond to the 
valuation question.  For example, a “definitely no” response was given because it 
was thought that “the food companies make a lot of profit themselves”.  Another 
example was “the shops make enough profit; it (food safety investment) should 
come out of (their) profit”.  The researcher cannot neutrally elicit responses from 
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the public.  The public’s willingness to pay is dependent upon how the question is 
framed.  In this case the results are guided by the context of the market for food 
and the payment method of food prices.  If the scenario had been willingness to 
pay higher taxes then the results could have been different. 
 
The payment method, of market prices, was challenged as one respondent said 
that it should have been taxation: “shouldn’t it be willing to pay for more taxes; if 
you’re talking about more regulations”.  In response it was stated that it could be 
difficult to ask people if they would be willing to pay more taxes.  The respondent 
replied by saying “so you’ve come round the back door?” implying that the question 
was offering a disguised charge. 
 
The private market context also had the effect of letting respondents avoid the 
valuation exercise.  Averting behaviour was present and so people were able to 
avoid paying.  For example, there was a definitely no response: “I tend to shop to 
avoid food poisoning”.  Also, the market context, may not address the valuation of 
public goods.  For example, reasons were given for non-payment such as “it’s the 
government’s responsibility otherwise it’s impossible to afford.  Also “government 
support is needed for small shops so they could meet the consistent standards ...  
initial support is needed”.  This shows the difficulty of trying to value an impure 
public good as people can avoid the question. 
 
The valuation of food safety is a challenge when the responsibility for food safety is 
shared across the food system.  Some respondents highlighted this issue e.g. “it’s 
not just about handling the food in the premises it’s about what you do when you 
take it home; it (the question) should be about the household too; you need more 
time for preparation; it’s (this aspect of food safety) not a monetary issue.  In 
contrast a valuation of rail safety may be easier to undertake.  This is because the 
public fully 'contracts out' responsibility for safety to the rail industry and so 
responsibility for safety cannot be put on the public. 
 
10.3.3. Part-whole bias 
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This section is about responses which went beyond the scope of the question.  
Some respondents were not able to concentrate only on the “part” of the issue in 
question.  Instead some people generalised to consider the “whole” or broader 
concepts, of food safety.  For example, “you get a bug two or three times a year so 
you need to be certain (about food hygiene) as some food poisoning is very 
serious”.  Another example was “yes I landed up ill for 3 days with a health risk.  I 
had food poisoning and it was from food bought in”.  The question was also 
interpreted on the basis of “dread” risks which lead to death; which goes well 
beyond the confines of the question.  A respondent said no because the question 
did not cover BSE, even though they may have received some benefit from 
additional food hygiene regulation.  The question stated that food poisoning, in this 
context, would last 24 hours or less but this was not being universally understood 
or accepted. 
 
The question was also interpreted too broadly in another way.  Food safety was not 
confined to the outlets where the products are sold.  For example it was stated:  
“some food factories open your eyes; some are immaculate while others leave a lot 
to be desired. One thing I’ll never eat is a kebab (because) it comes into the factory 
as frozen mutton and then gets processed".  Perhaps, the question was viewed as 
an artificial concept.  Some respondents may have thought that they should 
answer the question in the context of the whole food supply chain. 
10.3.4. The budget constraint 
 
A skewed distribution of willingness to pay responses towards higher bid values 
can occur.  This is because respondents fail to appreciate their budget constraint.  
In a consumer situation, say in a supermarket, people have to sacrifice money for 
quality according to their ‘limited income’.  However, in this type of stated 
preference survey people appear to be more reluctant to make such trade offs.  
Perhaps because they do not have to confront their budget constraints.  For 
example, it was stated: “I spend £50 a week (on food) but here’s me (saying I 
would be willing to be) spending hundreds on food hygiene.  It’s so important that I 
could spend a £1,000”.  Another example, was when someone said “you can’t 
spend enough” which was then qualified; “but probably not when said like that”.  
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Ambivalent statements such as this can make it difficult to interpret people’s 
responses.  It is not always clear how much people are willing to pay and even 
whether they are willing to pay at all. 
 
In defence of the research method, the variations in the bid amount did have some 
affect on people’s willingness to pay.  The increments in bid amounts did 
encourage people to think about how much they valued food safety.  For example, 
at the higher bid levels a typical response was “I would be willing to spend more but 
that is on the high side for consistent food hygiene”. 
 
10.3.5. Reasons for and against willingness to pay 
 
Some of the respondents who were willing to pay gave general reasons such as 
“that sounds sensible” and “food hygiene is very important”.  Although sometimes 
there were detailed reasons for willingness to pay such as “for quality they (the 
food outlets) would pay more attention to what they were doing.  Another 
justification was that: “cheaper food outlets are less likely to maintain consistent 
standards”. 
 
It appeared that when people took more care to understand the narrow definition of 
the question then they were more likely to say no.  In other words, those who are 
less willing to pay for food safety seem to be those who spend more time thinking 
about the question.  For example, a more well thought out response stated “it 
wouldn’t require [the bid amount] to make those improvements”.  However, a more 
detailed study would be needed to test this hypothesis; that not being willing to pay 
is partly caused by people taking more time to consider their response.  This would 
involve having to time people’s responses and compare it to their willingness to 
pay. 
 
10.3.6. Property rights 
 
Respondents were concerned that food hygiene regulation was already being 
undertaken and that they should not have to pay more for it.  Thus, in response to 
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the willingness to pay question, there was the reply that “isn’t that (food hygiene 
regulation) already being done by the environmental health (officers)”. 
 
The rejection of the property rights basis for the question is a major concern.  In 
general, this is about people believing that food hygiene regulation is already in 
place and so investment is not required.  For example: “I thought it (regulation) was 
done already ...  £100 could buy a lot of wine (an example of the other goods and 
services that money could be spent on).  I’ve never had food poisoning in my life 
but still probably yes”.  If the respondent believes that safety is already being 
provided then they have, or own, the (property) right to the work undertaken by 
environmental health officers.  Thus they do not need to acquire that right which 
makes it doubtful that they would be willing to pay.  Moreover, if the respondent 
“never had food poisoning” there is another reason to question the yes response.  
If the respondent has not suffered then there is doubt over their demand for a 
remedy.  Another example of doubt can be seen by the following quote.  “I would 
be willing to pay; I need the hygiene; but there shouldn’t be a trade off”.  The 
criticism of the trade off implies that the public should not have to pay more.  This 
again suggests that the respondent would not be willing to pay. 
 
In contrast, "no" responses are clear stated preferences but they do highlight the 
difficulty in the valuation of food hygiene regulation.  There were no reasons such 
as: “money should be spent on monitoring rather than (consistent) standards; no 
improvements are needed”.  This implies that money should be spent on the 
existing monitoring but that extra money is not needed.  Another no response was 
that “statutes are there but more could be done”.  The implication is that the 
respondent believed that better enforcement of food standards was needed.  
Although the respondent thought that more action could be taken; they did not 
think that additional investment could be justified because the existing laws are not 
being implemented well enough.  A similar point was made: “there are enough 
regulations if people adhere to them so I’m not willing to pay”. 
 
The significant feature of these no responses is their ambivalence.  There is a 
need for food safety but people are unwilling to pay for it.  This is because the 
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property rights issue is fraught; food premises are expected to be hygienic from the 
outset.  The following quote emphasises this point: “I worked as an electrician in 
takeaways and they had grease from workers overalls in them (implying that the 
food selling places were generally unclean).  Some takeaways - you’ve never seen 
the state of them ...  but they should be clean already.  If you paid extra money then 
it could be spent on what should be being done already”.  Another quote makes a 
similar point: “I know what to look for - I’m an ex Home Economics teacher ... I can 
watch for poor food; but would the man in the street; we shouldn’t have to look out 
for it (the safety); it should be done automatically.  It’s a matter of principle rather 
than spending more on top - the cost we pay should cover everything”.  Again 
people feel that cleanliness should be practiced already. 
 
A respondent implied a solution to the property rights problem: “standards should 
be kept, and if they are people shouldn’t have to pay more.  You should have a 
license for restaurants to open”.  However, such a licensing solution was implicitly 
attempted by government to fund the Food Standards Agency but seen as 
impractical. 
 
Also a no response was justified on the basis that: “years ago you could taste and 
smell food”.   The implication is that perhaps in the past there was less need for 
food hygiene regulation.  If this is the case then this is an intriguing response 
because it suggests food was more of a search or an experience good in the past.  
Perhaps by implication it is more of a credence good now. 
 
10.3.7. Trust 
 
The concept of trust provides several reasons why people’s stated willingness to 
pay can be questioned.  For example, “yes but I would have to see what I was 
getting for my money”.  The respondent cannot “see” the benefit of the public 
service.  Thus the valuation of food safety is more difficult than the ‘public good’ 
provided by say the Highways Agency where the service provided can be 
observed e.g. road building or maintenance.  There is a demand for transparency.  
For example: “for peace of mind, some of these restaurants could / should have an 
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open door policy; so people can see the inside of a restaurant before eating.  
People want satisfaction that it was all clean and safe”. 
 
There are also doubts over inspection policies: “yes, I would be willing to pay but 
would it (the agency staff) be able to go in (premises) unannounced and do spot 
checks”.  Moreover, one respondent said: “probably yes, (but) you don’t know how 
money is being used.  The TV has highlighted hygiene in the kitchens and back 
lanes.  I don’t know what hygiene is like in the back lanes”.  Also there was a: 
“probably yes - but you can’t see the back of the restaurant”.  There is the general 
concern about the back of food premises where food is stored.  To summarise, 
there is a need for the services provided by environmental health officers but there 
are doubts over “transparency” in the delivery of the public good.  As one 
respondent said “it’s an up in the air question - I don’t know whether it’s been 
looked at”. 
 
Also, there is a trust issue that people would be willing to pay “if it (food safety) was 
guaranteed”.  This raises the challenge about the level or standard at which food 
safety can be guaranteed.  A fundamental point made by a food tester was that: 
“the public doesn’t know what to expect”.  The average member of the public could 
say “probably yes - it would have to be a marked improvement for that sort of 
money” but there is the challenge to quantify a “marked improvement”. 
 
Another respondent said: “definitely yes - if it was absolutely consistent” but such a 
complete guarantee of food safety is unrealistic.  The concern about guarantees is 
that people are describing uncertainty (an “if”) so there is doubt, in the 
respondent’s mind, over whether a guarantee could be delivered in practice.  For 
example, “all outlets have to look at safety carefully.  Wherever you went it would 
be lovely if everywhere was guaranteed with more hygiene.  Big do (look at 
hygiene) but it should be everybody else ... in the home as well”.    In practical 
terms food safety guarantees are quite unlike other guarantees such as for private 
goods such as home appliances which can be replaced.  In contrast public health 
cannot be replaced as it were.  However, with experience goods and less serious 
forms of food poisoning then a food safety “guarantee”, or re-assurance, is less 
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contentious.  This is because the consequences of food borne illness are less 
serious which is why experience goods are more appropriate for valuation. 
 
However, there is evidence of the public making their own decisions to avoid some 
of the food hygiene problems associated with search or experience goods.  For 
example, it was said that “people shop at the major supermarkets for re-assurance; 
but there are some very poor takeaways in other parts of Tyneside.  That’s why 
parents like a [major fast-food] restaurant because they can see into the kitchens 
and they know the handling of the food is satisfactory”.  In this case, the “market” 
for food safety is operating adequately in which case intervention would not be 
required or willingness to pay. 
 
Finally observations were made about the food supply chain.  Although this is an 
embedded response there are some views here which support some of the ideas 
previously outlined.  It was stated that “yes (willing to pay) but you don’t know what 
goes on behind the scenes. I would buy direct from a farmer there’s more trust in 
that”.  Also: “I don’t know what’s going into food; I wouldn’t buy pies”.  Moreover 
respondents complained that enforcement needs to: “concentrate on (the) basics 
of hygiene but also look further back in the food chain”.  It was also said that the 
question should cover more than food hygiene.  For example: “(no) it’s not hygiene 
- but further back than supermarkets”.  The purpose of the study was only to look at 
the outlets selling food.  However, some respondents wanted to dispute this aim.  
Perhaps, it is unrealistic to separate different elements of the food supply chain 
and to only consider food safety in the places selling the food.  Perhaps, there are 
some fundamental questions about “what is going on behind the scenes” in the 
food industry; and policy should address these concerns and examine the whole 
food supply chain. 
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Chapter 11:  Discussion of quantitative results from the study. 
 
11.1.  Cost - benefit analysis 
 
The last chapter examined the qualitative themes which emerged from the study.  
This chapter assesses the quantitative results from the willingness to pay question 
(question 8).  An assessment can then be made of the usefulness of contingent 
valuation in the food safety context. 
 
The narrow scope of the benefit being offered, in the food hygiene study meant 
that it was necessary to set the bid amounts at relatively low levels.  Often these 
low amounts were not a sufficient incentive to encourage people to say no.  Thus 
there were a large number of yes responses particularly at the £100 and the £150 
levels. 
 
The median willingness to pay was found to be approximately £250 in the study, 
assuming the third no reason is a legitimate response.  This was based on the 
context of a mild case of food poisoning which lasts less than 24 hours.  An 
assumption could be made that an individual suffers one bout of food poisoning, 
lasting less than a day, in a year.  The individual loses 8 hours of working time in 
the day that they get food poisoning.  Therefore, they would need to be earning at 
least £31.25 an hour to justify a willingness to pay amount of £250.  If the 
willingness to pay method of valuation was to be compared to the economic cost 
measured by lost working time; then the willingness to pay figure is a large amount.  
This is in the context of an hourly wage rate of say £10 or £20 an hour.  Although, 
of course, it would be possible for an individual to suffer more than one case of 
food poisoning in a year. 
 
The purpose of the previous discussion was to explain why a monetary amount of 
£250 could be regarded as an excessive level of willingness to pay.  The problem 
is that this figure may not, in fact, indicate what people would pay for food safety.  
The public good presented, of more consistent food standards, was generally 
recognised as a good which was useful to obtain.  The food hygiene study 
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presented here develops the work of Covey et al (1998).  It narrowed down the 
food safety concept to the simplest set of ideas which could have been used in 
such a study.  The question made sure that a cross section of the population could 
understand the question.  If the question could be well understood then 
respondents should have been able to give a proportionate [low] valuation based 
on the [narrow] scope of the question.  However, this aim was not completely 
achieved.  Instead this study has confirmed the results found by Covey et. al. 
(1998:254) that part-whole bias, or the “embedding problem” is a constraint on the 
usefulness of contingent valuation in this context. 
 
The £250 willingness to pay [a year] figure could be placed in context.  The £250 a 
year figure could be multiplied by 23.5 million households' nationwide (Griffith et al. 
1999:113).  This comes to 5.9 billion.  This is a very high figure in the context of the 
Food Standards Agency's funding.  This is £87m net, per year, for April 2001-04 
(Food Standards Agency 2000b).  However, the valuation could have been the 
same regardless of whether the food safety definition was limited, or whether a 
broader concept was employed such as food poisoning leading to prolonged 
illness.  It is useful to examine why some respondents gave an embedded 
response.  The process of “bounded rationality” is relevant as it may explain how 
respondents answered the question.  Perhaps, many respondents understood that 
the public good was “a good thing” and then processed the question in terms of 
whether they could afford the good or not. 
 
11.2. Discussion of cost-benefit result 
 
To return to the concept of an excessive willingness to pay level.  The 
questionnaire situation is the only opportunity respondents have got to ‘purchase’ 
the food hygiene public good.  Thus respondents may feel that they have to 
capitalise on this unique opportunity, and they can only do this by giving an 
affirmative response.  Another concern is that people may give a yes response 
because they do not consider the consequences of an affirmative reply.  They may 
just think of the moral satisfaction, or warm glow, of having the good without 
considering the implications of payment.  Also, the questionnaire omitted a “don’t 
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know” response so people may have given an affirmative [warm glow] answer 
when they may have preferred to give a ‘don’t know’ response.  These 
explanations suggest that the median willingness to pay amounts, of about £250, 
may not be an accurate reflection of what people are willing to pay. 
 
A conclusion can be drawn about why respondents find closed-ended questions 
easier to answer than open-ended questions.  If a closed-ended question offers a 
favourable public good at an affordable price then the respondent simply gives an 
affirmative response.  If the public good is undesirable or too expensive then the 
respondent gives a negative response.  An open-ended question is more difficult to 
answer because it does not indicate to respondents whether they can afford the 
public good or not. 
 
Another concern was that comments were made which can be summarised as 
“you can’t put a value on life”.  This suggests that respondents are concerned 
about being asked to monetarise health improvements.  Perhaps, some of the no 
responses, from the food hygiene study came from people who objected to having 
to put a valuation on a public programme which is needed for health purposes.  
"No" responses could be explained by respondent’s dislike of the methodology.  
Although this dislike of ‘valuing life’ does not necessarily mean that respondents do 
not want food safety initiatives.  To summarise the researcher may not be able to 
fully estimate the demand for the public good.  This is because respondents may 
become preoccupied with the ‘value of life’ issue and this could affect the quality of 
the demand revelation exercise. 
 
Another problem is that there is not the ‘actual’ data with which to compare these 
survey results.  It is difficult to interpret these results because generally there are 
not referenda in Britain, which ask people whether they are willing to pay for public 
goods.  In a rare British example, in Bristol, more than half of people voted for local 
spending to remain unchanged rather than 3 other options which would have 
resulted in a 2%, 4% or 6% rise in council tax (BBC 2001).  Moreover, 
Switzerland’s experience suggests that referenda, upon which the contingent 
valuation method can be based, leads to lower taxation.  In Switzerland, many of 
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the country’s regions have to hold ‘willingness to pay’ ballots before implementing 
new spending projects.  In the regions where referenda were held, spending was 
17% less than in the areas which did not hold them (Guardian 2002).  These 
examples show that in practice people are less willing to pay for public services 
than might be expected from the results of this food hygiene valuation exercise.   
 
In the context of this hypothetical contingent valuation study there is a need to 
make the research more realistic; in terms of trying to construct a ‘real life’ trade off 
between money and safety.  Perhaps people could be asked if they would be 
willing to accept food which is closer to the sell by date in exchange for a lower 
price.  This is a real situation as supermarkets discount food which is close to the 
sell by date.  However, asking a question like this would be fraught because it is a 
willingness to accept question.  If food is close to the expiry date then the price has 
to be very low to encourage purchases.  Thus such a study is soon at the stage, 
where the food is at the expiry date and people will not buy it. 
 
Another way that the food hygiene scenario could have been more authentic would 
have been to simulate a ‘laboratory experiment’.  People could be shown a video of 
the benefits of food hygiene regulation and if they are willing to pay for these 
benefits then respondents could hypothetically pay.  However, there is a 
fundamental problem of explaining to respondents what would happen if they were 
not willing to pay, for measures to reduce mild cases of food poisoning lasting less 
than a day.  Clearly it would be unethical to give respondents food poisoning if they 
were not willing to pay.  Moreover, chemical contamination is a much more difficult 
concept with the consequences being more severe e.g. cancer; and then there are 
other serious concerns such as BSE!  Thus it does not appear to be possible to 
undertake a simulated market experiment in a food safety situation.  The corollary 
is that it is difficult to examine the criterion validity of contingent valuation when 
applied to food safety.  It is unlikely to be possible to compare food safety 
contingent valuation estimates with actual markets, or simulated market 
experiments (Garrod and Willis 1999:142). 
 
Methodological problems, such as embedding, suggest that a more sophisticated 
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stated preference method is needed instead of contingent valuation.  For example, 
a choice experiment could be adopted.  Choice modelling is more sophisticated 
than contingent valuation because a food concept can be broken down into the 
range of elements which it comprises (Burton et. al. 2001:481).  This should avoid 
the embedding problem.  In the earlier research described, food hygiene was 
described as 4 factors combined together.  In a choice experiment it could be 
possible to trade off each of the 4 factors [cooking, storage, preparation and 
handling] against money.  However, many food concerns could still be 
inappropriate for valuation using a choice experiment.  The research has shown 
that people often have little understanding of how food retailers, food 
manufacturers and farms operate.  This is because the public invariably is not 
employed in the food industry.  In particular, only 2% of the population is employed 
or has direct involvement with farming (Edwards 2001).  Therefore they are unable 
to consider, in much detail, what certain food safety initiatives are worth.  Moreover, 
in general, the public does not have access to farms and food factories so they do 
not have the basis for making a food safety valuation which covers the whole food 
system.  Thus, a more sophisticated methodology will still face the problem of the 
public’s lack of understanding of the food system, which made the contingent 
valuation study such a challenge. 
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Chapter 12  Conclusions 
 
The introduction to the thesis is now relevant as it discussed the purpose of the 
research.  This was to find out whether (1) a monetary valuation could be placed 
on particular food safety measures?  A valuation was achieved [in this thesis] using 
a limited food safety concept, related to common cases of food poisoning and the 
need for consistent food hygiene regulation.  The research was appropriate as the 
food safety concept was suitably limited to food hygiene.   
 
The challenge is (2) the extent to which such valuations can contribute to policy 
making?  Arguably economics does not make a significant contribution to the 
allocation of resources, in this area of food safety policy.  The public's valuation of 
food safety does not seem to be able to differentiate between the scopes of 
different government initiatives.  A programme to reduce chronic cases of food 
poisoning may be given a similar value, to an initiative to decrease common cases 
of food poisoning.  If results such as these are obtained then they are not of great 
contribution to the policy maker. 
 
In terms of the methodology, the use of stated preference [see chapter 3] instead 
of revealed preference was preferable.  Stated preference does allow the 
researcher to "tailor" the questionnaire to meet their needs.  It is possible to 
explicitly ask the public about specific improvements in particular types of safety.  
Thus a specific question, in this case on food hygiene, can be constructed.  Also 
the contingent valuation study [chapters 7-9] produced consistent results.  The 
open-ended survey [used in chapters 7 and 8] produced average willingness to 
pay values of £8 a week.  The closed-ended survey [used in chapter 9] produced a 
willingness to pay value of between £400 and £450 a year.  This is because the 
no's only outnumbered the yes' at the £450 level. 
 
However, there are many food safety concerns [outlined below] which go beyond 
just obtaining a monetary valuation for food safety.  Such concerns can hinder the 
public's ability to provide a useful valuation of food safety for policy makers. 
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12.1.  Risk Perception and involuntary hazard 
 
1.1.  There is a challenge of how to evaluate an involuntary hazard.  Respondent's 
willingness to pay for food safety may be linked to their feeling of control over the 
food system. 
 
1.2.   Concerns were raised, in the study, over the hygiene practices of the food 
industry.  Respondents were frequently perturbed about what was “going on 
behind the scenes”.   
 
1.3.  The public want to observe and influence the safety practices of the food 
industry.  Thus, there remains the challenge of how to incorporate the demand for 
'control over the food system' into a food safety valuation of this kind.  
 
12.2.  Information Asymmetry and the challenge from credence goods 
 
2.1. It is easier to value aspects of food safety, such as experience goods, that 
are of the least value to the public. 
 
2.2. It is easiest to value simple cases of food poisoning than more serious 
cases of disease such as BSE or cancer; which have credence good 
characteristics.   
 
2.3. This presents a challenge to food safety policy.  The Food Standards 
Agency was primarily established to deal with far - reaching hazards such as BSE.  
Thus the valuation of policies, to reduce say the BSE hazard, would be useful but 
does not appear to be forthcoming. 
 
2.4.  There is a ‘catch 22’ situation with credence good attributes such as 
pesticides.   
 
2.5. The public cannot 'taste' the pesticides so they do not have the 
understanding to make a valuation.  It is difficult for the public to answer because 
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they do not know what standards to expect, in terms of pesticide residues. 
 
2.6.  If the public could 'taste' pesticides, and the risks from the pesticides were 
known, then the food would be a search good in which case the need for food 
safety regulation would be largely redundant.  
 
2.7.  The study gave the contingent valuation question the best chance of working 
by restricting the concept.  Common cases of food poisoning was an appropriate 
concept, for valuation, as the definition was capable of being understood.  
Moreover, people did not say that illness lasting less than 24 hours was priceless, 
as might be expected with credence good attributes.   
 
12.3.  Public goods:  the 'impure' nature of the food safety public good 
 
3.1.  Since food safety is not a 'pure public good' then respondents felt that they 
could avoid the payment scenario presented to them.  
 
3.2.  Respondents felt that they could obtain or ‘purchase’ food safety from the 
private sector and the supermarkets.  The supermarkets were often sufficiently 
trusted that it was implied that intervention was not required.   
 
3.3.  The payment scenario of asking the public to pay more for the 'food safety 
public good' is fraught.  The public could feel that they have to pay twice.  First, in 
terms of private averting behaviour, to minimise individual or household risks, by 
shopping at the major supermarkets.  Second, in terms of paying for the 
government to address the hazard. 
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Appendix 1:  Outline of questions for section 7.2 
 
Newspaper readership 
 
A question was asked on newspaper readership: “Which newspaper do you read 
the most?” 
 
A)  Tabloids   e.g. The Sun / The Mirror 
B)    Middle Market  e.g. Daily Mail / Daily Express 
C)  Broadsheet   e.g. Guardian / Times / Telegraph 
D)  Local   e.g. The Journal / Evening Chronicle 
 
Food Attributes 
 
This question asked: out of the following 3 food attributes of [a] convenience, [b] 
freshness and [c] taste, which characteristic do you think is the most important? 
 
a) Convenient food.  For example, pre prepared meals 
b) Fresh food.  For example, local produce 
c) Tasty food.  For example, food with a good flavour 
 
Food Shopping Bill 
 
A question was asked, before the valuation question, to help people think about 
their willingness to pay for food safety.  The question asked how much people 
spend on their food shopping.  The question was “how much is your weekly 
household food shopping bill?” 
 
The (preliminary) valuation question was: 
 
“People spend money, as part of their shopping bill, to have tasty or convenient 
food.  Also, money spent on food at supermarkets is used so that supermarkets 
can have high standards of food safety.  It is possible that other areas of the food 
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industry e.g. farmers, food processors, takeaways or canteens do not have such 
high standards of safety.  Would be willing to pay more money on top of your 
weekly food shopping bill; to make sure that other areas of The food industry are 
brought up to the same high standards as the supermarkets? 
 
Variation 1:  If you are willing to pay; what is the most you would be willing to pay 
on top of your food shopping bill? [open-ended approach] 
 
Variation 2:  Would be willing to pay [N] on top of your food shopping bill yes or no 
[closed-ended approach; N is based on the open-ended question] 
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Appendix 1b 
    Willingness to Pay Willingness to Pay  Total 
    (Yes)    (No) 
 
Broadsheet Readership 25 (observed) 9 (observed)   34 
    22 (expected) 12 (expected) 
 
Non - Broadsheet  15 (observed) 14 (observed)  29 
Readership   18 (expected) 11 (expected) 
 
Total    40   23    63 
 
Calculation of chi-squared 2*2 table 
 
Observed Expected ((O-E)-0.5) (O-E)2  (O-E)2/E 
 
25  22  2.5  6.25  0.28 
 
15  18  -2.5  6.25  0.35 
 
9  12  -2.5  6.25  0.52 
 
14  11  2.5  6.25  0.57 
 
Total        1.72 
 
Degrees of freedom = (r-1)(c-1)  i.e.  (2-1)(2-1)  = 1 
 
Significance at 5 per cent level i.e   (0.05)   = 3.84 
 
Thus the result from the chi-square was 1.72 which is less than 3.84 (the 
significance level at the 0.05 level).  A hypothesis of independence can be 
supported.  Willingness to pay appears to be independent of newspaper 
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readership. 
 
 
Appendix 2:  Focus group schedule 
 
Section 1:  Concern over food safety 
 
1) What are your main food safety concerns? 
 
Think about asking them what they have done personally to address these 
concerns - stopped eating beef after BSE.  Do they buy organic vegetables?  How 
do they deal with the threat of food poisoning? 
 
2) Have you any safety concerns about where you buy your food? 
 
Ask them whether they think supermarkets offer safer food than independents to 
assess Marsden / Flynn hypothesis.  Also, ask about small independent shops (of 
different quality), takeaways and canteens e.g. what do you think about food safety 
in takeaways? 
 
3) Do you believe the Government is addressing your food safety concerns? 
 
Yes or No   If Yes why / If No why. 
 
Section 2:  Knowledge of Food Standards Agency 
 
1) Do you know what The Government is doing regarding food safety? 
2) Do you know what initiatives the Government is introducing to try and  
 deal with food safety? 
3) Have you heard of The Food Standards Agency? 
 Or have they heard of the “food safety” Agency? 
4) Do you know what the job or role of The Food Standards Agency is? 
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Ask them on what basis they have those views. 
Outline the role of the Agency 
[Its priority should be to oversee the independent sector of the grocery trade and 
encourage public understanding of food hygiene]. 
 
Section 3:  Contentment or dissatisfaction with government food safety policy 
 
1) Do you think The Agency is properly addressing your food safety concerns?  
Ask them what in particular they agree with or disagree with. 
 
2) What else do you think The Government should be doing about food 
safety? 
 
Ask them how they think the remit should be extended.  Ask about common food 
hazards like food poisoning which may be overlooked e.g. should the Agency be 
doing more to reduce food poisoning ? 
 
3) Who do you think will benefit from The Food Standards Agency? 
 
Do you think consumers will benefit or do you think it is more for the benefit of 
industry (ask them which type), or for the benefit of politicians or government? 
 
Section 4:  Willingness to Pay 
 
1) To support the work of the Food Standards Agency (outlined before) would 
you be willing to pay more? 
If yes then ask those who would pay more, why they think it is reasonable for them 
to pay more? 
 
If no then what are their reasons 
 
2) Who do you think should pay for food safety consumers, taxpayers or the 
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food industry? 
 
If the food industry then say that consumers will end up picking up the bill? 
If they say they don’t want The Agency then probe by saying that they won’t get the 
benefit from the agency (to see whether they really are willing to pay?) 
 
 
 
 
Section 5:  Food Standards Agency traded off against other public services 
 
1) Should money spent on The Food Agency, instead be spent on other public 
services? 
 
Mention smaller public goods such as national parks or nursery education before 
mentioning more significant public goods like health care e.g. hip operations. 
 
2) Should money spent on other public services, instead be spent on The 
Food Agency? 
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Appendix 3:  Valuation question number 1 
 
Question 1 Where do you do most of your food shopping? 
 
A) Large supermarket / Superstore 
B) Small supermarket 
C) Local food shop e.g. corner shop 
D) Market stall 
 
Question 2 Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 3  Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 4 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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Question 5 Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 6 
 
Have you, or anyone in your household had food poisoning recently (in the last 6 
months?) 
Yes or No 
 
Question 7 
 
About how much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets? 
From any other food outlets? (including eating out from canteens, restaurants and 
takeaways) 
 
Question 8 (Valuation question) 
 
The new Food Safety Agency will improve food hygiene. 
For example the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food. 
Assume there is no impact on other issues like BSE, Genetically Modified Food, 
irradiated food and chemicals in food. 
 
Because of the agency: 
 
1. The food you buy will be less likely to cause food poisoning. 
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2. Food safety in small shops, takeaways and restaurants would improve to 
the same level as the big supermarkets. 
3. Improvements in food hygiene would have to be made across the whole 
food industry. 
4. This would mean that food prices would go up wherever it was bought. 
 
Question: 
Are you willing to pay more for your food to get better food safety? 
Remember! 
This money could be spent on other products or on tastier food. 
It’s the same food at the same place It’s just safer to eat! 
If yes, you are willing to pay, what is the most you would expect to pay on top of 
your weekly shopping bill to support the Food Safety Agency? 
 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not. 
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Appendix 4:  Valuation question number 2 
 
Question 1 
 
How many of the following have you used in the last week? 
 
A) Small food shop / corner shop  C) Cafe / Restaurant 
B) Takeaway    D) Canteen 
 
Question 2 
 
Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 3  
 
Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
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Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Question 5   
 
Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 6  
 
Have you, or anyone in your household had food poisoning recently (in the last 6 
months?) 
 
Yes or No? 
 
Question 7 
 
About how much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets? 
From any other food outlets 
(including eating out from canteens, restaurants and takeaways?) 
 
Question 8 
 
The point of this question is to find out if you are willing to pay extra for lower food 
poisoning. 
Assume that a new supermarket, which includes a takeaway and restaurant, is 
opened up. 
This new supermarket has better food hygiene compared to other shops. 
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It has better monitoring and control of the food businesses which supply it. 
So that the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food is better than 
existing food shops. 
As a result, the amount of food poisoning, associated with this new supermarket is 
expected to be 20% lower than in existing food shops. 
But, food prices, throughout the supply chain, are higher to pay for these 
improvements in food hygiene. 
Would you be willing to pay more to shop at this new supermarket? 
Which is likely to lead to 20% less food poisoning? 
If yes, you are willing to pay, what is the most you would expect to pay on top of 
your weekly shopping bill to support the Food Safety Agency? 
 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not. 
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Appendix 5:  Valuation question number 3 
 
Question 1:  How many of the following have you used in the last week? 
 
A) Small food shop / corner shop  C) Cafe / Restaurant 
B) Takeaway    D) Canteen 
 
Question 2 
 
Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 3 
 
Do you trust the Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the food industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
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1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
Question 5 
 
Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 6 
 
Do food safety issues, such as food poisoning, influence where you do your food 
shopping? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 7 
 
About how much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets? 
From any other food outlets 
(including eating out from canteens, restaurants and takeaways?) 
 
Question 8 
 
The government has brought in a new Food Safety Department called - The Food 
Standards Agency 
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One of the aims (of this) is to improve hygiene in food outlets.  So that, by 2006, 
food poisoning will be reduced by 20%. 
Food hygiene will be improved as the Government will be working with the food 
Industry and local councils to improve the 
Storage 
Handling 
Preparation and 
Cooking of food up to the point of sale 
in the food outlets where you buy your food. 
To pay for these improvements in food hygiene, food prices would go up wherever 
it was bought. 
But, this would make sure small food shops were brought up to the same standard 
as the big supermarkets. 
Would you prefer to pay the same amount for food as you do now? 
With no reduction in food poisoning.  Or  
Would you be willing to pay more? 
 
So that food poisoning, in the places where you buy your food, is reduced by 20%. 
If you would be willing to pay more, then what is the most you would be willing to 
pay on top of your total food bill? 
 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not? 
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Appendix 6 
 
Question 1 
 
About how much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets? 
From any other food outlets 
(including eating out from canteens, restaurants and takeaways?) 
 
Question 2:  Valuation question number 4 
 
A national agency has been set up to deal with food safety. 
One of its aims is to improve hygiene in food outlets. 
Food hygiene could be improved by the new agency working closely with local 
councils. 
This will improve the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food in the food 
outlets where you buy your food. 
These improvements in food hygiene: would make sure that small food outlets 
were brought up to the same standard as the big supermarket. 
But food prices would have to go up, wherever it was bought, to pay for these  
improvements. 
Would you be willing to pay these higher prices, for better food hygiene? 
Yes, I would be willing to pay higher prices for better food hygiene. 
[Remember this extra money could be spent on other goods and services instead] 
No, I would not be willing to pay higher prices for better food hygiene. 
[This might be because you are satisfied with current levels of food hygiene] 
If you would be willing to pay higher prices for better food hygiene: 
What is the most you would be willing to pay on top of your weekly household food 
shopping bill? [Please state money amount] 
 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not. 
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Appendix 7 
 
Question 1 
 
About how much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets? 
From any other food outlets 
(including eating out from canteens, restaurants and takeaways?) 
 
Question 2:  Valuation question number 5 
 
Food hygiene, in the question, means the storage, handling, preparation and 
cooking of food. 
To improve consumer choice and food safety a new food agency has been brought 
in. 
It is possible that the agency could bring in new regulations on food hygiene. 
This would bring standards of hygiene in small food outlets up to the level of the big 
supermarkets. 
So food hygiene would be improved mainly at the small food outlets. 
Food hygiene in the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be 
monitored. 
It would lead to increased food costs, wherever it was bought. 
Not just at the corner shop and local cafe but also at the big supermarkets. 
Based on this: what is the most, if anything; you would be willing to spend on top of 
your food bill in a year? 
 
Follow up question:  please can you give me a reason for being willing to pay or 
not? 
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Appendix 8:  Valuation question number 6 
 
Question 1 How many of the following have you used in the last week? 
 
A) Small food shop / corner shop   C) Cafe / Restaurant 
B) Takeaway     D) Canteen 
 
Question 2 Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 3  Do you trust The Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the Food Industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 5 
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Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 6 
 
Do issues such as food hygiene influence where you buy your food? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 7 
 
How much does your household spend each week on food? 
 
A) Supermarkets 
B) From any other food outlets? 
 
Including eating out from canteens, restaurants, and takeaways 
 
Question 8 
 
Definition 
Food hygiene covers the storage, handling, preparation and cooking of food. 
Background 
A national food agency has been set up. 
It is possible that it will bring in new regulations on food hygiene. 
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These new regulations, if introduced, would monitor the standards of hygiene in 
small food outlets. 
Food hygiene in the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be looked 
at. 
The hygiene of all the food you buy would be at the standard you expect from the 
big supermarkets. 
But improved food standards would lead to increased food costs at every outlet - 
From the corner store to the supermarket 
From the local cafe to major restaurants. 
 
Question 
Would you be willing to spend an extra £100 per year? 
On top of your food spending for improved food hygiene? 
This money, for investment in food hygiene, could be spent on other goods and 
services instead. 
 
1) Definitely No 
2) Probably No 
3) Probably Yes 
4) Definitely Yes 
 
Please give a reason for your answer to the question. 
No reasons 
1) I am satisfied with the food hygiene available. 
2) I don’t think extra spending on food hygiene would be worth it. 
3) The food outlets should pay for improvements in food hygiene. 
 (I do not want to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets). 
4) Other - PLEASE STATE 
 
Yes reasons 
 
1) It could give me more choice over where I buy my food. 
 I would be more likely to use small food outlets. 
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2) I think food hygiene needs to be better [more consistent] at the 
 large food outlets. 
3) Other - PLEASE STATE 
 
Question 9 Household Composition 
 
How many people in your household are? 
 
A) under the age of 5  : 
B) between the ages of 5-16 :   C) 16+ 
 
Question 10 Age Group of respondent 
 
A) 18-25   B) 26-35   C) 36-45 
D) 46-55   E)  56-65   F) 66+ 
 
Question 11 Education of respondent 
 
Which of these categories best describes the stage 
where you left education     or 
where you have reached in your education? 
 
A) Completed Secondary Education 
B) [G] CSE  / O Level /  GNVQ 
C) BTEC   / A Level / Advanced GNVQ 
D) Certificate / Diploma e.g. HNC /   HND 
E) Professional Qualification 
F) Degree  / Higher Degree 
 
Question 12 
 
What is the occupation of the main income earners in the household? 
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Householder 1:      Householder 2: 
 
Question 13 Income of household 
 
What is the total household income before tax? 
A) less than -   £ 10,000 E) £40,000   -   £49,999 
B) £10, 000 -   £ 19,999 F) £50,000   -   £59,999 
C) £20,000   -   £ 29,999 G) £60,000 + 
D) £30,000   -   £39,999 
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Appendix 9:  The final version of the valuation question 
 
Preamble (Introduction to the questionnaire used for face-to-face interviews) 
 
"Hi, I'm Chris Packham and I'm doing some food research for Newcastle University 
- would you like to answer a few questions? (emphasize words in italics)" 
 
If yes, or undecided state "it should only take about five minutes" and show card 
confirming student status: This is to confirm that Christopher Packham is 
registered as a postgraduate student at Newcastle University.  He is investigating 
the public's attitudes to various aspects of food safety. 
 
If respondent seems fairly keen also state "I'm interested in finding out if you've got 
any comments on the questions".  Otherwise just run through the survey and get 
the quantitative data.(Give folder to respondent with questions in - let them read 
the question while I can also read it to them) 
 
Question 1 How many of the following have you used in the last week? 
 
A) Small food shop / corner shop   C) Cafe / Restaurant 
B) Takeaway     D) Canteen 
 
Question 2 Do you think all the food you buy is safe to eat? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 3  Do you trust The Government to make sure that food is safe? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
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1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 4 
 
Do you think some of the Food Industry is more interested in profits than its 
customers? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 5 
 
Do you think all food outlets offer the same levels of food safety? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 6 
 
Do issues such as food hygiene influence where you buy your food? 
 
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree  Agree 
Strongly       Strongly 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Question 7 
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How much does your household spend each week on food? 
From supermarkets and from any other food outlets - including eating out from 
canteens, restaurants and takeaways. 
 
 
 
Question 8 
 
Definition 
 
Food hygiene, in the question, is only about the storage, handling, preparation and 
cooking of food   only   in the food outlets.  These outlets are small food shops, 
small takeaways or cafes, big supermarkets and major restaurants. 
 
The question refers only to common cases of food poisoning lasting less than 24 
hours. 
 
Background 
 
A national food agency has been set up. 
It is possible that it will bring in new regulations on food hygiene. 
These new regulations would monitor the standards of hygiene in small food 
outlets. 
Food hygiene in the big supermarkets and major restaurants would also be looked 
at. 
The hygiene of the food you buy would be at the standard you expect from the big 
supermarkets. 
But consistent standards would lead to increased food costs at every outlet. 
 
Background continued 
 
Reasons can be given against spending more money on food hygiene. 
Here are some reasons against spending more money. 
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I am satisfied with the food hygiene available. 
I don’t think extra spending on food hygiene would be worth it. 
I think the food outlets should pay for all the checking of food hygiene. I do not want 
to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets. 
Remember that money spent on consistent food hygiene could be spent on other 
goods and services instead. 
 
 
 
Question 
 
Would you be willing to spend an extra £100 per year? 
 
On top of your food spending for consistent   food hygiene? 
 
1) Definitely No 
2) Probably No 
3) Probably Yes 
4) Definitely Yes 
 
Please give 1 reason for your last answer 
 
Reasons if you said no 
 
1) I am satisfied with the food hygiene available. 
2) I don’t think extra spending on food hygiene would be worth it. 
3) The food outlets should pay for all the checking of food hygiene. 
 I do not want to pay for independent enforcement of food outlets. 
4) Other reason - please state 
 
Reasons if you said yes 
 
1) It could give me more choice over where I buy my food.  I would be more 
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likely to use small food outlets. 
2) I think food hygiene needs to be more consistent or more reliable at the 
large food outlets. 
3) Other reason - please state 
 
Question 9 Household Composition 
 
How many people in your household are? 
 
A) under the age of 5  : 
B) between the ages of 5-16 :  
C) 16+ 
Question 10 Age Group of respondent 
 
A) 16-24   B) 25-34   C) 35-44 
D) 45-54   E)  55-65   F) 66+ 
 
Question 11 Education of respondent 
 
Which of these categories best describes the stage? 
where you left education or 
where you have reached in your education 
 
A) Completed Secondary Education       
B) [G]CSE  / O Level /  GNVQ   
C) BTEC   / A Level / Advanced GNVQ  
D) Certificate / Diploma e.g. HNC /   HND  
E) Professional Qualification       
F) Degree  / Higher Degree     
 
Question 12 
 
What is the occupation of the main income earners in the household? 
  
 
 
 
262 
 
Householder 1:      Householder 2: 
 
Question 13 Income of household 
 
What is the total household income before tax? 
 
A) less than  -   £ 10,000  E) £40,000   -   £49,999 
 
B) £10, 000 -   £ 19,999  F) £50,000   -   £59,999 
 
C) £20,000   -   £ 29,999  G) £60,000 + 
 
D) £30,000   -   £39,999 
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Appendix 10 
 
The explanation of the questions is below and the data is outlined on the following 
pages. 
 
Question 1 Outlets visited 
 
Question 2 Safe to eat 
 
Question 3 Trust Govt. 
 
Question 4 Profit  > Customer (Profit motive greater than customer interest) 
 
Question 5 Outlets same level 
 
Question 6 Hygiene Influences 
 
Question 7  Total Spend (Total household food shopping bill in a week) 
 
Question 8 WTP  Yes / No 
 
Question 8 WTP  Reason 
 
Question 9 Number  [of people in the household] Age[d] <5 
 
Question 9 Number  [of people in the household] Age[d] 5-16 
 
Question 9 Number  [of people in the household] Age[d] Over 16 
 
Question 10 Age Group (of the respondent) 
 
Question 11 Education (of the respondent) 
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Question 12 Job (or occupation of the respondent) 
 
Question 13 Income (of the household)   
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Bid = £100 Outlets Safe Trust Profit  > Outlets Hygiene Total WTP   
 Gender visited to eat Govt. Customer same level Influences Spend Y / N   
1 1 2 2 1 5 2 3 200 4   
2 0 1 4 3 4 2 2 80 4   
3 0 1 2 3 5 2 2 70 3   
4 0 0 2 3 4 2 2 35 1   
5 0 2 2 4 4 2 4 50 3   
6 1 1 4 4 4 2 4 50 3   
7 0 1 2 2 5 1 4 80 4   
8 1 0 2 2 5 1 3 . 2   
9 0 3 5 2 4 2 4 75 3   
10 1 1 2 . 5 3 4 40 2   
11 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 80 1   
12 1 1 2 2 4 2 3 80 4   
13 1 1 4 2 4 2 4 175 3   
14 0 1 4 2 4 2 4 70 4   
15 0 2 4 4 4 2 4 60 3   
16 0 1 3 2 4 2 4 30 3   
17 0 3 4 2 5 2 5 100 4   
18 0 1 3 2 5 2 2 100 3   
19 1 1 2 1 5 2 5 80 4   
20 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 100 4   
21 1 2 2.5 2 5 2 5 40 3   
22 0 1 4 4 3 2 4 60 3   
23 1 2 4 2 5 1 5 100 4   
24 1 2 4 3 5 2 4 40 3   
25 0 0 4 4 3 2 4 100 4   
26 0 2 2 2 5 2 4 65 3   
27 0 1 1 1 5 1 4 70 4   
28 0 1 2 2 4 1 5 60 4   
29 0 0 3 2 3 1 4 150 2   
30 0 0 4 2 2 1 5 . 3   
31 1 1 2 1 5 1 5 175 4   
32 1 1 4 4 4 2 4 20 2   
33 0 1 4 2 4 2 2 90 1   
34 0 1 3 3 2 2 4 160 4   
35 1 3 2 2 5 1 5 65 3   
36 1 2 2 2 5 2 4 100 4   
37 0 1 2 4 4 2 4 65 3   
38 1 3 4 3 4 1 5 170 3   
39 0 1 4 4.5 4 4 4 25 4   
40 0 2 2 4 4 2 3 85 3   
41 0 2 3.5 2 4 2 4 120 3   
42 1 0 4 3 4 2 4 100 3   
43 1 2 2 4 . 2 5 100 4   
44 1 0 2 2 4 2 4 20 1   
45 0 2 3 3 4 2 5 100 3   
46 0 1 2 3 4 2 4 . 2   
47 0 2 2 2 5 1 5 200 4   
48 1 2 3 2.5 4 2 4 30 3   
49 0 1 3 4 3 2 4 . 2   
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50 1 0 4 1 4 2 4 50 1   
51 0 2 3 4 4 2 4 42.5 4   
52 0 2 4 4 4 2 2 70 4   
53 1 3 3 2 5 2 4 110 3   
54 0 0 4 2 5 2 4 50 2   
55 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 80 3   
56 1 4 2 2 4 2 4 100 3   
 
 
Bid = £150 Outlets Safe Trust Profit  > Outlets Hygiene Total WTP   
 Gender visited to eat Govt. Customer same level Influences Spend Y / N   
1 1 2 3 3 4 2 4 50 3   
2 0 1 4 4 4 2 4 55 3   
3 0 2 4 4 5 1 4 55 3   
4 0 4 4 4 4 2 4 35 4   
5 1 2 2 1 5 1 5 15 1   
6 1 3 3 1 4 2 5 80 3   
7 0 1 3 3 5 1 4 70 3   
8 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 40 2   
9 0 1 4 2 4 2 4 80 4   
10 1 . 2 4 4 2 4 40 2   
11 1 1 4 2 5 2 4 30 1   
12 0 3 4 4 5 1 4 50 1   
13 0 3 3 1 5 1 2 25 2   
14 0 1 4 3 4 2 4 80 3   
15 1 2 2 2 5 2 4 . 3   
16 1 0 4 4 4 2 5 55 3   
17 1 3 2 2 4 2 5 150 4   
18 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 60 1   
19 0 2 4 4 5 2 3 100 3   
20 0 2 4 2 4 4 3 60 3   
21 0 3 2 2 4 1 5 100 3   
22 0 0 4 4 5 2 5 50 4   
23 1 2 4 2 5 2 4 100 4   
24 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 60 3   
25 0 3 3 3 4 4 3 100 2   
26 0 1 3 1 4 1 4 80 3   
27 1 2 2 1 5 2 3 50 2   
28 1 1 4 4 5 2 5 27.5 3   
29 . 1 3 2 4 2 4 50 2   
30 0 0 3 3 2 2 4 35 3   
31 0 1 3 2 4 2 2 100 3   
32 1 3 2 2 5 1 2 65 2   
33 0 1 2 2 5 1 4 110 2   
34 0 3 2 3 4 2 2 100 3   
35 0 2 4 3 4 1 4 55 1   
36 1 2 4 3 4 2 4 70 2   
37 1 4 3 3 3 3 4 100 3   
38 1 0 2 2 4 2 5 70 2   
39 1 1 4 2 5 1 4 150 1   
40 1 1 2 2 5 1 4 100 4   
41 1 0 4 2 4 2 4 45 4   
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42 0 1 4 3 2 1 4 . 2   
43 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 . 4   
44 1 2 2 2 4 2 5 60 4   
45 0 0 2 2 5 2 4 65 4   
46 1 1 2 3 3 2 5 50 3   
47 1 1 2 2 5 2 5 60 4   
48 1 0 2 2 5 1 5 35 3   
49 0 0 4 4 3 . 5 35 3   
50 0 2 4 4 4 2 4 60 4   
 
 
Bid = £200 Outlets Safe Trust Profit  > Outlets Hygiene Total WTP   
 Gender visited to eat Govt. Customer same level Influences Spend Y / N   
1 1 0 2 3 4 2 4 . 3   
2 1 0 4 2 4 2 4 15 .   
3 0 2 2 3 4 2 4 80 4   
4 0 2 4 3.5 4 2 4 70 3   
5 1 0 4 4 4 2 4 60 2   
6 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 120 3   
7 1 3 2 2 4 2 5 50 4   
8 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 30 2   
9 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 50 2   
10 0 1 2 2 5 2 3 40 1   
11 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 60 1   
12 0 2 1 2 4 2 4 133 4   
13 0 2 4 4 5 2 5 50 3   
14 0 0 4 2 4 2 2 70 4   
15 1 4 2.5 3 4 2 4 40 3   
16 0 4 4 2 5 1 4 85 2   
17 0 2 2 4 4 2 4 25 1   
18 1 1 4 2 4 2 4 35 1   
19 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 25 1   
20 1 1 4 2 4 2 4 60 3   
21 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 50 2   
22 1 3 2 2 5 1 5 30 3   
23 1 0 2 4 4 2 4 55 3   
24 1 0 2 2 4 2 4 60 2   
25 1 3 4 2 2 2 4 80 3   
26 1 1 4 2 5 2 5 30 2   
27 1 2 4 4 4 2 3 35 1   
28 0 2 5 4 4 1 4 40 3   
29 1 1 3 2 5 2 4 40 2   
30 1 0 2 1 4 2 5 50 2   
31 0 2 4 4 4 2 4 100 4   
32 0 2 3 2 5 3 4 60 2   
33 0 2 3 3 4 2 5 25 2   
34 1 0 3 3 4 2 4 100 3   
35 1 3 2 2 4 2 5 90 4   
36 0 1 4 4 5 4 5 80 2   
37 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 40 1   
38 0 0 4 2 4 2 4 . 3   
39 1 2 4 4 4 2 2 40 3   
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40 0 2 4 4 4 2 3 40 2   
41 1 2 2 2 5 2 5 25 3   
42 0 2 3 2 5 1 5 100 3   
43 0 1 3 2 4 2 4 85 3   
44 1 2 3 2 3 2 5 95 4   
45 0 1 4 3 4 2 4 20 2   
46 1 3 4 4 2 2 4 100 4   
47 1 2 4 3 4 2 4 120 2   
48 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 65 4   
49 1 3 3 2 5 2 5 100 4   
50 1 0 3 2.5 4 2 5 70 3   
51 0 1 2 2 5 2 5 50 3   
52 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 130 4   
53 0 2 2 2 4 2 4 140 1   
54 1 0 2 2 5 2 4 40 3   
55 0 2 4 2 4 1 4 30 4   
 
 
Bid = £250 Outlets Safe Trust Profit  > Outlets Hygiene Total WTP   
 Gender visited to eat Govt. Customer same level Influences Spend Y / N   
1 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 60 4   
2 1 2 2 2 5 2 4 70 3   
3 1 0 4 2 4 1 4 30 3   
4 1 . 4 4 4 2 4 120 4   
5 1 3 2 4 4 2 4 100 1   
6 1 0 4 4 2 2 4 35 1   
7 1 2 2 3 4 2 4 100 3   
8 1 0 5 3 4 1 5 90 1   
9 0 0 1 1 4 2 4 20 2   
10 1 3 3 3 4 1 5 45 2   
11 1 1 2 1 5 1 5 50 3   
12 1 4 2 3 5 1 4 130 3   
13 1 3 4 2 4 4 5 90 3   
14 1 2 2 2 4 1 5 90 3   
15 0 1 2 4 4 2 5 37.5 2   
16 0 2 4 2 4 2 4 60 3   
17 1 2 1 2 4 2 4 100 2   
18 0 1 1 3 5 1 4 40 2   
19 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 100 1   
20 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 100 3   
21 1 2 5 4 3 2 5 100 2   
22 0 2 4 2 4 2 5 75 4   
23 0 2 4 4 4 3 4 150 3   
24 0 1 4 4 2 2 4 35 1   
25 0 0 4 4 4 2 3 50 2   
26 0 2 3 3 4 2 3 80 3   
27 1 1 3 2 4 2 5 70 3   
28 1 1 2 4 4 2 4 30 2   
29 0 0 2 2 5 2 4 50 1   
30 0 1 2 2 5 3 2 15 1   
31 1 1 4 3 3 4 4 50 2   
32 1 . 4 3 4 2 4 100 2   
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33 1 1 2 4 4 1 4 105 3   
34 1 . 4 4 4 3 3 . .   
35 1 1 4 2 4 2 4 45 3   
36 1 3 2 2 4 2 4 80 3   
37 1 2 2 1 4 2 4 100 4   
38 1 3 4 2 5 1 5 100 4   
39 0 3 2 2 4 1 4 80 3   
40 0 1 4 3 2 4 5 65 2   
41 0 2 2 2 5 1 5 40 3   
42 1 0 4 4 4 2 4 65 2   
43 1 3 4 4 3 2 4 90 3   
44 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 30 3   
45 0 2 4 4 2 2 3 100 3   
46 0 1 4 3 4 2 2 50 2   
47 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 50 3   
48 1 0 2 2 5 2 4 90 4   
49 0 1 4 4 4 4 4 42.5 4   
50 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 50 2   
51 0 2 2 2 4 1 4 70 3   
 
Bid = £350 Outlets Safe Trust Profit  > Outlets Hygiene Total WTP   
 Gender visited to eat Govt. Customer same level Influences Spend Y / N   
1 1 0 3 2 4 2 4 50 3   
2 1 1 4 4 4 2 4 60 2   
3 0 1 4 4 4 2 4 50 2   
4 1 1 2 1 4 1 4 50 3   
5 1 1 4 4 4 2 4 80 1   
6 0 3 2 4 5 2 4 100 3   
7 1 0 2 2 4 2 4 20 3   
8 0 1 4 2 3 1 5 . 4   
9 0 2 2 2 4 2 2 50 3   
10 1 2 2 2 4 2 5 100 1   
11 0 2 2 2 4 2 4 50 2   
12 0 3 2 1 5 2 4 120 3   
13 1 1 2 3 4 2 4 80 3   
14 0 3 4 4 4 2 4 70 1   
15 1 1 3 3 4 2 4 70 2   
16 1 0 2 2 4 2 5 50 3   
17 0 3 2 1 5 1 5 100 2   
18 0 2 2 1 5 2 4 47.5 2   
19 0 3 2 1 4 1 5 15 1   
20 0 3 3 4 4 1 5 70 3   
21 0 3 3 3 4 2 3 50 2   
22 1 3 3 4 3 3 4 40 3   
23 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 40 3   
24 0 3 2 1 5 1 5 80 1   
25 1 3 2 1 4 2 4 60 3   
26 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 70 3   
27 0 1 2 1 4 1 4 50 1   
28 . 1 2 1 5 2 4 47.5 3   
29 0 2 2 2 4 2 4 50 2   
30 1 3 2 2 4 2 4 75 2   
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31 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 85 3   
32 1 1 4 4 5 2 4 65 3   
33 0 3 2 2 5 2 4 50 2   
34 0 3 3 2 4 2 4 60 1   
35 1 2 2 2 5 2 4 70 3   
36 1 2 4 3 4 1 5 90 4   
37 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 75 3   
38 0 2 4 4 3 2 4 80 4   
39 0 0 2 2 5 2 4 50 3   
40 1 0 2 2 4 2 4 25 2   
41 1 0 3 3 5 1 2 17.5 1   
42 0 3 3 3 5 1 5 85 1   
43 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 70 3   
44 0 1 2 2 5 1 5 45 4   
45 0 2 4 2 4 2 5 80 3   
46 0 1 3 4 3 2 4 90 3   
47 1 3 4 2 4 1 4 150 2   
48 0 1 4 4 4 2 4 100 3   
49 1 2 4 3 4 2 4 50 2   
50 1 0 4 2 2 2 4 . 2   
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Bid = £450 Outlets Safe Trust Profit  > Outlets Hygiene Total WTP   
 Gender visited to eat Govt. Customer same level Influences Spend Y/ N   
1 0 2 4 4 4 3 3 200 2   
2 1 . 2 2 5 3 5 150 2   
3 1 2 3 3 4 1 5 87.5 1   
4 1 0 2 2 4 2 4 100 2   
5 0 0 4 4 3 3 2 27.5 1   
6 1 1 2 2 4 2 5 80 4   
7 0 2 3 2 4 1 4 120 3   
8 1 1 2 2 5 2 4 60 3   
9 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 150 3   
10 1 1 4 4 3 2 4 80 1   
11 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 45 3   
12 1 1 2 3 4 2 4 70 3   
13 0 1 2 2 4 2 2 45 1   
14 0 0 2 2 4 2 4 10 1   
15 1 0 4 4 4 2 4 40 2   
16 1 0 2 2 4 1 4 90 2   
17 0 1 4 2 4 4 3 100 4   
18 1 2 4 4 4 2 2 30 2   
19 1 2 3 3 4 2 4 57.5 3   
20 0 1 4 4 4 2 4 50 1   
21 1 1 4 3 4 2 4 35 2   
22 0 1 4 4 5 2 4 60 2   
23 1 1 4 2 2 2 4 . 4   
24 0 2 2 2 4 1 5 . 2   
25 1 2 2 2 4 2 4 40 2   
26 0 0 2 1 5 2 4 130 3   
27 1 2 3 4 4 2 4 100 3   
28 1 2 3 2 5 1 5 150 4   
29 1 1 4 3 3.5 4 3 75 2   
30 0 1 2 2 4 2 2 80 2   
31 1 0 2 2 4 1 5 50 3   
32 1 2 4 2 5 2 5 100 4   
33 0 3 3 3 5 1 5 80 4   
34 1 2 4 3 4 3 5 55 1   
35 0 0 4 4 4 2 4 25 1   
36 1 2 3 2 5 2 4 100 3   
37 1 2 4 4 4 2 4 100 3   
38 0 3 2 2 4 2 4 100 3   
39 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 70 2   
40 0 2 5 4 4 2 3 . 3   
41 1 4 4 2 4 1 5 50 1   
42 0 0 4 2 3 2 4 37.5 1   
43 0 2 2 2 4 2 2 65 3   
44 0 0 4 2 4 2 5 90 3   
45 0 1 4 2 4 2 4 20 2   
46 1 1 4 3 4 2 4 90 1   
47 1 0 2 2 4 2 4 60 3   
48 1 0 2 4 5 2 4 90 2   
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49 1 0 4 4 5 2 4 40 2   
50 0 0 4 4 3 2 4 60 1   
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 WTP No. No. No. Age Education Job  Income    
 Reason Age <5 Age 5-16 Over 16 Group BID LEVEL £100    
1 3 0 0 3 4 2 1 .    
2 1 0 0 3 4 4 1 3    
3 2 0 0 2 5 2 3 3    
4 1 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
5 2 0 0 2 4 5 2 .    
6 3 0 0 2 5 1 1 4    
7 3 1 1 2 2 4 1 3    
8 3 . . . . . . .    
9 . 1 0 2 3 3 2 .    
10 3 0 0 2 6 4.5 3 .    
11 2 0 1 3 4 1 1 5    
12 1 0 2 2 3 2 1 5    
13 3 0 2 2 3 1 3 .    
14 2 0 0 2 6 5 3 6    
15 2 0 0 2 5 3 1 3    
16 1 0 2 2 3 4.5 1 3    
17 1 0 3 3 3 2 1 5    
18 2 1 0 2 2 4 1 4    
19 2 1 0 2 2 4.5 1 7    
20 1 0 1 4 4 5 1 4    
21 1 0 0 2 4 5 1 3    
22 1 0 0 3 5 1 1 .    
23 2 1 0 3 3 4 1 5    
24 2 0 0 1 6 1 3 2    
25 1 0 0 2 6 1 3 .    
26 1 2 0 2 3 5 1 .    
27 2 0 1 2 3 5 1 4    
28 3 0 0 2 4 2 1 .    
29 2 0 0 3 4 2 1 7    
30 . 0 0 1 6 4.5 3 .    
31 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 .    
32 1 0 0 1 5 4.5 3 1    
33 1 0 0 2 5 2 1 4    
34 2 0 0 4 4 3 3 3    
35 1 1 1 2 2 4 1 4.5    
36 1 0 2 3 3 5 1 5    
37 2 0 1 2 4 2 2 5    
38 2 0 0 2 5 5 3 3    
39 3 0 0 2 5 1 3 1    
40 2 0 0 2 5 1 2 .    
41 1 0 2 2 3 2 1 4    
42 3 0 0 3 3 2 2 5    
43 2 0 0 4 1 2 1 .    
44 3 0 0 1 6 1 3 1    
45 2 1 0 2 3 2 2 3    
46 1 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
47 3 0 2 3 5 5 1 5    
48 2 0 0 2 2 3 2 4    
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49 1 0 0 2 3 1 3 1    
50 1 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
51 2 0 1 3 1 2 2 .    
52 1 0 1 3 1 3 2 .    
53 1 0 2 2 3 2 2 4    
54 2 0 0 2 6 1 3 3    
55 2 0 0 4 2 5 1 4    
56 2 0 0 3 1 3 2 .    
 
 WTP No. No. No. Age Education Job  Income    
 Reason Age <5 Age 5-16 Over 16 Group BID LEVEL £150    
1 2 1 0 1 3 4 1 3    
2 1 2 0 2 1 4.5 1 3    
3 1 0 0 2 2 3 1 5    
4 1 0 0 1 5 5 1 3    
5 4 0 0 1 2 5 1 3    
6 2 0 2 3 4 4.5 1 7    
7 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2    
8 3 . . . . . . .    
9 2 0 0 2 5 4.5 3 3    
10 3 0 0 2 6 1 3 2    
11 2 0 0 1 6 1 3 .    
12 3 0 0 1 3 4.5 1 7    
13 3 0 0 1 3 3 2 2    
14 2 0 0 4 6 4 3 2    
15 . 0 0 1 6 2 3 2    
16 3 0 0 2 5 1 3 2    
17 1 0 1 4 3 4.5 1 3    
18 2 0 0 2 5 1 3 2    
19 3 0 0 2 5 4.5 2 .    
20 2 1 1 2 2 5 1 5    
21 2 1 0 2 2 5 1 4    
22 2 0 0 2 4 3 2 2    
23 1 0 1 5 4 1 2 3    
24 2 0 1 4 4 5 2 3    
25 1 0 0 3 1 3 2 .    
26 2 0 1 3 5 4 1 3    
27 4 0 0 2 5 4 2 3    
28 2 0 0 2 6 4 3 2    
29 2 0 0 2 6 . 3 .    
30 1 0 0 1 4 5 1 4    
31 1 0 0 3 5 5 3 .    
32 4 0 0 2 4 5 1 5    
33 2 0 1 3 3 5 1 5    
34 2 1 0 2 2 5 1 5    
35 1 0 0 2 2 5 1 .    
36 1 1 0 2 2 5 1 4    
37 3 0 2 2 2 5 1 4    
38 1 0 0 2 6 2 1 .    
39 . 0 3 2 3 4.5 2 5    
40 1 0 1 1 4 4.5 1 3    
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41 2 0 0 1 . 4.5 3 .    
42 3 0 0 2 5 4.5 1 .    
43 2 0 0 1 . 1 3 .    
44 3 0 0 3 6 5 3 3    
45 2 0 2 4 4 4 1 .    
46 1 0 0 2 5 4.5 3 2    
47 3 0 0 2 5 4 3 3    
48 1 0 0 3 5 4 3 .    
49 1 0 0 1 5 5 3 3    
50 1 0 0 2 5 3 2 4    
 WTP No. No. No. Age Education Job  Income    
 Reason Age <5 Age 5-16 Over 16 Group BID LEVEL £200    
1 2 0 0 1 6 2 3 1    
2 . 0 0 1 6 1 3 1    
3 2 1 0 2 3 4 3 3    
4 3 0 0 2 2 5 2 .    
5 1 0 0 2 1 3 3 2    
6 2 0 0 3 5 1 3 .    
7 3 0 0 2 4 2 3 1    
8 2 0 0 2 2 5 2 4    
9 3 0 0 1 6 1 3 2    
10 2 0 0 2 6 1 3 2    
11 1 0 0 1 4 1 1 .    
12 3 0 0 4 4 1 2 4    
13 2 0 0 2 4 2 1 4    
14 3 0 0 2 3 3 2 3    
15 2 0 1 1 4 4.5 1 2    
16 1 1 0 2 2 4 1 4    
17 3 0 0 1 6 . 3 1    
18 3 0 0 2 4 1 3 1    
19 4 0 0 2 2 4 2 4    
20 3 0 1 2 3 2 2 2    
21 2 0 0 2 6 1 3 2    
22 3 0 0 2 3 5 1 2    
23 1 0 0 3 5 1 3 .    
24 3 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
25 2 0 0 3 5 2 3 2    
26 3 0 0 2 6 . 3 2    
27 4 0 0 1 5 1 3 1    
28 3 0 0 1 2 5 1 3    
29 3 0 0 1 3 5 2 3    
30 3 0 0 3 5 1 1 3    
31 2 0 0 2 1 . 2 4    
32 3 0 0 2 2 1 2 2    
33 3 0 1 . 1 2 1 .    
34 2 0 0 4 4 2 2 .    
35 2 0 2 2 4 5 1 3    
36 4 0 0 3 4 4 1 5    
37 1 0 0 1 3 5 1 3    
38 1 0 0 1 6 . 3 1    
39 1 0 0 3 6 2 3 .    
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40 3 0 0 2 2 5 2 4    
41 3 0 0 1 6 5 3 4    
42 3 0 0 2 3 5 1 7    
43 3 0 0 2 4 4 1 4    
44 3 0 1 3 3 5 1 .    
45 1 0 0 2 5 5 3 3    
46 1 0 0 5 6 1 1 6    
47 1 0 1 2 3 5 2 .    
48 1 0 0 2 4 5 1 7    
49 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 5    
50 2 0 0 2 3 1 1 5    
51 2 0 0 2 5 4 1 3    
52 2 0 0 4 6 2 3 3    
53 4 0 2 2 4 5 1 5    
54 2 0 0 4 4 2 2 3    
55 2 0 0 2 2 2 1 4    
 
 WTP No. No. No. Age Education Job  Income    
 Reason Age <5 Age 5-16 Over 16 Group BID LEVEL £250    
1 2 0 0 3 2 2 1 6    
2 2 0 0 2 2 5 1 6    
3 2 0 0 1 5 4 3 1    
4 1 0 1 3 4 3 1 5    
5 3 0 0 3 4 1 2 4    
6 2 0 0 1 6 . 3 1    
7 3 2 0 2 3 3 1 6    
8 3 0 0 2 5 2 2 3    
9 2 0 0 1 3 4.5 1 5    
10 3 2 0 2 2 2 2 4    
11 2 0 0 2 2 5 1 .    
12 1 0 3 2 3 5 1 3    
13 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 .    
14 2 1 2 2 3 5 1 5    
15 2 0 0 3 6 2 3 3    
16 1 0 0 3 4 1 2 2    
17 3 1 2 2 3 4 1 4    
18 3 0 0 2 6 6 3 2    
19 3 1 0 1 3 5 1 4    
20 2 1 0 4 4 1 2 3    
21 2 2 0 2 2 4 1 5    
22 2 0 2 2 2 5 1 6    
23 3 0 0 5 1 1 2 .    
24 1 0 0 1 3 1 2 2    
25 3 1 1 2 3 3 2 3    
26 2 1 0 2 3 5 1 .    
27 3 0 0 2 2 5 1 6    
28 2 0 0 1 6 1 3 .    
29 3 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
30 4 0 0 1 6 1 3 3    
31 1 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
32 2 0 3 3 3 2 2 4    
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33 3 2 0 2 2 5 1 4    
34 . . . . 6 . 3 .    
35 1 0 0 2 3 5 1 4    
36 2 0 1 3 1 3 2 5    
37 2 0 3 2 3 5 1 4    
38 1 0 0 4 4 2 1 6    
39 3 0 0 2 6 4.5 3 5    
40 2 0 2 1 1 1 2 2    
41 1 0 0 2 5 2 3 2    
42 3 0 0 2 6 4 3 2    
43 1 0 2 2 3 4 2 5    
44 3 0 0 1 6 . 3 1    
45 3 0 1 4 1 4 1 .    
46 4 0 2 1 4 1 1 2    
47 2 0 0 1 3 5 1 4    
48 1 0 0 4 3 2 1 3    
49 1 0 0 2 6 . 3 2    
50 3 1 0 2 2 3 2 4    
51 2 1 0 2 2 5 1 4    
 
 WTP No. No. No. Age Education Job  Income    
 Reason Age <5 Age 5-16 Over 16 Group BID LEVEL £350    
1 2 0 0 2 6 1 3 2    
2 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 4    
3 1 0 0 2 6 4 3 2    
4 2 0 0 2 6 1 3 .    
5 1 0 0 2 5 . 3 2    
6 3 0 0 4 1 3 1 .    
7 2 0 0 1 6 . 3 1    
8 3 0 0 3 4 . . .    
9 3 0 0 2 2 2 2 4    
10 3 0 0 2 2 3 2 4    
11 3 0 2 2 3 2 2 4    
12 2 1 0 3 3 4 1 5    
13 2 1 0 2 2 5 1 5    
14 3 0 0 2 2 4 2 6    
15 3 0 1 2 3 2 2 1    
16 2 0 0 3 4 5 1 3    
17 3 0 0 2 5 5 3 4    
18 3 0 0 2 6 4 3 2    
19 2 0 0 2 5 4.5 3 2    
20 2 0 0 2 2 3 1 .    
21 3 0 0 2 2 2 1 4    
22 2 1 0 2 2 3 2 4    
23 2 0 0 1 6 1 3 1    
24 3 2 1 2 2 5 1 3    
25 3 0 0 2 6 . 3 .    
26 2 0 0 2 1 3 1 5    
27 3 0 0 2 6 1 3 1    
28 3 0 0 1 6 1 3 .    
29 2 0 0 3 5 1 2 2    
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30 3 0 0 1 2 5 2 5    
31 3 2 0 2 3 2 2 4    
32 1 0 0 2 2 5 1 5    
33 3 0 0 2 2 2 2 3    
34 2 0 1 3 4 5 1 4    
35 2 0 1 2 3 3 2 3    
36 2 0 0 3 4 4 1 5    
37 3 0 0 2 6 . 2 2    
38 3 1 0 2 2 5 1 6    
39 2 0 0 3 4 5 1 4    
40 3 0 0 1 5 1 3 3    
41 4 0 0 1 6 2 3 1    
42 3 2 0 2 2 4 1 4    
43 1 0 0 2 6 5 3 2    
44 1 0 0 2 3 5 1 4    
45 3 0 2 2 2 2 2 2    
46 3 0 2 2 3 4 1 5    
47 1 0 1 2 3 4.5 1 4    
48 2 0 0 2 4 2 1 7    
49 1 0 1 3 1 3 3 .    
50 3 0 0 2 6 1 3 .    
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 WTP No. No. No. Age Education Job  Income    
 Reason Age <5 Age 5-16 Over 16 Group BID LEVEL £450    
1 2 0 0 3 1 3 2 .    
2 3 0 2 2 3 2 2 4    
3 3 0 1 2 3 3 1 .    
4 2 0 0 2 5 2 3 .    
5 1 0 0 2 6 . 3 .    
6 2 0 0 2 4 2 2 4    
7 1 1 1 2 4 5 1 4    
8 3 0 0 2 5 5 1 6    
9 3 0 2 2 3 2 2 .    
10 3 0 2 2 3 2 2 4    
11 3 0 0 2 5 . 3 2    
12 3 0 1 2 4 3 1 3    
13 2 0 0 2 6 1 3 3    
14 3 0 0 2 5 1 3 1    
15 4 0 0 1 6 5 3 2    
16 3 0 2 2 4 2 1 6    
17 3 0 0 2 4 4 1 6    
18 3 0 0 2 3 5 1 4    
19 1 0 0 2 1 3 2 3    
20 3 0 0 2 6 1 3 3    
21 4 0 0 2 3 5 1 5    
22 4 1 1 2 2 5 1 6    
23 3 0 0 1 6 1 3 2.5    
24 3 0 0 2 5 5 3 3    
25 4 0 0 1 6 1 3 3    
26 2 0 1 4 4 2 2 .    
27 2 1 0 2 3 2 1 4    
28 2 0 0 3 1 5 1 .    
29 4 0 0 2 4 2 3 3    
30 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 .    
31 1 0 0 4 4 3 1 2    
32 3 0 0 3 4 4 1 5    
33 3 0 0 2 3 5 1 6    
34 3 0 0 2 5 . 3 3    
35 4 0 0 1 6 4 3 2    
36 1 0 0 4 4 5 1 6    
37 1 0 1 2 3 5 1 4    
38 2 1 1 2 3 5 1 4    
39 3 0 1 3 4 5 1 5    
40 2 0 0 3 2 5 2 4    
41 4 0 1 1 3 4.5 1 3    
42 1 0 0 1 6 . 3 1    
43 1 0 0 3 2 2 2 3    
44 2 0 0 2 5 1 2 3    
45 3 0 0 2 2 5 1 4    
46 1 0 1 3 3 2 2 2    
47 2 0 0 2 4 1 1 .    
48 4 0 0 3 5 2 2 2    
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49 3 0 0 2 5 2 2 .    
50 3 0 0 2 5 2 3 3    
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
